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Abstract 
The aim of this dissertation is to defend the claim that citizenship is an architectonic human well-
being capability. Citizenship so conceived is a necessary condition for human flourishing. I make 
and defend this claim in an endeavour to bridge the theory-practice gap that exists in Sen’s and 
Nussbaum’s notions of capability – a gap that has led some critics to describe the capability 
approach as an unworkable idea. By “citizenship” I mean, firstly, the formal status of being a 
legally recognised member of a state, and secondly, the formal capacities and immunities 
connected with such status – in short, citizenship rights. My claim, then, is that being a citizen in 
both senses of the word is a condition for achieving various functionings and, in this way, enabling 
human beings to live lives they have reason to value. The conception of capabilities in Sen’s 
capability approach is essentially theoretical and abstract. However, the value of the capability 
approach as an evaluation space for human well-being ultimately depends on its translation into a 
practical evaluative tool accessible to both academic researchers and policy-makers. Adopting the 
position that citizenship is an architectonic capability operationalizes the capability approach in 
particular ways. Firstly, defining citizenship as a capability gives specific content to, and thus 
improves our theoretical understanding of, capabilities. Secondly, defining capabilities in this way 
makes it easier for us to develop appropriate methods for their measurement. Thirdly, this approach 
develops a richer concept of citizenship, according to which citizenship is not simply a legal 
designation, but an important condition of human flourishing. I take this dissertation to be a 
contribution to growing efforts that are aimed at clarifying and operationalizing the capability 
approach.  
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Opsomming 
 
Hierdie proefskrif het ten doel om aan te toon dat burgerskap verstaan kan word as ‘n 
argitektoniese kapasiteit-vir-welstand (“well-being capability”). Hierdie siening word ontwikkel 
as deel van ‘n oorhoofse poging om die gaping tussen teorie en praktyk in Sen en Nussbaum se 
opvattings van kapasiteit (“capability”) te oorbrug – ‘n gaping wat verskeie kritici daartoe gelei 
het om die kapasiteitsbenadering (“capability approach”) as onwerkbaar te beskryf. Met 
“burgerskap” bedoel ek eerstens die formele, wetlike lidmaatskap van ‘n staat en tweedens, die 
kapasiteite en beskermings wat met hierdie status gepaardgaan – in kort, burgerregte. My bewering 
is dat om ‘n burger in albei opsigte te wees ‘n noodsaaklike voorwaarde is vir die realisering vir 
vorme van menslike funksionering op grond waarvan persone rede het om hul eie lewens as 
waardevol beskou. Sen se bekende kapasiteitsbenadering (“capability approach”) is teoreties en 
abstrak. Uiteindelik hang die waarde van hierdie benadering egter daarvan af of die begrip 
“kapasiteit” vertaal kan word in ‘n praktiese maatstaf vir die evaluering van menslike welstand vir 
die gebruik van navorsers en beleidmakers. Die omskrywing van burgerskap as ‘n argitektoniese 
kapasiteit operasionaliseer die kapasiteitsbenadering in spesifieke opsigte. Eerstens, hierdie 
definisie gee bepaalde inhoud aan, en verbeter dus ons teoretiese begrip van, die kategorie: 
kapasiteit. Tweedens maak hierdie definisie van kapasiteit maak dit makliker om toepaslike 
metodes vir die meting van menslike welsyn te ontwikkel. Derdens lei hierdie benadering tot ‘n 
meer omvangryke opvatting van burgerskap, waarvolgens burgerskap nie bloot ‘n regstatus is nie, 
maar ‘n belangrike voorwaarde vir menslike florering. In al drie opsigte lewer hierdie proefskrif 
‘n bydrae tot die groeiende pogings om die kapasiteitsbenadering tot menslike welstand te 
verhelder en te operasionaliseer.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The capability approach, developed in the 1980s by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum, offers 
us a normative theoretical framework for evaluating human well-being. The purpose of this 
dissertation is to apply the capability approach to the notion of citizenship. More specifically, I 
will argue that citizenship is best understood as a specific kind of architectonic capability and, as 
such, as a condition for human well-being or flourishing. By “citizenship” I mean both the formal 
status of being a legally recognized full member of a state and the freedoms connected with such 
status. My claim, then, is that being a citizen in both senses of the word is a necessary condition 
for realising and enhancing valued functionings and, in this way, enabling human beings to live 
lives they have reason to value. Citizenship is architectonic in the sense that it is a foundational 
capability that paves way for the securing of other capabilities that are essential for human well-
being. My use of the term “architectonic” is informed by Aristotle’s (1962), Nussbaum’s (2011) 
and Le Grange’s (2012) use of the term. For all these thinkers, something is architectonic if it is 
pivotal or foundational in the design, and/or structuring of a desired state of affairs. For example, 
Aristotle (1962: 29) defines the polis as the architectonic community that enables human 
flourishing. Commenting on the capabilities of practical reason and affiliation, Nussbaum (2011: 
39) posits that these are architectonic in the sense that they organise and pervade the others, or in 
simpler terms, they influence and structure all other capabilities. In a similar fashion, Le Grange 
(2012: 143) argues that our humanness or Ubuntu (in the African sense) is an architectonic 
capability. Ubuntu here refers to the interconnectedness, the relatedness, and the interdependence 
of human beings, and of human beings with the non-human nature (see also Samkange and 
Samkange (1980), Ramose (1999), Metz 2011). For Le Grange, all the “innate capabilities” listed 
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by Nussbaum (see Chapter Two, Section 3.1) are made possible by our interdependence. This 
means the freedom to do or be is dependent on others. This comes down to the African saying that, 
“I am what I am because of who we are”.1 I apply the same reasoning to the case of citizenship. 
Citizenship is a condition for achieving valued functionings, and it is architectonic in the sense 
that it is an essential capability for achieving and organising other human well-being capabilities. 
Stated differently, it is the “capability to have capabilities”. For one to secure important well-being 
capabilities, one has to achieve the capability of citizenship in the first place. For the sake of clarity 
it is possible to talk of the capability of citizenship as being one kind of end that functions, in turn, 
as necessary means to the realisation of other capabilities. Cases where one capability is a means 
to other capabilities are numerous. For example, the capability of being educated is a means to 
achieving the capability for political participation. It is thus possible that one end can be a means 
to another end. The term “means” in this context has a special meaning that makes it different 
from, say, money as a means to the capability of being well-nourished. In the latter scenario, money 
is strictly a means to an end. Money is not an end in itself. In this dissertation, I will stick to the 
term “architectonic” rather than “means”, with reference to citizenship.  
Both Sen and Nussbaum conceive of human capabilities as substantial freedoms – a set of 
opportunities to choose and to act (see Sen 1992, 1999; Nussbaum 2011). The two theorists largely 
understand the concept of capability in the same way, although their focus differs slightly. Sen’s 
approach is usually referred to as the Human Development Approach, because he mainly focuses 
on human development. Nussbaum, on the other hand, does not employ this term, as she is 
concerned with the capabilities of non-human animals as well as human beings (Nussbaum 
                                                          
1 I have adopted Le Grange’s definition of architectonic capability, but I will not use the rest of his argument on 
Ubuntu. 
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2011:18).2 For the purposes of this dissertation, I am only concerned with the question of human 
capability as it relates to citizenship. Capabilities in this sense are not merely abilities residing 
inside a person, but the freedoms or opportunities created by a combination of personal abilities 
and the political, social, and economic environment (Nussbaum 2011:20). Moreover, the extent of 
people’s freedom(s) to do and to be what they wish to do and be – that is, the range of their 
capabilities – is a measure of their well-being or quality-of-life. The capability approach, then, is 
a theoretical framework that allows us to assess the content and range of human well-being within 
and across societies. When comparing societies in terms of human well-being, capability theorists 
ask: “What is each person able to do and to be with the resources available to her?” In other words, 
what are the genuine choices or freedoms (capabilities) available to people to do the things they 
want to do or to assume desired states of being (functionings)? Choice matters here; even if a 
person decides not to do something, we can still ask whether there was a real opportunity to do it 
in the first place. There is a difference between not eating because you have decided not to eat the 
food that is available, and not eating because there is no food to be had. In the latter scenario, even 
if you do not feel like eating now, you still do not have a choice because if you had wanted to eat, 
you would not be able to do so.  
In developing the capability approach (CA), Sen and Nussbaum draw attention to notable defects 
in traditional welfare economics, which understands human well-being as being synonymous with 
economic growth or an increase on income measurement scales. For example, Sen (1999:5-6) 
points out that merely counting income per head (e.g. per capita GDP) fails to take into account 
                                                          
2 Scholars like Robeyns (2003, 2005) think that Nussbaum also differs with Sen in the sense that she aims to develop 
a partial theory of justice, whereas Sen develops a framework that has no such single aim. However, I disagree with 
Robeyns on this count. More on this below, as well as Chapter 5, Section 1.3 where I defend the view that Sen does 
develop the CA as a framework for social assessment, including the assessment of social justice (see Sen 2004: 78). 
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the many factors that may affect the ability of different groups and different individuals to convert 
income into well-being. There are many more factors critical in evaluating the quality of human 
life than people’s incomes, assets, and levels of satisfaction or desire fulfilment, all traditionally 
considered by mainstream economics. As a consequence, Sen (1999:3) redefines development as 
the process of expanding the real freedoms that people enjoy. Freedom in this sense is not merely 
the absence of constraint; it is the real opportunity to live a flourishing life. What is at stake here, 
in other words, is human well-being in the broadest sense of the term, and the goal of human 
development as maintaining, nurturing or improving well-being (Alkire 2010:2; UNDP 1990:10). 
Thus, unlike traditional welfare (or income) economics, the capability approach to human 
development is significant in being person-centred. It focuses on measuring the real lives people 
are capable of leading rather than taking for granted that economic growth will automatically result 
in greater well-being. The capability approach thus puts people’s lives at the centre of the 
development process. People are not just the principal means but, even more importantly, the 
principal ends of development. 
The substantive freedoms that Sen and Nussbaum suggest should inform our assessment of well-
being include capabilities of avoiding deprivations such as starvation, undernourishment, and 
premature death, as well as civil and political freedoms of political participation, speech, 
conscience and so on (Sen 1999:36). The political, social, and economic environment matters in 
advancing substantive freedoms or opportunities. That is to say, the development of capabilities 
and hence the promotion of human well-being requires a functioning human society. From an 
Aristotelian perspective – which is the background against which the capabilities approach is 
developed – the human being can only reach her full development in a state, for “not being self-
sufficient when they are isolated, all individuals are so many parts all equally depending on the 
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whole [which alone can bring about self-sufficiency]” (Aristotle 1962:29). Outside the political 
community characterized by a functioning and effective state, human beings are reduced to 
providing for themselves, whereas the state plays a pivotal role in nurturing the political, social 
and economic environment for the development of members’ capabilities. Citizenship or 
membership of a state is thus intricately connected to capabilities. In particular, I will argue in this 
dissertation that citizenship (as status) is a capability that in turn promotes the development and 
expansion of other capabilities. The other capabilities that are attached to citizenship status are the 
political, civil and social freedoms individuals require to flourish and reach their potential. Persons 
become equipped with certain freedoms to undertake particular actions or make certain claims for 
the enrichment of their lives as a consequence of their status or membership as citizens.  
Following Marshall (1950:29), my concern here is with citizenship as a capability and therefore a 
standard “against which achievement can be measured and towards which aspiration can be 
directed”. Citizenship in this sense is defined by the possession of three sets of freedoms; political, 
civil and social (ibid: 10-11). Political freedoms are freedoms to participate in the exercise of 
political power either as an office bearer or a voter. Civil freedoms are individual freedoms of 
speech, conscience, and holding property among others. Social freedoms are powers for citizens 
to receive social services from the state, among them health, education, economic welfare and 
security (ibid.). All three sets of freedoms are possible only within the confines of the state, and 
this seals the relationship between citizenship – that is, membership of a state – and capability. 
Such freedoms cannot be exercised by solitary individuals on a desert island because rights are 
correlative to duties and in this regard, rights can only be exercised where both right claimers and 
duty bearers exist. Stateless persons are thus unable to exercise their rights. This is one of the 
important arguments that Arendt (1968) makes in The Origins of Totalitarianism. Citizenship, for 
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Arendt, is the primary right each individual needs insofar as it constitutes “the right to have rights”, 
and it is this primary right that makes opinions significant and actions effective (Arendt 1968: 
296). Conversely, the condition of statelessness – of existing outside the protective/punitive legal 
and political auspices of a home state – means the loss of the right to have rights. Absent from any 
institutionalized source of authority, universal human rights become unavailable in practice to 
those who have no state to protect them; that is to say, without the legal and political status that 
entitles individuals to government protection, stateless persons find themselves unable to make 
use of their human rights. The conclusion Arendt draws from this situation is that once an 
individual is prevented from participating in any political community (whether through the 
withdrawal of her citizenship rights or the dissolution of the polity in a failing state), she is in effect 
expelled from the category of humanity (Arendt 1968: 297). Conversely, it is through being a full 
member of a political community, with all the attendant rights and privileges of such membership, 
that human beings are able to convert their rights into actual freedoms. In this dissertation, my 
focus is primarily on those people who are legally designated citizens of a particular state – people 
who look up to the state as the duty bearer of their rights. Some such people may not enjoy their 
citizenship rights in full owing to their sex, colour, tribe, religion and so on. To some extent, I also 
have in mind long-time residents, some of whom innocent descendants of long time migrants – 
residents who do not know any other state except the one they currently reside. Complicated cases 
involving refugees and recent illegal immigrants are not discussed in this work although the 
dissertation may provide a starting point for analysing such cases.   
Following Arendt’s characterisation of citizenship as “the right to have rights”, and in keeping 
with my conception of citizenship rights as capabilities, I therefore want to propose a conception 
of citizenship as “the capability to have capabilities”. I have three objectives in advancing the 
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argument that citizenship is a constitutive capability. First and foremost, I want to distinguish 
citizenship rights from universal human rights. Citizenship rights are positive rights created and 
secured by the state, while universal human rights are traditional political rights that do not have a 
clearly defined duty bearer. Although citizenship rights also comprise civil and political rights, 
such rights are not only negative rights that demand state inaction (see Nussbaum 2011:65). On 
the contrary, securing citizenship rights requires constant positive action by the state with a view 
to advancing people’s capabilities to live the kinds of lives they have reason to value. The concept 
of universal human rights that prioritizes negative civil and political rights downplays the idea of 
social rights, and thus disregards their significance for human well-being.  
Secondly, I seek to give practical content to the concept of capability. Since its inception, Amartya 
Sen’s capability approach as a framework of evaluating human well-being has been criticized on 
the grounds that its central concepts – capabilities and functionings – are relatively abstract and 
therefore difficult to conceptualize and adopt as practical guides for action (see Srinivasan 2009;; 
Smith and Seward 2009). Accordingly, Nussbaum (2003: 36) has argued that the capability 
approach will provide useful practical guidance, “only if we formulate a definite list of the most 
central capabilities, even one that is tentative and revisable.” Although I agree with the above 
observation, it is also important to note that Sen’s reluctance to be specific on which capabilities 
matter more than others, and why, is understandable given the fact that he wanted the CA to be 
used in various contexts, and each context may require a different list of capabilities. The CA can 
be used in the analysis of poverty, in the assessment of inequality, in the evaluation of well-being 
and so on. For Robeyns (2005:94) it can also be used in the evaluation of policies, ranging from 
social policies to development policies by governments and non-governmental organizations in 
developing countries. However, regardless of this fact, Sen’s refusal to give definite content to 
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capabilities has not been welcomed by all researchers. For instance, Srinivasan (2009:460) argues 
that, from a purely practical perspective, Sen’s “silence” is an obstacle for operationalizing the 
capability approach. For Nussbaum (2003:35), although Sen’s consideration of capabilities “gives 
us a general sense of what societies ought to be striving to achieve, his reluctance to make 
commitments about substance (which capabilities a society ought most centrally to pursue), means 
that this guidance remains but an outline”. Most of Sen’s critics thus argue that it is precisely the 
vagueness of the concept of capability that begets the operational weakness of the capability 
approach. By arguing that citizenship is a capability, this dissertation is an advance towards 
operationalizing the CA, particularly with regards to human development, in that it (i) provides 
the notion of capability with positive content and (ii) thereby clarifies the notion of capability 
itself. To academics, the CA is useful in conceptualizing justice, human development and related 
human institutions. However, as an evaluative tool, the CA should also conceptually be within the 
grasp of policymakers, politicians and civil society in general. The practical relevance of the CA 
will only hit home, in turn, if it can be shown how capability can be operationalized for a particular 
society. Thus, while this remains an academic dissertation, it is nevertheless my aim to give 
practical content to the CA. 
Thirdly and equally importantly, in arguing for citizenship as capability, I aim to demonstrate the 
reasons for taking citizenship in general and citizens’ well-being in particular seriously. 
Citizenship that is not defined by the actual lives people live and the freedoms they possess is 
nothing but paper or nominal citizenship. The capability approach calls on us to consider both the 
substantive content of the freedoms secured by citizenship and how these freedoms are distributed; 
this bolsters the equality component of citizenship. Introducing citizenship in human development 
discussions offers an alternative way of conceptualizing and addressing inequality in all its forms. 
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All those endowed with the status of citizenship should have equal opportunities to exercise their 
capabilities. To this end, inequality engendered by race, gender, or caste systems technically 
relegates some people to the status of non-citizens, irrespective of their formal legal status. Against 
this background, we are also better able to make sense of the deprivations faced by non-citizens 
such as refugees, asylum seekers, illegal immigrants, and all those that live outside the protection 
of the state.  
Before I set out the overall structure of the dissertation, I briefly want to clarify my own position 
vis à vis the different approaches of Sen and Nussbaum, the main theorists of the capability 
approach on whose views I will be drawing throughout. To begin with, the differences between 
Sen and Nussbaum are in my view exaggerated. The concept of capability they both advocate is 
fundamentally the same, although each has a different focus. Scholars like Robeyns (2003, 2005) 
argue that Nussbaum differs from Sen in the sense that she is clear in her pursuit to develop a 
partial theory of justice, whereas Sen develops a framework that has no clear aim. However, I 
disagree with this view. Sen is concerned with issues of poverty and inequality and these are 
essentially issues of justice. The publication of The Idea of Justice by Sen in 2009 further supports 
my view. Secondly, Sen’s approach is usually referred to as the Human Development Approach 
because he mainly focuses on human development. Nussbaum on the other hand claims that she 
cannot call her approach the Human Development Approach because she is concerned with the 
capabilities of nonhuman animals as well as human beings (Nussbaum 2011:18). While I have 
grave reservations about the way in which Nussbaum mixes human and nonhuman capabilities on 
her list, this point is moot, as I am only concerned with Sen’s and Nussbaum’s theories in so far 
as they relate to matters of well-being. Like both Sen and Nussbaum, I am concerned with the 
well-being of human beings and their agency freedoms (irrespective of Nussbaum’s further 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
10 
 
concern with nonhuman animals). However, I support Nussbaum in recommending a list of central 
capabilities that every government should protect. I see this as important in making the CA 
practically useful. 
Turning now to the structure of my argument: the dissertation is composed of five chapters, each 
contributing to the justification of the thesis that citizenship is an architectonic capability. Starting 
from the assumption that the object of human development is human well-being, Chapter One is 
devoted to an analysis of the concept of human well-being. This sets the scene for the argument to 
follow, in so far as my analysis of development, capabilities and citizenship all relate to human 
well-being. Such discussions strive, as it were, to answer the Socratic question, “How should one 
live?” (Sen 1988:2) For Aristotle, politics must use the rest of the sciences, including economics, 
to advance its end, which is the human good (ibid: 3). The question about the nature of and 
conditions for human well-being is precisely the question of the human good. It is thus critical that 
analysing the meaning of well-being comes before everything else. I discuss several theories of 
well-being in this chapter, in so far as they provide background to the emergence of the human 
development concept in particular and the capability approach in general. The idea of capability 
was introduced by Sen in 1979 and the concept of human development gained prominence in 1990 
when the first Human Development Report was published. The CA did not emerge by chance; 
rather, it was prompted by shortcomings of two prior approaches to well-being. The first of these 
consists of one-dimensional theories of well-being, specifically monetary and utilitarian theories. 
One-dimensional theories define well-being in terms of a single dimension like income or pleasure 
and this, as noted above, is grossly inadequate as definition for well-being. Secondly, the CA was 
developed in response to a number of inadequate multi-dimensional conceptions of well-being 
which, despite being an improvement over one-dimensional concepts, fail to give an adequate 
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account of well-being for reasons to be detailed in the chapter. Such approaches include those 
developed by Doyal and Gough (1991, 1993), Ramsay (1992), Rawls (1971) and Morris David 
(1979). 
After analysing the concept of well-being in Chapter One, I explore the central features of the 
Capability Approach in detail in Chapter Two, arguing in particular why the CA should be 
preferred over other approaches as a framework for assessing human well-being. It should be noted 
that the capability approach is a broad normative framework that can be used in various fields to 
conceptualize and evaluate human well-being, social justice, social change and several other social 
phenomena. Sen (1999) uses the CA to conceptualise human development and justice (2009), 
while Nussbaum (2003) employs the CA to develop a partial theory of justice, both of these being 
matters of human well-being. Although my focus will be on human well-being, it is important to 
state that the basic elements of the CA are the same regardless of the purpose for which the 
approach is being applied. In defining the key concepts of the capability approach, I will focus on 
both Sen and Nussbaum’s versions of the capability approach, while incorporating aspects of other 
theorists’ arguments where appropriate.  
This dissertation aims to connect the ideas of capability and citizenship in a systematic way. 
Having defined capability in Chapter Two, I move on to an analysis of the concept of citizenship 
in Chapter Three. Citizenship issues are of interest to many disciplines, and to avoid using the term 
haphazardly, I confine myself to normative notions of citizenship. I particularly focus on 
republican and liberal models of citizenship, but I argue at the end that the liberal model provides 
a better account of citizenship that relates well with the idea of capabilities. The republican model 
produces a partial or inadequate understanding of citizenship because it characteristically 
denigrates the social rights element of citizenship. I argue that, although there is some resistance 
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to the inclusion of social rights in the definition of citizenship, no conception of citizenship that 
excludes them can be complete. Citizenship rights are a sub-set of human rights but I distinguish 
citizenship rights so understood from general human rights. I clarify this position in Chapter Four 
which deals mainly with the concept of rights. Having defined the concept of capability in Chapter 
Two and delineated a normative conception of citizenship in Chapter Three, in Chapter Four I 
offer a more detailed investigation into the concept of human rights with the aim of justifying why 
I chose to use the capability approach rather than the human rights approach for conceptualising 
well-being. The capability approach and the human rights approach share a lot in common. They 
share a common motivation in that they are both concerned with matters of human freedoms and 
human dignity (see Sen 2005, Nussbaum 2011, Vizard et al. 2011, 2012). Both the capability 
approach and the human rights approach deal with the issue of people’s quality of life. It is 
therefore important that I justify my preference for the capability approach. Generally, I take the 
position that the capability approach is an improvement over the human rights approach and helps 
in addressing some of the important controversial and unresolved issues in ethical debates about 
human rights. In addition, the concept of capability, as Vizard et al (2011:2) rightly point out, 
provides an important entry-point for defending the validity of a broad class of human rights 
concerns, covering, for example, political, civil, economic and social rights. As for the structure 
of the chapter, I begin by giving a brief overview of the historical origins of the notion of human 
rights, before examining two central debates about, respectively the ontological status and the 
scope of such rights. Once that is done, I then go on to show how citizenship rights differ from 
universal human rights, and how the former are related to capabilities.  
Chapter Five contains the main argument of the dissertation. Here I reconcile all issues discussed 
in Chapters One to Four so as to demonstrate that citizenship is not only a capability, but it is an 
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architectonic capability. I show that individuals that lack equal citizenship lack the real freedoms 
to live the lives they value. I use the case of gender inequality to clearly argue my case. Using 
several examples, I demonstrate in which respects the lack of equal citizenship – in the specific 
sense as defined in Ch. 2 – prevents women from realising valued functionings. Specifically, I 
demonstrate how the notion of citizenship as the capability to have capabilities enables us to 
conceptualize and evaluate gender inequality as a problem of citizenship rights that carries with it 
a specific duty of the state towards its citizens. I argue that the failure of the state to establish and 
secure the conditions for women to develop their capabilities constitutes a deprivation of their 
citizenship, irrespective of their legal status. Conversely, women are only citizens to the extent 
that they can lay claim to equal opportunities to flourish as every other citizen. For Marshall 
(1950:29) “…all those who possess the status of citizenship are equal with respect to the rights 
and the duties with which the status is endowed”. The implication of this is that unless one is equal 
to other members enjoying full rights of citizenship, he or she is excluded from citizenship. In 
arguing this way, I demonstrate the practical usefulness of conceptualizing citizenship as a 
capability. I choose gender inequality because it provides a useful case for comparison between 
my own conception of citizenship as the capability to have capabilities and other attempts to 
operationalize the CA, particularly in the work of Robeyns (2003) and Nussbaum (1995). My aim 
is to demonstrate that treating citizenship as a capability is simpler and can more easily be adapted 
for policy and practical purposes than the list-based approach favoured by Robeyns, Nussbaum 
and others. 
The fact that citizenship is a basic capability for enjoying the benefits and privileges of the state is 
supported by the conception of citizenship I will defend here. Regardless of the fact that it was 
developed six decades ago and also the fact that it mirrored the socio-political development of a 
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particular society, T.H. Marshall’s (1950) conception of citizenship has remained influential in 
most citizenship conceptual analyses. Marshall’s conception of citizenship thus plays a pivotal role 
in my definition of citizenship, particularly because he defines citizenship as including three sets 
of rights – civil, political and social – which, put together, bear on human well-being in a 
significant way. A major highlight of this concept is that it takes particular note of the social 
component of citizenship, which I argue to be indispensable to any complete account of 
citizenship. By the “social component” I mean the rights to moderate economic welfare and 
security, of which the duty bearer is the state.  
My argument in this dissertation is by-and-large liberal egalitarian. I draw significantly from 
Anglo-American scholars mainly because my primary goal at this point is to establish a link 
between the concepts of citizenship and capability, and I analyse these concepts in the context in 
which they were originally developed. A successful bridging of these two concepts will become a 
springboard from which I will, in subsequent works, move to analyse well-being issues in other 
contexts, particularly within the Africa. I am aware that some African scholars have already started 
applying the capability approach to African issues (see Le Grange 2012, Mets 2016, Hoffmann 
and Metz 2017). This dissertation seeks therefore to establish another avenue or platform for 
conceptualising a variety of well-being in any context, including Africa. 
In conclusion: this dissertation defends the claim that there is a necessary relationship between the 
concepts of citizenship and capability, in so far as the former is an example of the latter. 
Capabilities are substantive freedoms to achieve alternative functionings, while citizenship is a 
bundle of state-secured freedoms vested in members. Citizenship is thus the fundamental 
capability we require in order to secure persons’ political, social, and economic freedoms. In other 
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words citizenship is a capability to other capabilities3. I do not claim that citizenship is the only 
condition for human well-being, or that citizenship rights are the only metric for measuring well-
being. Nevertheless, I conclude that, at least at the ideal level, citizenship is an indispensable 
human well-being capability, and the five chapters comprised herein justify this position. 
  
                                                          
3 I am aware of many other arguments on the right to have rights and on citizenship from within different philosophical 
traditions. My aim, however, is not to survey all of them, or to develop some kind of amalgam of all of them. Rather, 
I stick to arguments that have a bearing on the relationship between citizenship and capabilities. Moreover, while I 
am specifically concerned with the ways in which the lack of citizenship impacts on vulnerable groups, arguments 
concerning expatriates, legal refugees, and holders of Green Cards (see Ong 2003, Baubock 2005, Hammer 1990 etc), 
are not contrary to my conclusion, which is that citizenship is a capability, and that it is precisely those without legal 
citizenship are most vulnerable to being excluded from important civil, and political citizenship rights.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
HUMAN WELL-BEING: MEANINGS AND MEASUREMENTS 
Introduction 
This chapter is the first of the steps I wish to take to develop a richer conception of citizenship as 
the capability to have capabilities and thereby to show that citizenship is foundational to human 
well-being. By a richer conception of citizenship, I mean a conception that is more expansive or more 
qualitative – a conception that does not limit or give a partial understanding of citizenship. This means that 
citizenship is not just a legal tag, but a fundamental capability for human well-being. The first step in 
developing such a conception of citizenship involves analysing alternative conceptualizations and 
measurements of well-being, and revealing where each falls short. The second step is a clear 
elucidation and justification of the CA in Chapter Two. I will, however, draw on the CA theorists’ 
criticism of well-being theories discussed in this chapter. In analysing the various 
conceptualizations of well-being, the guiding questions are: (i) what is well-being and (ii) how do 
we evaluate or assess it? These questions have occupied philosophers since the classical Greek 
period, but the meaning of well-being has remained contested. Well-being researchers, among 
them Doyal and Gough (1991), Sen (1993), Dasgupta (1993), and Gasper (2007) offer disparate 
conceptions, as it is not intuitively obvious which items should be included in a finite set of 
elements that contribute to, or constitute, human well-being. It is also not agreed whether or not 
elements included on existing lists are necessarily important for overall human well-being. The 
existing conceptual contestations mean that it is a real challenge to come up with one widely 
acceptable conception of well-being. Even though the concept is attractive, it has remained elusive, 
partly owing to the fact that it is topical in several disciplines, among them psychology, economics 
and philosophy. Definitions coming from these disciplines cannot be reconciled easily, although 
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some common elements can be singled out from them. Common among all the conceptions of 
well-being is that they are a matter of the quality of life, usually a positive quality of life. The term 
“well-being” usually encompasses what is good for a person, and this is the usage of the term that 
I have adopted in this dissertation. Well-being is about the good life, or human flourishing in 
general. However, I am aware that in philosophy some may also talk of “negative” well-being, 
when a person’s life is not going well for her. In my view, the idea of negative well-being is 
problematic in the sense that we cannot talk of “wellness” as negative. In view of the fact that there 
are several approaches to conceptualising well-being, most researchers classify theories so that 
those that use a similar approach are analysed together. For example, Deci and Ryan (2008) and 
also Phillips (2006) argue that well-being can be classified into two traditions—the hedonistic 
tradition and the eudaimonic tradition. In the hedonistic tradition, focus is on pleasure, generally 
defined as the presence of positive aﬀective states and the absence of negative aﬀective states. As 
for the eudaimonic tradition, focus is on living life in a full and deeply satisfying way (Deci and 
Ryan 2008:1). This eudaimonic tradition is clearly defined by Sirgy (2012:8) who states that it 
derives from the Aristotelian conception of the good life, prudence, reason, and justice. The goal 
is to have people flourish or function to meet their full potential, to contribute to society, and to 
achieve the highest standards of morality.4 
Other researchers divide well-being theories into substantive and formal theories of well-being 
(see Boz 2009; Wrens-Lewis 2014). Substantive theories focus on what constitutes well-being. 
For example, hedonism states that well-being is constituted by pleasure. Formal theories specify 
                                                          
4 There is a growing literature on well-being as part of an African communitarian ethic – in particular, in relation to 
the concept of ubuntu (cf. La Grange 2012; Metz 2016; Hoffmann & Metz 2017; Rapatsa 2016). While this is a fruitful 
avenue of exploration, my focus in this chapter is on the shortcomings of some of the standard conceptions of well-
being that have held sway up to now, while the focus in the coming chapters will be on the concept of citizenship as 
a feature of the regime of political and social rights, rather than on a particular (communitarian) ethic. 
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how one finds out what things are intrinsically good for people, but they do not say what those 
things are. To take well-being as satisfaction of preferences is to offer a formal theory of well-
being. This theory does not say what things are good for individuals, but it indicates how to find 
out by seeing what they prefer (Boz 2009:2). In addition to these, other theories of well-being are 
classified as objective list theories (see Finnis 1980, Parfit 1984, Griffin 1986). Objective list 
theories propose that well-being is the outcome of several objective conditions of humans, rather 
than the subjective experience of pleasure or the satisfaction of subjective preferences (Brey 2012: 
4). According to this view, there are goods that enrich our well-being even if we do not desire them 
or experience pleasure from them. Well-being is achieved by living a life comprising all or most 
of the goods on a prescribed list. The list is objective in the sense that elements on the list are not 
determined by one’s tastes, attitudes, traits or interests. Possessing goods or doing things on the 
list makes one’s life rich, even if one does not desire or want them. As Parfit (1984: 4) argues, 
some things like the development of one’s abilities, knowledge, and the awareness of true beauty, 
are simply good for us even if we would not want to have them.  
In my analyses of the theories of well-being, I will adopt a way of classifying such theories that is 
slightly different to the ones listed above. I divide the theories into two categories – unidimensional 
or one-dimensional theories of well-being on one hand, and multi-dimensional theories on the 
other. This means I will divide this Chapter into two parts. I discuss one-dimensional theories that 
comprise utilitarian and monetary theories under Part One and multi-dimensional theories under 
Part Two of the chapter. One-dimensional theories, in short, reduce well-being to a single 
dimension, such as utility or satisfaction of preferences (or desires)5. I will begin by discussing 
utilitarian theories, with reference to the two most prominent types, namely hedonistic and desire 
                                                          
5 Desire-fulfilment theories are also called preference-satisfaction theories (see Brey 2012: 3) 
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satisfaction theories. According to Ransome (2010:42) both hedonistic and desire-satisfaction 
theories of well-being source their evaluative foundations in the utilitarian ethical tradition, and 
together for a while have dominated the evaluative foundations of well-being research. Hedonistic 
theories of well-being focus on the intrinsic value of certain psychological states, holding that what 
is good for a person overall is the greatest achievable balance of pleasure over pain. The balance 
of pleasure over pain for them is what constitutes happiness.6 Desire-satisfaction theories on the 
other hand hold that well-being consists in the satisfaction of a person’s desires or preferences. 
But is pleasure or satisfaction of a desire all that counts for well-being? Researchers like Wren-
Lewis (2014) argue that “happiness” is a possible indicator of well-being while others like Sen are 
against using “happiness” for measuring well-being because it (happiness) suffers from “the 
problem of adaptation”. The problem of adaptation is explained in sections below.  
In addition to utilitarian theories, one-dimensional approaches also include the monetary or income 
conceptualizations of well-being that have dominated research in welfare economics. In welfare 
economics, comparisons of living standards and development between countries and regions are 
commonly made referring to the Gross Domestic Product per person or Gross National Product 
per person (per capita GDP or GNP). As will be argued in this section, income approaches to well-
being are grossly limited on various accounts, including the common scenario where aggregate 
output and income may be relatively high whereas actual well-being is low. Discussions on 
monetary approaches complete Part One of Chapter One. Under Part Two of Chapter One, I 
analyse three multi-dimensional conceptualizations of well-being: Rawls’s primary goods 
approach, Morris’ Physical Quality of Life Index, and Doyal and Gough’s Basic Needs Approach. 
                                                          
6 Hedonistic happiness is narrowly defined by pleasure and is therefore distinct from Aristotelian happiness which is 
much broader. 
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Such conceptualizations, according to Ransome (2010:42), shift well-being discussion away from 
the traditional theoretical presumption of foundational monism, towards a more flexible pluralist 
approach to human well-being. While these multi-dimensional theories are an improvement over 
one-dimensional theories, they still fall short in a number of respects. I will analyse some of these 
shortcoming in the present chapter, before turning to the capability approach in Chapter Three. 
Here I will demonstrate that the latter approach is able to address the shortcomings of both uni- 
and multidimensional theories of well-being.  
1. One-dimensional theories of well-being 
1.1 Utilitarian theories 
1.1.1 Hedonistic theories 
 In answer to the question, “What does well-being consist in?” the hedonist will answer, “The 
greatest balance of pleasure over pain”. Happiness for hedonists depends upon the balance of 
pleasures and pain. Jeremy Bentham (2001:205), the founder of modern hedonist utilitarianism, 
begins his Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation thus: “Nature has placed 
mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone 
to point out what we ought to do as well as to determine what we shall do” (Bentham, 2001:205). 
Bentham further argues that the principle of utility recognizes this fact. By utility he means: “that 
property in an object whereby it tends to produce benefit, advantage, pleasure, good, or happiness 
(all this comes to the same thing) ... to prevent the happening of mischief, pain, evil, or unhappiness 
to the party whose interest is considered: if the party be the community in general, then the 
happiness of the community: if a particular individual, then the happiness of that individual” 
(ibid.). 
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For hedonists, the level of well-being is determined by pitting the amount of positive feelings 
experienced by every person who is positively affected by a particular action against the negative 
feelings experienced by every person who is negatively affected by the action, and then subtracting 
the latter from the former (Fissi 2014:3). A positive result indicates that the action in question 
increases the total level of well-being across the relevant individuals, while a negative outcome 
means the action decreases well-being. This is Bentham’s so-called “felicific calculus” that 
underpins the well-known principle of the greatest happiness of the greatest number (ibid: 3).  
The fact that happiness is linked to well-being is not in dispute. Philosophers since the classical 
period have acknowledged that happiness is linked to the conditions of leading a good and valuable 
life, and Aristotle famously argued in the Nicomachean Ethics (1914:275) that happiness is the 
end of human actions. However, we need to be cautious when conceptualizing happiness. There is 
a difference between Aristotle’s and Bentham’s conceptions of happiness. Bentham’s happiness is 
hedonistic in that it is defined by physical or psychological pleasure and pain. Aristotle’s 
conception of happiness, on the other hand, is not hedonistic and means much more than just 
pleasure and pain or state of mind. Aristotle focused on happiness as eudaimonia, which translates 
as flourishing, success, or the opportunity to lead a purposeful and meaningful life (Sirgy 2012:8). 
It is a conception of the good life, prudence, reason, and justice. For Sirgy, Aristotle’s happiness 
as it pertains to people means to flourish or to function to meet their full potential, to contribute to 
society, and to achieve the highest standards of morality. In this regard, well-being consists of 
more than pleasure-defined happiness, but, more importantly, it is concerned with living well or 
actualizing one’s human potentials (Deci and Ryan 2008:2). Contra the utilitarian calculus, this 
conceptualization maintains that well-being involves fulfilling one’s virtuous potentials and living 
as one was inherently intended to live (ibid: 2). In Chapter Two and later, I will argue that we have 
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good reason to adopt this wider conception of well-being (without necessarily conceiving it in 
these exact Aristotelian terms). For our present purposes, it is enough to note that there is a real 
distinction between the Aristotelian-inspired conception of happiness as flourishing and hedonistic 
utilitarian happiness, and to keep in mind that it is the former that is the inspiration behind the 
capability approach that I discuss in detail in Chapter Two. Hedonism, on the other hand, reduces 
well-being to physical or psychological pain and pleasure or to what Aristotle called “amusement”, 
and viewing happiness that way is problematic.  
There are several reasons why hedonistic pleasure and pain are too narrow and inadequate if taken 
as the sole determinants of well-being. Firstly, hedonism is generally criticized for its view that 
nothing can matter prudentially to an individual except the quality of their experience. However, 
this goes against our common beliefs, because we also need consider the source, process and 
consequences (both current and future) of an experience (see Arneson 1999:2). Our conscience 
tells us that a pleasurable experience that results from, say, raping a minor is wrong. Secondly, 
hedonism defines both happiness and well-being very narrowly by claiming that all that matters to 
well-being is pleasure. Thus, before we even think of pleasure and pain as determinants of well-
being, we must first ask ourselves whether or not excess pleasure over pain is all that counts for 
well-being. For Haybron (2001:501), hedonism is clearly a false definition of happiness owing to 
the fact that some pleasures it enumerates cannot plausibly be construed as constitutive of 
happiness. All sorts of shallow and flitting pleasures are made to count as happiness. Haybron goes 
on to argue that such pleasures, however intense, play no constitutive role in determining how 
happy a person is. Watching a good movie, or having sexual intercourse, may be intensely 
pleasurable, but still fail to make one any happier. In Haybron’s words, “such pleasures, don’t 
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reach ‘deeply’ enough, so to speak ... they flit through consciousness and that is the end of it” (ibid: 
505). It is thus erroneous to equate happiness with pleasure. 
 Matters are further made complex by the fact that the concepts of pleasure and pain are not by any 
means clear. What sort of experiences constitute pleasure and what sort of experiences constitute 
pain? (cf. Dworkin 1983:193). For example, “pleasure,” which suggests a specific kind of sensuous 
glow, poorly describes the experience produced by a harrowing piece of drama or poetry, an 
experience people nevertheless sometimes aim to have, and “pain” does not easily capture 
experiences of boredom or unease or depression. Thus, the content of experiences of pleasure and 
pain are themselves vague. To complicate matters further, what will we say about a woman who 
finds pleasure and celebrates in having conceived when we know the pain that pregnancies bring, 
which might even mean death in some cases? To add to this, what if one’s pleasure is being 
externally induced by a malevolent god or by a naughty scientist? I am thinking here of Descartes’ 
demon argument or Nozick’s (1974) “brains in a vat” hypothesis.  
All this goes to show that hedonism is fundamentally flawed as a theory of well-being. The 
fundamental problem of hedonism is reducing well-being to pleasure, which is just one aspect of 
a person’s life, instead of assessing various valued life aspects both internal and external to the 
person. To summarise the main points here: firstly, pleasure on its own cannot define well-being, 
as there is more to human well-being than just pleasure. Secondly, the concept of pleasure is itself 
vague; and thirdly, pleasure poorly defines happiness. We are thus confronted by a chain of 
conceptual flaws that disqualify hedonism as a factor in determining well-being. There are 
therefore no strong grounds to believe that hedonistic happiness relates to well-being in a 
significant way. The section below discusses another theory of well-being that has been argued to 
be an improvement over hedonistic theories. Desire satisfaction theories are arch-rivals of 
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hedonistic theories that for some time were thought to give a more plausible account of well-being. 
As the discussion below reveals, desire satisfaction theories are as unconvincing as hedonistic 
theories.  
1.1.2 Desire Satisfaction Theories 
Desire satisfaction theories, which also source their evaluative foundations in the utilitarian ethical 
tradition, hold that well-being consists in the satisfaction of a person’s desires or preferences 
(Ransome, 2010:42). For desire satisfaction theorists, people desire or value more things than just 
physical pleasure. People often find such things as friendship, love, truth, beauty, freedom, 
achievement, among others, to be desirable. One’s life is doing well to the extent that one’s life is 
filled with such things (Heathwood 2006:540). In other words, a desire is fulfilled when the 
associated proposition becomes true (Arneson 1999:16). Desire satisfaction theories seem 
appealing owing to the fact that they define happiness as comprising more aspects of human life 
than simply pleasure. In addition, the evaluative principle of such theories is at face value quite 
appealing: one’s life is doing very well if one is realizing one’s desires. What more does one want? 
Upon closer analysis however, desire satisfaction theories are far from being uncontroversial. 
Several challenges confront desire satisfaction theories to the extent that they fail to convince as a 
serious theory of well-being.  
Firstly, desire satisfaction theories fail to deal with cases of changing desires or preferences (see 
Dworkin 1983, Heathwood 2006). Desires are by their nature unstable; people’s preferences 
change, for example, so that the question of how far someone’s preferences for his life have been 
fulfilled overall will depend on which set of his preferences is chosen as relevant, or which function 
of the different preferences he has at different times (Dworkin 1983: 193). Some philosophers 
argue that preferences only refer to ideal preferences (those preferences we would have if we were 
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fully informed, or were more rational) and the hope is that these are stable. Heathwood (2006: 541) 
rejects this solution, arguing that even a fully informed person can change her preferences, and 
thus the theory requires us to force people to desire things they no longer desire. Apart from the 
problem of changing desires, the desire satisfaction theory of well-being has been criticized on the 
grounds that people may desire remote things – remote in terms of importance, time and place, 
and so on. Sometimes people desire things that are trivial and unrealistic and such desires do not, 
in any way, contribute to their well-being. For example, I may desire to meet a man from another 
planet or marry a mermaid, but that desire does not contribute to my well-being in any way. 
Thirdly, some people desire not to be well-off. A person who accidentally killed his whole family 
might desire to live a difficult and painful life, as a way of coping with the loss, although this does 
not have any positive impact on his well-being as we know it. States of pain, boredom and hunger, 
which he may prefer, are not in any way candidates for well-being. In addition, someone might 
have outrageous preferences, something like a penchant for murder. Such a defective desire is 
obviously not good for that person, hence there are preferences that are not good for the person 
and therefore do not add to their well-being.  
Forgeard et. al. (2011:86) criticize the idea of life satisfaction, first of all because satisfaction is 
often dependent on how good one is feeling at a particular time, and therefore it may be 
contaminated by mood and other contextual effects. Secondly, they argue that the biggest problem 
with desire satisfaction measures is that this construct has too often been equated to overall well-
being, leading researchers to ignore other facets that contribute to overall human well-being such 
as autonomy, equality and the capability to make choices. The conclusion that can be drawn at this 
stage is that neither hedonistic nor desire-satisfaction theories give us a sufficiently holistic 
conception of well-being. I reiterate, however, that I am critical overall of the hedonistic and 
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desire-satisfaction ideas of happiness, which are distinct from eudaimonic happiness. The 
eudaimonic conception of happiness is, in my view, central to well-being, and this argument is 
fully discussed in Chapter Two.  
In the next section, I shall discuss the general criticisms that have been levelled against 
utilitarianism as a theory of well-being. Although hedonistic and desire satisfaction theories of 
happiness are argued to rival each other, they are nevertheless both utilitarian. We can call the 
former hedonistic utilitarianism and the latter preference utilitarianism, and both forms are 
consequentialist. In this regard, the problems of utilitarianism discussed in the next section refer 
to both hedonistic and desire satisfaction theories of happiness. I particularly focus on Rawls’s and 
Sen’s criticisms of utilitarianism because of their appeal or relevance to issues of human well-
being. 
1.1.3 General criticisms of utilitarianism as a well-being theory 
Some far-reaching criticisms of utilitarianism have come from Rawls and Sen (see Rawls 1971, 
1974, 2005; Sen 2009, 1999, 1997, and 1992). Both thinkers see utilitarianism as a defective theory 
of well-being, although I shall argue that Rawls’s alternative theory faces different but equally 
strong challenges. Rawls’s criticisms with regard to utilitarianism are considerable and I discuss 
them first. All in all, Rawls sees utilitarianism as defective as a well-being theory in that it does 
not take seriously the distinctions between persons (Rawls 1971:26). This is because, in matters 
of social policy, it focuses on nett utility without due attention being paid to distributional matters. 
Utilitarians prioritize maximizing overall well-being and reject distributive principles. They aim 
for the greatest net sum of benefits over burdens, regardless of the pattern of distribution. This is 
true for both hedonistic and preference utilitarianism. Accordingly, a policy in which the 
satisfactions of a third of a population comprising the rich outweigh the dissatisfactions of the two 
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thirds poor will be welcomed by utilitarians – or, at the very least, cannot be discounted by them 
from the outset. In some sense, it is possible within a utilitarian society that the general well-being 
of society could be increased at the expense of individual members of that society. This, according 
to Rawls (1971:26), violates the third formulation of Kant’s categorical imperative which states: 
“Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person 
of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end”. Thus, utilitarianism 
suffers from distributional indifference by ignoring the extent of inequalities in what is needed to 
obtain happiness on an individual level. Parfit (1984: 338), however, questions Rawls’s conception 
of the distinction between persons. He argues that our burdens cannot be compensated by mere 
benefits to someone else, but may be morally outweighed by such benefits. Thus it may still be 
right:  
to give the benefits rather than relieve the burdens. Burdens are morally outweighed by 
benefits if they are factually outweighed by these benefits. All that is needed is that the 
benefits be greater than the burdens. It is unimportant, in itself, to whom both come (ibid: 
338). 
Rawlsians might reject the above explanation on the grounds that it presents different persons as 
one super-human. It is possible to weigh the benefits and burdens of one person only, but when 
several people are involved, utilitarian maximization fails. Singer (2002:1) has responded to this 
criticism, explaining that utilitarians obviously know perfectly well that persons are separate, but 
what they deny is that it follows from this separateness that one ought not to trade benefits to one 
person against benefits to another. Singer’s response, in my view, still does not deal with the 
problem of blind maximization of benefits, and he has attempted to correct this through his own 
version of preference utilitarianism. This shifts attention from happiness to preferences because 
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people can be mistaken about what will make them happy but they are never mistaken about what 
they prefer. For Singer (1993:94) preference utilitarianism states that an action contrary to the 
preference of any being is wrong, unless this preference is outweighed by contrary preferences. 
There is a difference between what one prefers and what makes one happier. I might be happier 
eating a lot of sugary foods but may prefer to abstain from eating these to keep a healthy body. In 
terms of groups, the theory calls us to take into account the preferences of the individuals involved, 
except where those preferences come in to direct conflict with the preferences of others. We should 
therefore maximize the chance that everyone’s preferences will be satisfied. This is however, 
problematic, simply because the preference of one person can sometimes be outweighed by the 
preferences of others, leading to that person’s rights being violated. We might find it moral to eat 
one member of the family and save ten others that are starving to death. His preference to live 
might be outweighed by the preference of the ten others to survive. Maximization of preferences 
might be justifiable where no direct human rights violations are present. Yet I find it hard to justify 
a theory that turns a blind eye to justice towards individual persons in the weighting of benefits 
and burdens or preferences. Rawls’s criticism of utilitarianism can therefore still be applied to 
Singer’s preference utilitarianism. Also keep in mind the criticisms against taking preference 
satisfaction as a measure of well-being, discussed under 1.1.2 above. 
Sen duly agrees with Rawls that utilitarianism neglects rights, freedoms and other non-utility 
concerns, and goes on to argue that the theory also does not deal with the problem of adaptation 
and mental conditioning – what Nussbaum (2001:78) calls the problem of adaptive preferences. In 
the first place, it may take much less to bring about happiness for some than for others, but 
subjecting the former to lesser opportunities and fewer resources and benefits is by no means fair 
or just. Thus, Sen argues that the utilitarian approach does not attach intrinsic importance to claims 
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of rights and freedoms, because these are only valued indirectly, in so far as they influence utilities 
(Sen, 1999: 62). Happiness, for Sen, is desirable, but he stresses that we do not want to be happy 
slaves. That is to say, there is more to living a worthwhile life than happiness, understood here as 
the satisfaction of desires or preferences. The second weakness of the utilitarian calculus for well-
being that Sen cites is that our assumptions can be easily swayed by mental conditioning and 
adaptive attitudes, where people’s happiness adapts to oppressive situations. The utility calculus 
can essentially be unfair to those who have come to terms with their deprivation as a means for 
survival, having adjusted their desires and expectations. Persistently underpaid factory and chain-
store workers in exploitative economic arrangements, many African farm workers, and hopelessly 
oppressed housewives in sexist cultures and religious sects provide good examples. These groups 
of people may become reconciled with their circumstances to the effect that they may show signs 
of satisfaction or happiness. A utilitarian evaluation may approve such arrangements because it 
merely focuses on utility. It will not differentiate, say, between a happy, well paid, worker and an 
equally happy, but badly paid labourer who has mentally adapted to his/her situation. Singer 
(1993:12-13) responded to the problem of adaptive preferences by arguing that the preferences we 
should satisfy, other things being equal, are those that people would hold if they were fully 
informed, reflective, and vividly aware of the consequences of satisfying their preferences. But 
Singer admits that it is difficult to define being “fully informed”, or being “vividly aware”. Singer 
does not, in my view, respond to Rawls and Sen’s criticisms convincingly. 
 It is undeniable that utilitarianism is a clear and simple theory to use in crafting policies or 
evaluating them, which is why it is still influential both in politics and economics. However, in 
view of the above discussion, it has too many defects to offer a convincing conception of well-
being. Rawls (1971) and Sen (2009) have correctly argued that a lot more things contribute to 
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human well-being than just pleasure (both mental and physical). Rights, justice, and capabilities 
also matter. Of critical note is the fact that Aristotle’s concept of happiness points to virtuous living 
and is thus different from utilitarian happiness. I have discussed this distinction above. In the next 
section, I discuss another one-dimensional theory of well-being that, even though treated 
separately by most researchers, is also founded on the principle of utility. 
1.2 Income-based or monetary measures of well-being 
Income-based or monetary measures of well-being are another example of one dimensional 
theories of well-being. These hold that one of the primary concerns – at least, in terms of stated 
objectives – of Government policies and other interventions is their potential to increase citizens’ 
well-being. But to determine or evaluate well-being requires a method or framework for that 
exercise. For many years, almost since “development economics” was developed from the works 
of researchers such as Simon Kuznets (1941), income maximization or increasing Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP)7 has been the primary measure of international comparisons of living standards 
and of general welfare, inspired by the belief that economic growth subsequently increases the 
nation's welfare. The logic of using GDP as a measure of welfare was therefore simple and 
attractive: if the economy was growing, so was well-being (Islam and Clarke 2002:202). GDP was 
therefore said to enhance understanding of the general standard of living enjoyed by the average 
person. For example, it was generally believed that people living in countries with higher GDP per 
capita tended to have longer life expectancies, higher literacy, better access to safe water and lower 
infant mortality rates. In addition, according to Nussbaum (2011:47), GDP is very easy to measure, 
since the monetary value of goods and services makes it possible to compare quantities of different 
                                                          
7 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is the monetary (usually USD) value of a country’s final output of goods and services 
in a year. GDP per capita shows what part of a country’s GDP each person would have if this GDP were divided 
equally. 
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types. Moreover, for her, GDP is preferred in being transparent, as it is difficult for countries to 
forge data to make them look better. Moreover, economic growth seems to be in the right direction 
in showing a region or country’s relative achievement. Economic growth is argued to have a 
trickle-down effect which suggests that the benefits of economic growth are bound to improve the 
lot of the majority of the poor, even if no direct action is specifically taken for that (ibid.).  
However, even Kuznets disapproved of the use of GDP as a general indication of well-being, 
cautioning that the well-being of a nation can scarcely be inferred from a measure of national 
income. Thus, long before the introduction of the capability approach, most economists had 
already started to notice that high GDP might occur along with growing unemployment, worsening 
income distribution, rising incidence of monetary poverty, poor provision of social services, 
deteriorating indicators of health and nutrition, and so on (see Stewart and Deneulin 2002, Morris 
1979, Ray 2008). 
Disillusioned by the shortcomings of GDP, Morris (1979) is one prominent figure who, before 
providing his alternative measure of well-being, first exposed the various limitations of per capita 
GDP, which he dismissed as not being an acceptable measure of well-being. First and foremost, 
GDP according to Morris concentrates on goods and services that have monetary value but 
neglects many productive activities – for example, small informal work and the work of 
housewives – that also contribute to people’s well-being. Secondly, given its method, GDP does 
not measure what Morris called “subjective elements” of well-being such as the happiness, justice, 
security, freedom, or leisure a society provides (Morris, 1979:8). Similarly GDP does not directly 
concern itself with, physical qualities of life like life expectancy, birth, death, and morbidity 
characteristics, and literacy. Empirical evidence has shown that there is no direct impact of 
economic growth on these aspects (Morris, 1979:8). Income per head also raises problems. There 
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is no guarantee that rising disposable personal income over time as reflected by per capita GDP 
necessarily occurs in ways that improve well-being, as distribution patterns are not reflected. Some 
groups may even suffer declines in real income. GDP growth may be a result of favourable exports, 
whereas prices of goods and services rise locally due to other reasons. Moreover, economic growth 
may be accompanied by adverse consequences in health, especially if pollution and deforestation 
levels increase. Economic growth may thus be antagonistic to well-being. For instance, 
contemporary researchers on well-being like Azumdar (1999:1), observed that during the 1950s 
and 1960s, a large number of Third World countries achieved the overall economic growth targets 
of the United Nations, while the quality of life of the masses of people remained for the most part 
unchanged, demonstrating that something was very wrong with viewing development as economic 
growth. In addition, Amartya Sen (1999:5-6) observed in 1999 that citizens of Gabon, Namibia 
and Brazil were much richer in GDP per capita than the citizens of Sri Lanka, China and India, but 
the latter had substantially higher life expectancies than the former, clearly demonstrating the 
dissonance between GDP per capita and the freedom of individuals to live long and live well (Sen 
1999:5-6).  
These observations demonstrate the glaring limitations of income-based measures of well-being. 
While Sen does not entirely disregard the valuation of income in well-being conceptualizations, 
he stresses that the valuation of income is entirely as a means to other ends and also that it is one 
means among others (Sen 1997: 385). For him, income is, of course, a crucially important means, 
but its importance lies in the fact that it helps the person to do things that she values doing and to 
achieve states of being that she has reason to desire. The worth of incomes cannot, thus, stand 
separated from people’s overall well-being or from how people actually live in society (ibid: 385). 
Moreover according to Sen, the relationship between income (and other resources) on the one hand 
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and individual achievements and freedoms on the other is not constant. Different types of 
contingencies lead to systematic variations in the conversion of incomes into the distinct 
functionings8 we can achieve (i.e. the various things we can do or be), and that affects the lifestyles 
we can enjoy (Sen 1997:385). Sen identifies five sources of parametric variations. The first 
variation he identifies concerns personal heterogeneities. According to him, people have disparate 
physical characteristics connected with disability, illness, age, or gender, making their needs 
diverse. For example, an ill person may need more income to fight her illness than a person without 
such an illness would need. Secondly, there are environmental diversities, variations in 
environmental conditions, such as climatic circumstances (temperature ranges, rainfall, flooding, 
and so on), that can influence what a person gets out of a given level of income. Thirdly, there are 
variations in social climate. Sen argues that the conversion of personal incomes and resources into 
functionings is influenced also by social conditions, including public health care and 
epidemiology, public educational arrangements, and the prevalence or absence of crime and 
violence in a particular location (Sen 2005: 154). The fourth variation concerns differences in 
relational perspectives. For Sen, the commodity requirements of established patterns of behaviour 
may vary between communities, depending on conventions and customs. Here, he gives the 
example of a relatively poor person in a rich community. That person may be prevented from 
achieving some elementary functionings (such as taking part in the life of the community) even 
though his/her income, in absolute terms, may be much higher than the level of income at which 
members of poorer communities can function with great ease and success. 
 Lastly, according to Sen, income distribution within the family is also a factor. He stresses that 
incomes earned by one or more members of a family are shared by all, non-earners as well as 
                                                          
8 I will provide a detailed analysis of this concept and other key concepts of the CA in Chapter Two. 
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earners. The family is, thus, the basic unit for consideration of incomes from the point of view of 
their use. The well-being or freedom of individuals in a family will depend on how the family 
income is used in furtherance of the interests and objectives of different members of the family. 
Hence intra-family distribution of incomes is a crucial parametric variable in linking individual 
achievements and opportunities with the overall level of family income. Distributional rules 
followed within the family (e.g. related to gender or age or perceived needs) can make a major 
difference to the attainments and predicaments of individual members (Sen 1997: 386). All of 
these variations lead Sen to argue that in comparing the well-being of different people, looking 
only at the commodities each can successfully command is to rely on insufficient information. We 
also need to pay attention to the different states of being that these resources are intended for, 
namely, being well-nourished, living a healthy and long life, leading a happy and satisfied life and 
so on. We must consider how well people are able to function with the goods and services at their 
disposal. The position that Sen is advocating is that the space of evaluation ought not to be the 
space of the means but the space of the ends of well-being.  
I expand on Sen’s argument in this regard in the chapters to follow. For now, I merely point to 
some of the practical problems with measuring well-being in terms of GDP. According to Dowrick 
(2007:65-6), the failure of measured GDP to capture well-being accurately is not surprising, given 
that the definitions and measurement practices of national accounts have been designed with a 
quite different purpose in mind, namely, to provide the accounting framework for the operation of 
monetary and fiscal policies. To begin with, GDP is therefore more properly regarded as a partial 
measure of aggregate output than as an indicator of either current or future well-being. In other 
words, GDP is a narrow and therefore limited as a measure of well-being. It merely focuses on 
formal economic output, and does not pay attention to other important aspects that matter to well-
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being, like resource depletion, leisure, household production of goods and services, black market 
activities or external costs and benefits associated with production and consumption (ibid.). It can 
further be noted that the GDP does not separate costs from benefits. It simply adds them together 
under the heading of economic activity. Thus, if industries emitting toxic waste cause illnesses 
requiring expensive medical treatment, both the output of the polluting industry and the 
expenditure on medical services will be counted as positive contributions to GDP (ibid.). This is a 
mistake because, as I have already argued, well-being relates to those goods that contribute to the 
richness of human life. Illness, for example, cannot be counted as an ingredient of well-being. 
Moreover, increasing GDP does not indicate progress if the increasing income accrues to a very 
small number of people. We need to pay attention to how the income is distributed because it is 
possible to have a strong economy occurring alongside a starving and ill population. If the income 
is not spread in manner that enhances the lives of the generality of the population, its contribution 
to well-being is limited. I expand on this argument in the sections below.  
In addition to the above, the method of computing the GDP is quite complex. Slottje (1991:684) 
argues that the coverage of the measure is incomplete, it changes over time, and there are various 
index number issues, as one has to add together all private consumption, plus all government 
consumption, plus all investment and net exports to come up with a country’s GDP. Chances of 
ending up with misleading or wrong results are therefore high. Moreover, there is a serious 
problem that relates to the conversion of local currency measures into a common denominator, 
typically the U.S. dollar, as there are well known biases in the use of market exchange rates for 
such conversions, making it even more difficult to make comparisons across countries. Some 
governments may prefer to give a superficial value for their currency, making comparisons 
inaccurate in the process. As a consequence of these problems, development economists have 
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become increasingly dissatisfied with GDP and have started searching for more satisfactory 
measures of well-being. 
To recapitulate: Utilitarian and economic theories of well-being are one-dimensional in so far as 
they reduce well-being to a single metric, be it happiness, satisfaction of preferences/desires or 
income. Each of these, while not irrelevant for the consideration of well-being, leaves much to be 
desired. Utilitarian happiness is difficult to define and does not capture all aspects of human well-
being. In the same vein, our desires may not contribute positively to our well-being, and in addition 
some of them may be dangerous to other parties. Similarly, income defines well-being quite 
narrowly. Even with a high income, your life may not go well if you are living in an environment 
where, for instance, you are denigrated along racial, tribal, or religious lines. Given the failures of 
one-dimensional theories of well-being, a multidimensional concept, which takes into account the 
many different features of human life that cannot be reduced to a single metric, promises to give 
us a better handle on the notion of human flourishing. In the next part of the chapter, I select and 
analyse three multidimensional approaches that have gained prominence over the past three 
decades. As noted above, although I will use the CA to criticize these, I reserve a full discussion 
of the CA for chapter two. 
2. Multidimensional conceptualizations of well-being 
Multidimensional conceptions of well-being have been motivated by the failure of the utilitarian 
and income-based measures of well-being that have dominated well-being assessments for most 
of the 20th century (McGillivray 2007:3). As a consequence, it has become more common, at least 
from the early 1970s onwards, to treat well-being as a multidimensional concept. In this section I 
discuss three examples of such multidimensional approaches to well-being; Rawls’s primary goods 
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approach, Morris’ Physical Quality of Life Index (PQLI), and Doyal and Gough’s Basic Needs 
Approach. The Capability Approach also belongs in this group; this is discussed in Chapter Two.  
2.1 Rawls’s social primary goods approach to well-being 
The publication of Rawls’s A Theory of Justice in 1971 marked a turning point in well-being 
research. In this influential book, Rawls conceives of well-being as the possession of “primary 
goods”. Primary goods are those goods which every rational person can be presumed to want, 
because they “normally have a use whatever a person’s rational plan of life” (Rawls 1999:79). 
That is, primary goods are the means by which an individual can achieve their ends – whatever 
those ends may be. Moreover, for Rawls (2005:180), being free and equal persons, citizens require 
for their advancement roughly the same primary goods. Ideally, these primary goods should be 
distributed equally among the citizens. He specifies the social primary goods as comprising some 
basic liberties like those of thought and action which are necessary for the rational pursuit of a 
conception of the good, freedoms of movement and choice of occupation, income and wealth and 
what he calls “the social bases for self-respect”. By the latter he means a person’s sense of value. 
If one lacks self-respect, one lacks the motivation and confidence to do anything, and this renders 
the other primary goods useless. In this regard, Rawls (1971:58) advises that we should strive to 
eliminate social conditions that take away individuals’ self-respect. These are the “all-purpose 
means” for achieving directly or indirectly a wide range of ends, whatever they happen to be 
(Rawls, 1999:79, 2001:58-61). Civil and political primary goods should ideally be distributed 
equally. Economic primary goods can be unequally distributed, provided the inequality improves 
the life conditions of the least advantaged in society.  
Primary social goods offer an alternative basis to utility or income alone for a more settled social 
agreement on what is important to well-being and also a social responsibility. Rawls’s political 
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liberalism takes primary goods to be the foundation for human well-being. These primary goods 
should be available to every citizen, whatever their conception of the good. According to Boz 
(2009:6) Rawls’s approach avoids the problems of expensive tastes and anti-social preferences 
associated with desire satisfaction theories and therefore provides a more impartial measure for 
comparing the well-being of different individuals than a preference standard does. Rawls’s primary 
goods are those fundamental goods that all human beings want as opposed to the subjective, 
sometimes unrealistic and selfish, desires that we may individually have. However, in The Idea of 
Justice, Sen (2009:5) argues that Rawls’s primary goods approach to well-being is flawed on three 
basic grounds. First and foremost, Rawls concentrates on identifying just institutional 
arrangements for a society, but this approach concentrates primarily on ideal institutions, and does 
not directly focus on the actual societies that would ultimately emerge. Here Sen directly attacks 
Rawls’s primary focus on the basic structure. The ‘basic structure’ of society according to Rawls 
consists of some the central interaction-shaping institutions of society, like the constitution, 
property laws, economic structures, parliament, the judiciary, the family, and so on (Rawls 
1972:54). Rawls’s idea is that these institutions govern the division of the advantages which accrue 
from social cooperation. These advantages are precisely the social primary goods discussed above. 
So a society is just when its fundamental institutions are arranged according to fair principles. 
Rawls identifies two such principles: 
The First Principle 
Each person has the same indefeasible claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic 
liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme of liberties for all. 
The Second Principle 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
39 
 
Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: first, they are to be attached 
to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and 
second, they are to be to the greatest benefit to the least advantaged. (Rawls 2005:5-6) 
The two principles are arranged in lexical order – the first being prior to the second. However, 
such an approach, according to Sen, is not convincing. Well-being should be analysed in terms of 
the actual lives that people are able to lead, given the institutions and rules (Sen 2009:10). Just 
institutions may not directly correspond to people’s actual realizations and accomplishments. For 
instance, a country can have a brilliant constitution that espouses the virtue of justice, yet this may 
be disregarded in practice. It is therefore not enough to just focus on just institutions without taking 
note of their practical efficacy. Secondly, Sen questions the weight that Rawls places on the liberty 
principle, arguing that it is wrong to prioritize liberty over such critical concerns as hunger, 
starvation and medical neglect, among others, all of which are important to well-being. The 
question is why liberty should get more attention than other things. Lastly, Rawls is criticized for 
focusing on primary goods such as liberties, incomes, wealth, and opportunities. Sen typically 
argues that focusing on these primary goods neglects some considerations that can be of great 
importance to the substantive assessment of equality and also of efficiency. For Sen, there is a 
strong need to for moving from focusing on primary goods to actual assessment of freedoms and 
capabilities, considering the fact that people vary in their ability to convert the same amount of 
primary goods into good living (Sen 2009: 66).9 
Sen’s criticism of Rawls above follows a series of earlier criticisms (see Sen 1999, 1992, 1979). 
In Justice as Fairness: a Restatement, Rawls (2001:169-176) attempts a response to Sen, arguing 
                                                          
9 While I agree with Sen and other capability approach theorists that the primary goods metric is an inadequate measure 
of well-being, I do agree with large aspects of Rawls’s liberal conception of citizenship. I defend this position in my 
discussion of citizenship in Chapter Three. 
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that the latter’s interpretation of primary goods does not recognize the fundamental relationship 
between primary goods and persons’ basic capabilities. Primary goods, for Rawls, are citizens’ 
capabilities or powers that enable them to be normal and fully cooperating members of society. 
Such rights as equal political liberties, equal civil liberties, as well as income and wealth rights, 
according to Rawls, are essential conditions for the adequate development and full exercise of 
citizens’ moral powers of liberty and equality (Rawls 2001:169). Sen, however, remains 
unconvinced, since – and this is central to his theory as a whole – there is still a distinction between 
the exercise of one’s freedoms, should one so choose, and having the means to such freedoms.  
Rawls also tries to defend his prioritising of the liberty principle, arguing that this priority rules 
out what he called “exchanges or trade-offs” between fundamental political and civil rights and 
the social and economic advantages regulated by the difference principle. For example, he argues 
that equal political liberties cannot be denied to certain groups on the grounds that their having 
these may block policies needed for economic growth and efficiency (Rawls 2001:47). This might 
seem convincing, but adherents of the capability approach can still argue that Rawls’s problem is 
that he is operating at wrong a level. Instead of examining the ‘basic structure’ of society 
(institutions like the constitution and laws), why not instead look directly at the actual quality of 
life of the people, given their liberties? We can also contest the view that the distribution of primary 
social goods is fair in this case, owing to the fact that people differ in their ability to convert these 
primary goods into valued functionings. For example, women may need additional laws to protect 
them from violence if they are to freely participate in politics. The same applies to the acquisition 
and ownership of property.  
Thus, although Rawls in Justice as Fairness (2001) attempts to link the idea of primary goods with 
that of basic capabilities, his account fails to measure up. This is precisely because his approach 
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focuses mainly on equality in the holding of these primary goods. However, according to Sen 
(1999:97), we ought to focus on real freedom—what each person is actually enabled to be and do 
with the ensemble of primary goods and other resources she has, given her personal traits and 
talents, in the context of her actual circumstances. To focus on primary goods is to focus on a 
means of uncertain significance; this is to focus on what does not really ultimately matter. Instead 
people’s well-being should be measured by the capabilities they have to do various things or be 
what they want to be. (More on this in Chapter Two).  
Apart from Sen’s specific reservations about Rawls’s primary goods theory, Arneson (1990:431) 
further maintains that this theory does not guarantee any minimal degree of satisfaction of any 
individual’s aims. This emanates from the fact that some people's final aims are more expensive 
and more complex to satisfy than the aims of others. Suppose that two persons, X and Y, want a 
field in which to exercise. X simply wants to jog around the field, while Y wants to train to become 
a football star. Making a field available does satisfy X’s aim, but does not do the same for Y, who 
needs additional things like goalposts and a ball. The conclusion that can be drawn from this 
football analogy is that justice as fairness might be unfair to individuals seeking to satisfy different 
conceptions of the good. 
2.2 The Physical Quality of Life Index (PQLI) and Well-Being 
The publication of Rawls’s A Theory of Justice in 1971 succeeded in bringing to the fore the 
shortcomings of utilitarianism as a theory of justice or as a measure of well-being. At the same 
time, various well-being theorists had become disillusioned about viewing income maximization 
as a benchmark of human well-being. As a consequence, Morris (1979) developed the Physical 
Quality of Life Index (PQLI), which was a direct reaction against income-based measures of well-
being. The PQLI is an average of what Morris calls “life-saving social characteristics”, namely 
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infant mortality, life expectancy, and literacy indices (Morris 1979:31). The composite PQLI index 
is arrived at by combining the three indicators – life expectancy at age one (i.e. the expected 
number of years a child at age one is expected to live), infant mortality (calculated per 1000 births), 
and literacy (the percentage of a population 15 years or older that is literate) – into a single measure. 
For each indicator, the performance of individual countries is placed on a scale of 0 to 100, where 
0 represents the worst performance and 100 the best performance. Once performance for each 
indicator is scaled to this common measure, the composite index is then calculated by averaging 
the three indicators, giving equal weight to each of them. The resulting Physical Quality of Life 
Index is then scaled on an index of 0 to 100. If, for example, life expectancy in Zambia is 49, infant 
mortality, 180/1000, and literacy, 25%, the PQLI is 25. Similarly, if the life expectancy at age 1 in 
the UK is 72, infant mortality 16/1000, and literacy 99%, the PQLI is 94. The PQLI gives 
information about the changing distribution of social benefits among countries, between the sexes, 
among ethnic groups, and by region and sector. In addition, the PQLI facilitates international and 
regional comparisons by minimizing developmental and cultural ethnocentricities (Morris 
1979:34).  
Morris argues that the three indicators that constitute the PQLI has several advantages as compared 
to using GDP/GNP. Firstly, he argues that these indicators are universal rather than society-
specific, and therefore allow for international comparisons. People everywhere would prefer that 
newborn children live, and all people prefer to live longer rather than shorter lives. Secondly, 
literacy has become an accepted universal value, as it is a prerequisite for active participation in 
the contemporary world. In the third place, the three indicators measure results, not inputs (Morris 
1979:32). A higher PQLI indicates positive well-being whereas a low PQLI indicates a poor state 
of being. The PQLI may also reflect how effective certain policies have been over a period of time. 
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This can be done by observing whether the PQLI is getting higher or lower. Finally, the three 
parameters of the PQLI are simple and comprehensible, unlike the computations characteristic of 
the GNP which require adding figures relating to all the economic activity of a country (Morris 
1979:29-30).  
However, while the PQLI is an improvement over the use of the GNP, it is still fundamentally 
limited. Firstly, while the index does start off by identifying multiple dimensions of well-being, it 
still leaves out some significant considerations. For Alkire and Moizza (2009:7) the PQLI is 
conceptually flawed on the grounds that it aggregates the different components that contribute to 
well-being into a single measure; yet because these components cannot morally or logically be 
traded off against each other, they cannot be aggregated into a single measure. Moreover, as Morris 
(1979:35) himself admits, two of the PQLI’s three components relate to health. This makes the 
PQLI dimensionally limited, as it overemphasizes the importance of health in human well-being 
at the cost of other considerations. While health is an important component of well-being, it is not 
all there is to well-being. For instance, having a sense of self-worth and respect and the freedom 
to appear in public without shame may equally matter for well-being. Moreover, items that are 
prioritized for well-being differ across societies. Literacy may, for example, be valued differently 
by different cultures. A third impediment to the utility of the index is the limited availability of 
reliable data on a number of non-income achievements, particularly for comparative purposes at a 
global level. The US dollar that is usually used as a common measure is, in some instances, abused 
with some countries using superficial exchange rates. At the end of the day, we may not be able to 
obtain reliable data. In addition, components of the PQLI are biased in favour of poor people in 
poor societies and therefore do not provide a reliable measure of well-being across all societies. 
For example, evaluating the level of well-being using infant mortality and literacy rates in the UK 
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or US may not help much, as these rates are constantly low and high respectively in such states. 
Even though Morris claims that his prime aim was to measure the performance of the poorest 
countries in meeting the most basic needs of the people, we need a framework that can be applied 
in different kinds of societies. Lastly, by giving equal weighting to all parameters, the PQLI 
undermines the value of some significantly valuable parameters. For example, even though 
maintaining low infant mortality rates and high literacy rates are both critical, there is no doubt 
that in terms of weighting, the former is weightier than the latter, simply because having a chance 
to live is much more desirable than the ability to read and write (see Alkire and Mozzat 2009:7). 
The above reservations explain why the PQLI has received a lukewarm reception globally.  
2.3 Satisfaction of basic needs as well-being 
Another influential multidimensional well-being measure that has received significant attention 
was developed by Doyal and Gough and involves assessing the satisfaction of citizens’ basic 
needs. This approach evaluates socio-economic systems and institutions according to the 
anticipated well-being outcomes enjoyed by their citizens and these outcomes are conceived in 
terms of the level of satisfaction of basic human needs (Gough 1994:25). According to Doyal and 
Gough (1991:55) “basic individual needs” refer to a particular category of goals that are 
universalisable – goals which must be achieved if any individual is to achieve any other goal. Basic 
needs are those needs that persons need to be protected from “serious harm” of some objective 
kind. A “serious harm” is defined, in turn, as a fundamental disablement in the pursuit of one’s 
vision of the good such as the impeding of successful social participation in a particular time, place 
and cultural group. Doyal and Gough state that the basic needs for such successful social 
participation are physical health and personal autonomy (ibid.). Health and autonomy (autonomy 
being defined as agency: the ability of a person to initiate an action, to formulate goals and to act 
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to achieve them) are for Doyal and Gough humans’ most basic needs, and these must be satisfied 
to some degree before individuals can participate in their form of life to achieve any other valued 
goals. They claim that the undertaking of physical tasks in daily life requires manual, mental and 
emotional abilities with which poor physical health usually interferes, while cognitive and 
emotional capacity (agency) is a necessary pre-requisite for a person to initiate an action.  
While Doyal and Gough consider health and autonomy to be the basic requirements of well-being, 
they argue further that, in order for these to be attained, some second-order goals – which they call 
“intermediate needs” – have to be secured first. These “intermediate needs” are grouped into 
eleven categories: adequate nutritional food and water, adequate protective housing, a non-
hazardous work environment, a non-hazardous physical environment, appropriate health care, 
security in childhood, significant primary relationships, physical security, economic security, safe 
birth control and child-bearing, and basic education (ibid: 59). Thus, while basic human needs are 
the universal prerequisites for well-being, it is the satisfaction of our intermediate needs that 
enables the realization of our basic needs. While physical health and autonomy are universal needs, 
Doyal and Gough accept that the ways in which these are satisfied may vary according to a specific 
society or time; however, they remain “universal” needs because they are necessary in any culture 
before any individual can participate effectively to achieve any other valued goals (ibid: 59). 
Doyal and Gough’s basic needs theory is undoubtedly a major contribution to well-being 
conceptualizations and, as we shall see, relates well to Amartya Sen’s capability approach.10 
However, a few problems still linger around this theory. The definition of needs is still a contested 
                                                          
10 Another promising attempt to think about needs and well-being is Lawrence Hamilton’s The Political Philosophy 
of Needs (2003). I merely flag this here, as it is tangential to my overall project of developing a conception of 
citizenship as the capability to have capabilities.  
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terrain: how are they identified and do those that are identified carry the same weight? It is also 
important to carefully distinguish needs from related concepts such as desires and wants. At an 
individual level, it is sometimes difficult to separate between our desires and wants on one hand, 
and our needs on the other. According to Soper (1993:116) Doyal and Gough may claim that needs 
are distinguished from wants in being goals which all human beings have to achieve if they are to 
avoid “serious harm”, this latter being defined in terms of the maintenance of physical health and 
autonomy. But unlike our wants, our needs are such that we may be unaware of them and thus 
incapable of naming them. In other words, needs are universal, whereas wants and desires are 
personal choices. In addition, it remains contested that needs can really be “universal” given 
different cultures and religious beliefs that usually have significant influence on issues of health 
and autonomy (ibid: 116). The idea of basic needs thus causes difficulties, particularly in regard 
to cross societal comparisons of well-being. Finally, according to Alkire and Mozzat (2009:8), 
some operational forms of the basic needs approach were exclusively focused on resources and 
inputs, and this particular form overlooked people’s varying abilities to convert resources into what 
Sen later called “functionings”. In other words, the basic needs theory suffers from a problem 
similar to the one suffered by Rawls’s primary goods theory. Both theories wrongly assume that 
the same bundle of primary goods or of the “basics of life” results in similar life chances for 
everyone. There are many factors that cause people with the same amount of resources to live 
different lives. Two thousand dollars may be enough to cover the month’s needs of a healthy 
individual, but is grossly inadequate for one who goes through kidney dialysis every week. The 
concept of “needs” is thus ambiguous in this theory, and in matters of human well-being, focusing 
on whether people have access to basic needs is not as effective as focussing on the actual quality 
of their lives.  
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Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have examined several possible conceptions of well-being, and in doing so, also 
demonstrated that there is no easy route to agreement on what constitutes “wellness of life”. 
Researchers differ in their moral outlook and ideological persuasions, and disagree about how to 
define well-being as well as about its benchmarks. However, we have also seen that there are 
increasing signs of convergence among researchers on particular aspects of well-being. Firstly, it 
is now generally agreed that well-being is a multidimensional rather than a one-dimensional 
concept. Section One of this chapter has highlighted the limitations of defining well-being solely 
on the basis hedonistic happiness, desire satisfaction or income. It is now commonly appreciated 
that well-being cannot be reduced to any one of these factors. Even some utilitarians, such as Mill, 
Singer and others reject hedonistic happiness as a measure of human well-being, as human beings 
take satisfaction from things in life that go beyond physical pleasures. In addition, happiness is a 
psychological state that is susceptible to adaptation and conditioning, meaning one can unwittingly 
become used to particular bad conditions or situations without feeling particularly unhappy. 
Income is also too narrow as a measure of well-being, as it has been shown in practice that 
economic growth in most instances does not “trickle down” or may actually be accompanied by 
declining incomes for some. The economy may grow, buoyed up by the retrenchments of workers 
or the removal of subsidies, but such moves have a detrimental effect on the affected persons’ 
well-being. Having a high income does not also mean that the income is spread evenly across all 
members of a country. The income might be concentrated among a few. These problems 
demonstrate the general insufficiency of basing well-being conceived as utility. Issues of 
distribution, rights and justice are ignored in favour of maximizing aggregate utility. 
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The multi-dimensional conceptions of well-being discussed in Section Two are arguably an 
improvement over one-dimensional concepts. The main challenge for multidimensional concepts 
is disagreement on the constituent dimensions that define well-being. More research is needed in 
order to arrive at an agreed conception of well-being for the benefit of those that have the task of 
advancing it. I have mind here governments and other policy makers, who can only effectively 
work to improve the well-being of citizens if there is clarity about what it is they are trying to 
measure. It is the contention of this dissertation that the Capability Approach holds the most 
promise in that direction, with citizenship understood as the basic or anchoring capability. The 
first step in advancing this claim is to gain a clearer understanding of what this approach entails. 
This is the topic of the chapter to follow. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE CAPABILITIES APPROACH TO HUMAN WELL-BEING 
Human development, as an approach, is concerned with what I take to be the basic development 
idea: namely, advancing the richness of human life, rather than the richness of the economy in 
which human beings live, which is only a part of it (Sen, 1988:3). 
Introduction 
In Chapter One, I demonstrated the limitations of some of the most prominent one-dimensional 
and multidimensional conceptions of well-being. In developing the Capability Approach, Amartya 
Sen and Martha Nussbaum respond to the limitations of such conceptions, particularly income-
based, utilitarian, and primary goods-based conceptions of well-being. I analyse the Capability 
Approach in detail in this chapter, and I do so with two main objectives in mind. Firstly, I aim to 
show that the Capability Approach provides us with a richer and more useful starting point for 
thinking about well-being than the other approaches discussed. I refer to it as providing a starting 
point, in the sense that the CA is not itself a conception of well-being but rather a theoretical 
framework for conceptualizing and evaluating well-being, among other aspects of human life. In 
other words, the CA does not tell us what well-being is, but guides us in determining the things 
that we should consider in thinking about well-being. My second aim is to present the CA as the 
theoretical foundation for the human well-being paradigm in well-being conceptualizations. This 
helps to lay the groundwork for my argument that citizenship should be understood as a human 
capability. As we shall see, Nussbaum also proposes capabilities for non-human species. While I 
do not wish to deny that capability approach might be applicable to non-human animals, I do not 
consider citizenship to be such a capability. For this reason, in analysing the concept of capabilities, 
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I draw significantly on both Sen and Nussbaum, but will avoid discussing the latter’s capabilities 
for non-human animals.  
Amartya Sen seems to have first used the term “capability” in 1979, while delivering a public 
lecture, “Equality of What?” and this lecture marked his entry into philosophical research and into 
matters of justice and well-being. Since then, scholars such as Alkire (2002), Clark (2002), 
Nussbaum (1992, 1995, 1997, 2000, 2001, 2003, 2005, 2011), Qizilbash (2002), and Robeyns 
(2000, 2005, 2006, 2011) have adopted his ideas and developed them into the Capability 
Approach. According to Sen (1997:394), this approach has clear linkages with Adam Smith’s 
analysis of necessities and with Aristotle’s treatment of eudaimonia in The Nicomachean Ethics 
and The Politics. However, in The Idea of Justice, Sen (2009:52) confesses that it was Rawls’s 
ideas of justice that deeply influenced him to write on issues of well-being and justice.11 Sen, 
however, departs from Rawls, arguing that in his “equality of primary goods” approach to justice, 
Rawls overlooks the fact that there are fundamental differences between human beings; or better: 
Rawls does not take into account the kinds of differences that lead to different outcomes even when 
there is equal distribution of primary goods. Well-being, for Sen, must thus be measured by 
assessing people’s freedom and choices, rather than equality in the holding of primary goods, or 
their income or consumption. By focusing on freedom, Sen is reinforcing his belief that people 
differ in their capacity to convert goods into valuable achievements owing to diversity in internal 
characteristics such as age, gender, general abilities, particular talents, and proneness to illness, as 
well as in external circumstances such as social backgrounds, environmental predicaments and so 
on (Sen 1992:1).  
                                                          
11 Rawls’s theory of justice is briefly discussed in Chapter 1. 
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However, Sen develops the CA to respond not only to Rawlsian and utilitarian approaches to well-
being, but also to development economics, particularly to what he considers to be the ‘non-ethical’ 
character of modern economics (Sen 1988:1-2). By this he means that, in contrast to what has been 
the case previously, say, from Socrates to Adam Smith, economics is now studied without 
humanity in mind, and has thus separated itself from ethics. Economics no longer concerns itself 
with the Socratic question, “How should one live?” – a question that is central to ethics. For Sen, 
by contrast, economics should be concerned with actual people, not simply representative persons. 
In view of this, he argues that we should move away from income-led evaluation methods of 
development, and focus instead on people’s ability – as opposed to formal equality of opportunity 
– to achieve the ends that they value. He argues that development is not just a question of the 
wealth or pleasure or goods that a person has; it is a question of how people manage to live their 
lives, and the ability (capability or freedom) they have to do certain things that are important to 
them (Sen 1992:40).  
From this idea of capabilities, Sen develops a “freedoms” concept of development that is human-
centred: hence the term human development. The concept of human development entails that the 
principal means and the primary ends of development should be the expansion of people’s 
substantial freedoms or opportunities to choose and act (Nussbaum 2011:20). For Sen, expanding 
people’s freedoms advances, firstly, their well-being (enriching their lives) and, secondly, their 
agency (freedom to pursue other goals that may not necessarily enhance well-being) (Sen 
1999:36). The Capability Approach is thus the theoretical foundation for the concept of human 
development, meaning that a fuller understanding human development requires a full exposition 
of the CA first, and this is the strategy this chapter adopts in the four sections below. The concept 
of human development refers, in turn, to the process of improving human well-being. The concepts 
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of human well-being and human development are thus intricately linked and are usually studied 
together by CA theorists, particularly Sen (1999) and Alkire (2005, 2009, 2010). 
In Section One, I analyse the concepts of capabilities and functionings which are the key elements 
of the CA. As already noted, the CA is neither a theory of justice nor a comprehensive theory of 
well-being, but rather a framework or yardstick for evaluating the many aspects of (human) well-
being. What is distinct about this approach is its emphasis on the fact that in the evaluation of 
justice, development or other aspects of well-being, our focus should not be merely on the means 
but also on the ends of human development and justice. For example, when conceptualizing human 
development, our focus should not be confined to the income that people have, which is only a 
means, but we should focus on what people are able to do and be with that income. We should 
look at whether people are living longer, are being healthy or are being literate rather than focusing 
on, say, the per capita income for their particular society. 
 In Section Two, I follow up the initial overview of the capability approach with a more focused 
analysis of the concept of human development, showing its place in the capability discourse, and 
clarifying it as a process of enhancing human well-being. The concept of human development is 
linked to the idea of the CA in forwarding the thesis that development is about the expansion of 
people’s capabilities and functionings (Fukuda-Parr 2003:117-118). Expanding people’s freedoms 
and opportunities simply means improving their well-being. My focus will thus be on a concept 
of human development that is sensitive to the means-ends distinction, that is concerned with human 
freedoms and dignity and that recognizes human agency – that is, the role of people in the 
development process. On this view, human development entails improving human lives by 
expanding the range of things that a person can be and do, such as being healthy and well 
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nourished, being knowledgeable, and participating in community life. In other words, the end of 
the process of human development is human well-being. 
Section Three is a follow up on Section Two as it analyses the Human Development Index (HDI) 
as a measure of human development. This index is a measure of human development that combines 
three human capabilities: health, education, and a decent standard of living (Stanton 2007:15). 
However, I argue that the HDI poorly represents the rich CA-inspired concept of human 
development. The HDI is simply too narrow and inadequate a measure of development. The notion 
of human development, as will be shown, is far broader than the HDI measure. 
Section Four discusses whether or not researchers should complete the capability approach 
framework by proposing specific lists of capabilities for different researches. Sen and Nussbaum, 
who are the main proponents of the CA, are divided on this issue. Sen (2004) argues that the 
selection and justification of lists of capabilities interferes with the virtue of public discussion, 
whereas Nussbaum (1995, 2000, 2003), Sabina Alkire and Rufus Black (1997), and Ingrid 
Robeyns (2003), have all proposed some capabilities to complete the CA, but in different contexts. 
I follow Nussbaum’s position that lists are required to complete the CA. However, I differ with 
her in the sense that her concept of capabilities is wider and includes capabilities for non-human 
species, something that is at variance with the goal of this dissertation. In addition, I have 
reservations about the nature of Nussbaum’s human capabilities and how she lists together human 
and non-human concerns. The fifth section analyses previous attempts at completing the CA. I 
discuss Nussbaum’s (1995:515-517) and Robeyns’s (2003:71-2) lists in detail as I draw guidance 
from these in defending my own argument in Chapter Five. The sixth and last section of this 
chapter briefly discusses some criticisms levelled against the CA in general.  
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1. Key elements of the Capability Approach 
1.1 Functionings and capabilities 
Sen argues that living may be seen as a set of interrelated functionings, consisting of “beings and 
doings”. The concept of “functionings” reflects the various things a person may value doing or 
being (Sen 1999:75). Examples of “beings” are: being healthy, being educated, being well-
nourished and so on. Examples of doings are: travelling, participating in an election, going to a 
party, getting married, and so on. These beings and doings together constitute what makes a life 
valuable. These are the various things a person may value doing or being and, taken together, these 
create a better conceptual space in which to assess well-being than utility or opulence (Alkire 
2005:118). Sen claims that functionings are constitutive of a person’s being, and an evaluation of 
well-being has to take the form of an assessment of these constituent elements (Sen 1992:39). 
Sen (1999:75) goes on to define capabilities as the alternative combinations of functionings that 
are feasible for a person to achieve. Capability is thus a kind of freedom; specifically, the 
substantive freedom to achieve alternative functioning combinations (or, less formally put, the 
freedom to achieve various lifestyles). Thus, while travelling is a functioning, the real opportunity 
to travel is the corresponding capability. The distinction between functionings and capabilities is 
between the realized and the effectively possible; in other words, between achievements, on the 
one hand, and freedoms or valuable opportunities from which one can choose, on the other. 
According to Gasper (2002:11), the term “valuable” implies that only desirable options of beings 
and doings are relevant choices. Negatively valued options like the option to become HIV-positive 
are not components of well-being.12A person’s capability is relevant to his or her well-being from 
                                                          
12 As I argued in the introduction of Chapter One, well-being extends only to those things that are objectively good 
for a person.  
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two perspectives, firstly, if the achieved functionings constitute a person’s well-being, the 
capability to achieve functionings constitutes the person’s effective freedom to achieve a desired 
or valued state of being (well-being freedom). Secondly, achieved well-being is dependent on the 
capability to function, and choosing may itself be a valuable part of living, and a life of genuine 
choice with serious options is arguably richer than a life with little freedom to choose between 
different valuable functionings (Sen 1992:41). 
A person’s functionings and her capability are closely related but distinct. For Sen (1987:36), a 
functioning is an achievement, whereas a capability is the ability to achieve. Functionings are, in 
a sense, different aspects of our living conditions. They are states of being like being well 
nourished or being literate. For Nussbaum (2011:25) functionings are beings and doings that are 
the realizations of capabilities. Capabilities, by contrast, are notions of freedom, in the positive 
sense: what real opportunities you have regarding the life you may lead (Sen 1987:36). In other 
words, capability means freedom or the opportunity to select valued functionings. The distinction 
between achieved functionings and capabilities is thus between the realized and the effectively 
possible; in other words, between achievements and freedoms (Sen 1987:95). What is ultimately 
important is that people have the freedoms (capabilities) to lead the kind of lives they want to lead, 
to do what they want to do and be the person they want to be.  
The evaluative focus of the capability approach can be either on the realized functionings (what a 
person is actually able to do) or on the capability set of alternatives she has (her real opportunities) 
(Sen 1999:75). Realized functionings and the capability set of alternatives give different types of 
information: the former about the things a person does and the latter about the things a person is 
substantively free to do. Both versions can be used, either separately or combined. Either way, the 
main argument of the CA is that for well-being evaluation, the appropriate space is neither that of 
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utilities, nor of primary goods, but the space of the substantive freedoms – the capabilities – to 
choose a life one has reason to value (Sen 1999:74).  
When understood in this way, the CA enables us to make interpersonal comparisons of well-being. 
For example, a test of equality between different people is assessing whether their capability sets 
are equal or unequal. Instead of focusing on the resources or primary goods they have, we rather 
assess what they are able to do or be with these resources. The real freedoms people have to live 
the lives they value is what matters to well-being. For example, two people, A and B work and 
live in different cities, but both earn 5000 USD and have similar budgets per month. Both rent 
similar houses, but because A lives in the capital city, he pays five times more rent than B. Security 
and health cost more in the capital, and therefore A spends three times more money than B uses 
on these same services. If we are to use resources or primary goods to assess the well-being of 
these two persons, our conclusion will be that they both live similar lives, but it is clear that, 
comparatively, the range of things that A can do and be is much constrained. The CA is attractive 
in the assessment of well-being precisely because it focuses on real lives lived (ends) rather than 
resources (means) which sometimes mislead. I clarify the distinction between ends and means in 
the section below.  
1.2 Means versus ends 
According to Robeyns (2005:95) a key analytical distinction in the capability approach is that 
between the means and the ends of well-being. Only the ends have intrinsic importance, whereas 
means are instrumental to reach the goal of increased well-being. For Robeyns (2011:7) the 
approach stresses that we should always be clear, when valuing something, whether we value it as 
an end in itself, or as a means to a valuable end. This implies that the capability approach evaluates 
policies and other changes according to their impact on people’s capabilities as well as their actual 
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functionings. The main reason why the capability approach holds that it is better to focus on the 
ends rather than the means is that people differ in their ability to convert means into valuable 
opportunities (capabilities) or outcomes (functionings) (Robeyns 2011:7; Sen 1992:1). Since ends 
are what ultimately matter when thinking about well-being and the quality of life, means can only 
work as reliable proxies of people’s opportunities to achieve those ends if they all have the same 
capacities or powers to convert those means into equal capability sets.  
This means-ends distinction is what ultimately makes the CA a unique and attractive framework 
for evaluating well-being. This argument, as Deneulin and McGregor (2010:505) point out, does 
not imply that incomes and commodities (means) are not necessary, but rather that, if we are 
concerned with well-being outcomes, we need to expand the informational basis for assessing 
well-being, since income is not an end in itself but a means to further human ends. What is 
ultimately important is to create an enabling environment for people to enjoy long, healthy and 
creative lives, but this is often forgotten in the immediate concern with the accumulation of 
commodities and financial wealth (ibid: 505). Human well-being is thus not captured by aggregate 
income measures, and is not about the resources people have, but about what they are able to do 
and to be with what they have, such as living long and healthy lives, being educated, or having a 
voice to participate in decisions which affect their lives (ibid: 505). It is therefore the space of 
capabilities that matters, rather than the space of means. This is where traditional mainstream 
welfare economics failed with regard to assessing well-being. In the next section, I will analyse 
the concept of capability further by discussing Nussbaum’s specific understanding of this concept.  
1.3 Nussbaum’s combined capabilities 
For Nussbaum (2011) the capabilities that we defined above as substantive freedoms should in fact 
be referred to as combined capabilities. They are combined capabilities in the sense that they are 
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freedoms created by a combination of internal personal abilities (or capabilities) and the political, 
social, and economic environment. They are the totality of opportunities one has for choice and 
action in his or her specific political, social and economic situation (Nussbaum 2011:20). An 
understanding of Nussbaum’s idea of combined capabilities helps us understand her proposed list 
of capabilities in particular, and her view of justice in general. Of particular note is the special 
attention she gives to what she refers to as internal capabilities, which she proposes should be 
distinguished from combined capabilities. Internal capabilities are different from innate or 
personal natural traits, but they are abilities, skills, or traits that result from interacting with the 
social, economic, familial, and political environment (Nussbaum 2011:21). Nussbaum advises that 
it is important to distinguish internal capabilities from combined capabilities (of which they are a 
part) because there are instances when a society might do well in producing internal capabilities 
but hinder people from having the opportunity to function in accordance with those capabilities. 
For example, a society may develop the internal capability of free speech in its people but then 
deny them free expression in practice through repression of speech. A clearer example is that of 
people who have internal capabilities for political participation but are unable to make use of them 
in the sense of combined capabilities because they may be immigrants without legal rights; or in 
some cases, the state may use violence to hinder people from participating (Nussbaum 2011:22). 
Finally, Nussbaum argues that a society cannot develop citizens’ combined capabilities without 
developing their internal capabilities, although it is possible for society to do well in creating 
contexts for choice in many areas but not to educate its citizens or nourish the development of their 
powers of mind. For example, it would be grossly undesirable to have a society in which the 
external conditions for free speech are available, but lacking a people with the internal (rational, 
emotional etc.) ability to make use of this freedom. For Nussbaum (2011:21), it is the duty of 
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society to develop these internal capabilities through education and, support for family care, and 
through availing resources to enhance physical and emotional health, among other interventions. 
This basically is her concept of combined capabilities. 
It is to Nussbaum’s credit that she has managed to clearly define the components or the constituent 
parts of a capability. It is beyond contest that a capability is characterized by both internal and 
“external”13 components as she defines them. However, in my view the concepts of combined 
capabilities and internal capabilities are far from convincing. If the ontology of a capability is 
internal personal skills plus favourable social, economic and political factors, internal skills alone 
cannot therefore be capabilities. For example, if water is made up of hydrogen and oxygen, 
hydrogen alone cannot constitute water. Both hydrogen and oxygen are needed to produce water. 
A component cannot be a component and a whole at the same time. For this reason, it is difficult 
to make sense of the separate concepts of internal capabilities and combined capabilities. If by 
capability we mean effective freedom or real opportunity, by implication, both internal and 
external components are present, otherwise it is not a capability. Nussbaum wants us to accept that 
internal skills or traits are capabilities, as is evident on her proposed list of capabilities, but she is 
unwilling to say the same for external components, and so she does not talk of “external 
capabilities”. The fundamental question I ask in this regard is: What are the pre-conditions of a 
capability or real opportunity? In my view, effective freedom requires two preconditions: (1) the 
necessary material or institutional means to satisfy one’s valued aims, and (2) developed and 
operational mental faculties. Nussbaum, however, reasons that we can talk of “internal capability” 
if at a given time a person can achieve a particular aim, should the appropriate circumstances 
present themselves. For example, all adult persons, for her, have the internal capability for 
                                                          
13 The term is in quotes because Nussbaum has for some reason avoided using it. 
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religious freedom and the freedom of speech (Nussbaum 2000: 84). My argument is that the 
absence of an enabling external environment takes away the capability. A permanently blindfolded 
person no longer has the capability of sight. The capability is present only when the person has 
real freedom to see. Either the capability is present or it is not. It is because of the above 
considerations that I am inclined to argue that the notion of combined capabilities does not add 
anything to the concept of capability in the same sense that the concept of combined water does 
not add anything to the concept of water. 
 This leads me to argue that there is no fundamental difference between Sen’s and Nussbaum’s 
concepts of capability. Even though Nussbaum mentions several levels of capability, beginning 
with basic to internal capabilities, the resultant combined capabilities mean no more than what Sen 
simply calls capability without the adjective “combined”. Most definitions of capability are general 
and do not specify whether a given definition of capability is coming from either Sen or Nussbaum. 
What is important to note at this stage is that both Sen and Nussbaum agree that capabilities and 
functionings are the objects that should be considered relevant in the assessment of well-being. 
They agree that we must shift our evaluations of well-being away from utilities or income to 
capabilities and functionings. As Alkire (2010: 4) points out, all formulations of the capability 
approach agree that two concepts are central to the approach: freedom (capability) and valuable 
beings and doings (functionings). This conceptual convergence among the CA theorists trumps 
their disagreements on components of capabilities and on whether there should or should not be a 
recommended list of capabilities. My position here allows me to use the concept of capability 
freely, without having to constantly specify whether I will be using Sen’s or Nussbaum’s concept.  
Having defined the central concepts of the capability approach, in the section below I analyse the 
concept of human development – a concept that is intricately connected with the concept of 
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capabilities. According to the CA, well-being is conceptualized and assessed in terms of 
capabilities and functionings. The concept of human development to be discussed in the following 
section comes in here as the process of expanding capabilities (see Sen 1999:3). Almost all CA 
theorists, with the exception of Nussbaum, have embraced Sen’s view that human development is 
the process of enlarging people’s freedoms and opportunities (capabilities) – in  in short, their 
well-being. Nussbaum disagrees with this claim, as she thinks that human development gives only 
a partial account of well-being because it was introduced only for human beings and for political 
purposes, and is thus not a comprehensive doctrine of well-being. She therefore develops an 
expanded concept of well-being that encompasses other species like animals, plants and the world 
of nature (Nussbaum 2003:42). As I have indicated earlier. I will not pursue Nussbaum’s expanded 
conception of well-being here and will restrict my focus to well-being as it pertains to human 
beings. Regardless of Nussbaum’s concerns, the concept of human development is so central to 
the capability approach and human well-being that it needs a detailed analysis. 
1.4 The concept of human development  
The term “human development” qualifies the term of development through the addition of the 
adjective “human”. This move is the brainchild of Mahbub ul Haq (1934-1998), a Pakistani 
economist who, in the 1990s, helped in developing the United Nations’ (UN) Human Development 
Reports (HDR) (Haq 1995:25). For Alkire (2010:2), the concept of human development is 
conceptually founded on, and is one example of, the application of the Capability Approach. The 
UN’s Human Development Reports (HDR), which have been inspired particularly by Sen’s 
capability approach, describe the objective of development as that of expanding capabilities, or, 
simply put, “expanding people’s choices” (see HDR 1990:10). The idea, then, is that human 
development is a process of nurturing and improving well-being. In other words, the objective or 
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end of development is well-being, and the process involves enlarging people’s freedoms and 
opportunities (Alkire 2010:2). This is the view of development that I have adopted for this 
dissertation. I am however aware that Sen does not only use the concept human development to 
refer to the expansion of well-being related freedoms. For Sen, human development has a much 
broader objective than well-being. In effect, well-being is only one of the two main objectives of 
human development. While development is the process of expanding the real freedoms that people 
enjoy, freedom itself can be sub-divided into well-being freedom and agency freedom. While these 
two types of freedom are closely related and interdependent (Sen 1999:40), they are nevertheless 
analytically distinct. Well-being freedom relates to the enrichment of human life, and in this regard 
human development advances human well-being. Agency freedom, on the other hand, relates to a 
person’s freedom to promote certain causes and the occurrence of certain things, even though this 
may not advance his or her well-being and may even lower it (Sen 1988:41). For example, a person 
may value the freedom to be a political activist, constantly demonstrating for more political rights, 
but this may result in him or her getting beaten up by the police from time to time and spending 
long periods in detention. This person will be valuing her agency freedom – respecting her ability 
to form goals, commitments and values (ibid: 41). This freedom is, in a sense, aimed at well-being 
– particularly community well-being, because there is some value (or expected positive outcome) 
in, say, fighting for the rights of children, or some other community values – without yet being 
equivalent to well-being itself. In my view, even agency freedom contributes significantly to well-
being if we admit that having the capability to form and shape our goals is psychologically 
rewarding. In view of my argument in Chapter One that well-being extends only to those aspects 
that are objectively good for the person, I am of the opinion that agency freedom contributes to 
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well-being to the extent that it is objectively good for the person. Generally, I adopt Alkire’s 
(2010:2) view that human development is the process of nurturing well-being. 
The general motivation for the idea of human development is to “re-direct” the function of 
economics in nurturing human well-being. In earlier times, economics was a branch of ethics (see 
Sen 1988:2), and was supposed to concern itself with “how people ought to live”. Sen (1988) and 
Haq (1995) both believe that modern economics has overlooked this important function, as 
evidenced by its preoccupation with economic growth, without due attention being paid to how 
this growth affects people’s lives. In coming up with the concept of human development, Sen, Haq 
and others, remind us that the basic objective of development is to create an enabling environment 
for people to enjoy long, healthy and creative lives. The human development concept, according 
to Fukuda-Parr (2003:117), unlike the monetary (economic) concept of development, serves the 
broader objectives of human well-being; for it stresses that the purpose of development is to 
enlarge people’s choices. The Human Development Report (HDR) of 1990 lists the most critical 
of these wide-ranging human choices as: to live a long and healthy life, to be educated and to have 
access to resources needed for a decent standard of living. Additional choices include political 
freedom, guaranteed human rights and personal self-respect (HDR 1990:10).  
According to Haq, the defining difference between the economic growth and human development 
approaches is that economic growth focuses exclusively on the expansion of only one choice – 
income – while human development embraces the enlargement of all human choices, economic, 
social, cultural and political. The main problem with the income-growth approach to well-being is 
that it takes it for granted that economic growth or an increase in national income improves 
people’s well-being as well. Admittedly, that may be the case, but that connection (income to well-
being) is by no means a necessary one. As Haq (1995:14) rightly points out, income may be 
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unevenly distributed in society (which is the case in most countries), or else national priorities as 
chosen by rulers (for example guns instead of butter) may not be for the betterment of people’s 
lives. In such instances economic growth does not trickle down.  
Although both Haq and Sen have written on human development – Haq in Reflections on Human 
Development (1995), and Sen in Development as Freedom (1999) – in the rest of this section I will 
focus on Sen's version of development because of its special emphasis on freedoms and because 
we can directly deduce that it has its theoretical foundations in the CA. The idea of capability is in 
turn critical for my dissertation because I link the concept of capability with that of citizenship. 
If we may focus specifically on Sen’s concept of human development, he conceives development 
as a process of expanding the real freedoms that people enjoy (Sen 1999:3). This arises from the 
key idea of the capability approach that social arrangements should aim to expand people’s 
capabilities – their freedom to promote or achieve valuable beings and doings. Development, then, 
is the expansion of capabilities, the expansion of the range of things that a person can be and do, 
such as to be healthy and well nourished, to be knowledgeable, and to participate in community 
life. Seen from this viewpoint, development is about removing the obstacles to what a person can 
do in life, obstacles such as illiteracy, ill health, lack of access to resources, or lack of civil and 
political freedoms. The development process is one of giving individuals the freedom to realize 
more and better functionings and the removal of major sources of unfreedoms like poverty, 
tyranny, and poor economic opportunities as well as systematic social deprivation14 (Sen 1999:3). 
In other words, an essential test of development is whether people have greater freedoms. To this 
                                                          
14 Here I only flag the centrality of the state and citizenship to the process of development if development is understood 
this way. This argument will be expanded in Chapter Three. 
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end, Sen argues that if freedom is what development advances, concentration should therefore be 
on that overarching objective, rather than on some particular means.  
Focusing on developing human freedoms, according to Sen, contrasts with narrower views of 
development such as identifying development with the growth of the GNP, a rise in personal 
incomes, technological advance, or social modernization. The GNP was never suited to be a 
measure of development. It was designed to measure monetized activity, much of which represents 
lack or loss of well-being. For example, Sen (1999:5-6) points out that opulence or income per 
head (e.g. per capita GDP) fails to take into account the many factors that may affect the ability of 
different groups and different individuals to convert income into well-being. There are many 
factors critical in evaluating well-being other than people’s incomes, assets, and levels of 
satisfaction or desire fulfilment, all the things traditionally considered by mainstream economics. 
To this end, the process of development should be evaluated or assessed in terms of whether the 
freedoms that people have are enhanced (Sen 1999: 4). The success of society is to be primarily 
assessed by the substantive freedoms that the members of that society enjoy (Sen 1999:18). 
Examples of well-being freedoms are those of avoiding premature death, avoiding death from 
curable diseases, avoiding hunger and so on. These freedoms have a direct bearing on human well-
being, and progress has to be assessed primarily in terms of whether the well-being freedoms of 
people are being enhanced. 
However, a person can have goals and values other than the pursuit of their own well-being (Sen 
1992:56). Since capabilities are an expression of freedom, what people are actually able to do or 
to be, “to choose to live as they desire”, they also incorporate the notion of agency, what Sen refers 
to as “agency freedom”. A person’s agency achievement refers to the realization of goals and 
values he/she has reasons to pursue, whether or not they are connected with their own well-being. 
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If a person aims at, for example, the development of their country or the cleanliness of their 
community, their agency achievement would involve the evaluation of states of affairs in the light 
of those objectives, and not merely in the light of the extent to which they contribute to their own 
well-being (Sen 1992: 56). Agency in this case is concerned with the individual’s freedom to 
choose and bring about the things that he/she values, social or political. To this end, an agent is 
someone who acts and brings about change, as a member of the public and as a participant in 
economic, social and political actions, whose achievement can be judged in terms of their own 
values and objectives, whether or not they are assessed in terms of external values as well (Sen 
1999:19). In other words, in Sen’s work, the term “human agency” represents people's ability to 
act on behalf of goals that matter to them, and this aspect of freedom, Sen argues, is a core 
ingredient of positive social change (Alkire 2005: 218). Agency means a responsible autonomy, 
an other-regarding way of deciding and acting. It may even lead to acts that decrease our well-
being to the advantage of other persons, as when one gets beaten by the police in the street while 
demonstrating for children’s rights. As Sen (1999: 19) states, “The people have to be seen ... as 
being actively involved – given the opportunity – in shaping their own destiny”. Alkire (2005: 
219) links Sen’s use of the term agency with the concept of “empowerment”. The term 
“empowerment” is not one that Sen’s capability approach often employs, but it is related to, 
although not synonymous with, an increase in human agency. What this means is that for Sen 
human development has a much broader objective than enhancing well-being. It also entails 
expanding people’s agency freedoms. Although Sen makes a distinction between well-being 
freedom and agency freedom, I have argued above that it is possible to view freedoms as 
contributing to well-being. For example, participating in a demonstration for a worthy cause may 
contribute to one’s well-being through the achievement of some personal (or psychological) 
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satisfaction. It must be conceded, however, that an undertaking might end in frustration and failure, 
while still counting as an instance of agency freedom. Thus, while it is possible that agency 
freedom often contributes to well-being, it is not inevitable that it would do so in every case. Sen’s 
argument should therefore make us careful not to turn well-being into a single master value that 
would trump all other considerations. 
All in all, the CA in all its forms, including the human development approach is theoretically 
attractive. But how should we measure people’s quality of life at the practical level? How are we 
to rank countries using the capability or freedoms approach? Such questions provide a background 
to the development of the Human Development Index (HDI) which was developed Mahbub ul-
Haq with the help of Amartya Sen and launched in 1990. According to Nussbaum (2011:59), Haq 
believed that nations accustomed to seeing a single ranking like the GDP or the PQLI would accept 
nothing but a similar single ranking. The formulation of the HDI was therefore strategic. This 
explanation, however, does little to counter the various criticisms targeted at the HDI, as the 
discussion in the next section will show. 
1.5 The Human Development Index (HDI)  
The Human Development Index, or HDI, is a capability-based index for measuring a country’s 
human development or well-being and is intended to provide an alternative to the still common 
practice of evaluating a country’s progress using GNP or per capita national income. Mahbub ul-
Haq actively participated in its formulation (see Haq 1995). The HDI seeks to capture both 
economic growth and improvements in the quality of life, and is thus a better measure of well-
being compared to the use of GDP. It comprises three indicators: longevity, knowledge and income 
(Haq 1995:49). Longevity is measured by life expectancy at birth as the sole unadjusted indicator. 
Knowledge is measured by two stock variables, adult literacy and the mean years of schooling, 
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with a weight of two-thirds given to literacy and one-third to mean years of schooling. The income 
variable captures a bundle of goods and services needed for the best use of capabilities, or in other 
words, a level of income regarded as adequate for a reasonable standard of living (Haq 1995:49). 
The HDI itself is a weighted average of these three variables. 
According to Gatt (2005:23) the major strength of the HDI is that it presents a single measure of 
development which takes into account the economic and social aspects of human life. To this end, 
this has served to broaden public interest in the other variables, notably education and health, 
which are crucial factors in human development or well-being. In other words, the HDI promotes 
more dimensions of well-being in addition to income. Moreover, this measure is easily comparable 
between countries, and is flexible enough to accommodate some refinements (Haq 1995:56). 
However, the HDI has also been extensively criticized. I focus here on Elain Gatt’s (2005) 
criticisms of the HDI, as they are representative of the most common problems with employing 
the HDI. The obvious criticisms relate to the equal weighting of the three indexes, and the 
inattention to a host of other important dimensions relating to development, such as the presence 
of democracy, good governance of society, a fair judicial system, housing quality, pollution, 
gender equality, corruption, crime rates, unemployment, quality and variety of goods and services, 
economic growth, and quality of education. Haq acknowledges that this criticism is justified, but 
he defends the use of a limited number of variables, arguing that more variables blur the main 
trends and confuse the picture and therefore it is reasonable to keep the index sharp and simple 
rather than integrating everything into the HDI (Haq 1995:58). Too many variables would 
exacerbate the weighting problem, as some variables involve serious measurement problems. It is 
better that some legitimate concerns, that have been left out, be studied separately.  
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Another challenge with regard to HDI is that there is not enough justification underlying the choice 
of the indicators within the HDI (Gatt 2005:24). The Human Development Report (1993) gives a 
brief explanation as to why each indicator was chosen and outlines the relative advantages as well 
disadvantages, but the reasoning is far from convincing. For example, it is stated that the advantage 
of the use of the life expectancy variable is that its variance across individuals within a country is 
likely to be much smaller than that of income. However, Gatt thinks that there could be equally 
important indicators which could be used, such as infant mortality. Proponents of the HDI should 
give more justification as to why this variable is weightier than other possible variables.  
Gatt directs another criticism at the literacy variable. The variable involves a combination of two 
indicators, adult literacy rate and the mean years of schooling for individuals over 25 years of age. 
Yet literacy is quite difficult to measure (Gatt 2005:25). She thinks that non-traditional modes of 
acquiring education should also be incorporated in the HDI, though it would be difficult to obtain 
reliable data on these issues across countries and over time. Haq (1995:60) responds that the fact 
that the HDI uses unreliable data does not mean we should stop using the HDI, but all that is 
needed is to improve it. His argument is that the HDI is at least an improvement over other 
measures, like the GDP, which also suffer from the problem of unreliable data. The third indicator, 
namely income per capita, is commonly viewed as the most problematic one. The indicator used 
is per capita GDP in purchasing power parity (PPP) dollars. For Gatt (2005:26), apart from the 
discounting procedure used, there is the problem of income distribution, which, if very uneven, 
can be a misleading indicator of well-being of households. Other researchers question the 
relevance of the HDI for industrialized nations, commenting that the approach is more suited for 
developing countries. In addition, one may also argue that the HDI is simply an adjustment to GDP 
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statistics without fundamentally altering their results, given that there is a strong correlation 
between health, education and GDP per capita (ibid: 26; see also Chowdhury 1990:26).  
It can also be argued that the HDI, although used as a yardstick, is less about human development 
than about the state’s ability to present a picture according to its interests. Gatt (2005:25) suggests 
that although longevity is not something that can be played around with easily by government 
statistics, small changes in this variable lead to substantial differences in the place the country 
occupies in the HDI. It would not be a surprise that certain authoritarian regimes are ready to add 
three or four additional months to their citizen’s average lifespan. For another thing, the HDI does 
not make any reference to the quality of education. Just like real incomes and life span, school 
enrolment statistics can be manipulated at will. For example, two countries producing equal 
amount of goods with equal longevity and education levels must have the same HDI. However if 
one of the countries spends much more on defence than the other, the level of welfare in the two 
countries will be different. This will reduce the disposable income and make the country less 
affluent than the other. The HDI does not take this into account (Gatt, 2005:25). 
The last issue Gatt notes with regard to HDI relates to the reliability and accuracy of statistics 
(ibid:25). One has to keep in mind that data are very often dependent on sample surveys and 
censuses, which are not necessarily carried out by every country and over sufficiently frequent 
periods. Furthermore, the political sensitivity of the HDI may encourage statistical forgery. 
Countries trying to attract tourists or foreign investment may resort to providing inaccurate 
statistics just to present that favourable picture. It is important to note that the human development 
approach to well-being gave birth to the Human Development Index (HDI), but, as this discussion 
has demonstrated, the HDI is grossly inadequate as a measure of well-being. Although an 
improvement over income measures, the HDI measure poorly represents the human development 
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approach to human well-being. It is that movement from human development theory to the HDI 
index that needs reworking. 
All in all, Haq (1995:59) admits that human development is a much richer concept than the HDI 
can ever hope to capture. He also acknowledges that the HDI is neither perfect nor fully developed. 
My position on this is that the HDI need not be rejected, but requires improvement in light of the 
criticisms mentioned above. The several shortcomings discussed in this section are just too many 
to ignore, but we also need to acknowledge the contribution of the HDI so far, particularly in the 
operations of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The HDI is discussed in this 
section as an extension of the discussion on the concept of human development. It is critical to 
point out that most researchers who have adopted the concept of human development have not 
extended the same allegiance to the HDI.  
Moving on, an analysis of the CA and human development will be incomplete without discussing 
whether or not the CA theorists should propose and defend a list of capabilities – substantive 
freedoms, in Sen’s terminology – that states ought to advance or protect. In other words, should 
we operationalize the CA by drawing and justifying a clear list of capabilities to which 
governments and other policy-makers can refer? I deal with these questions in the next section. 
2. Capability lists versus public reasoning 
In all his writings, Sen has refrained from recommending a list of capabilities that matter to human 
well-being, arguing that the selection and weighting of capabilities depend on personal value 
judgments, which are partly influenced by the nature, context and purpose of the evaluative 
exercise (which could vary). Of even greater concern to him is the consideration that providing 
such a list does not respond to public reason and the formation of social values (Sen 2004:78). Sen 
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wants the CA to remain as a framework because capability assessment can be used for different 
purposes (varying from poverty evaluation to the assessment of human rights or of human 
development), and public reasoning and discussion are necessary for selecting relevant capabilities 
and weighing them against each other in each context. It would therefore be a mistake “to build a 
mausoleum for a “fixed and final” list of capabilities usable for every purpose and unaffected by 
the progress of understanding of the social role and importance of different capabilities” (Sen 
2004:77). The choice of relevant capabilities has to be related to the underlying social concerns 
and values within a particular society. For Sen, it is the public reasoning in each society which is 
to determine which capabilities are valuable to promote. Public reason requires that the moral or 
political rules that regulate our common life be, in some sense, justifiable or acceptable to all those 
persons over whom the rules purport to have authority. This idea implies that, in certain contexts, 
citizens have a moral (not legal) obligation to give public reasons (Rawls (1997:776). This 
obligation follows from a political conception of the citizen combined with reasonable pluralism, 
the idea that under free political institutions, there will not be consensus on comprehensive 
conceptions of the good. Embracing public reason is a response to reasonable pluralism 
representative of the citizen's ethical capacity to be reasonable, in Rawls’s technical sense of the 
term: “the ethical capacity to propose and abide by fair terms of social cooperation” (ibid: 776). 
For Rawls, civility requires giving public reasons that respect everyone’s status as free and equal. 
We ought to reason with each other on political issues, and we want fundamental political policies 
to be debated and be endorsable by all reasonable citizens. Similarly, Sen (2004:80) believes that 
public discussion and reasoning can lead to a better understanding of the role, reach, and the 
significance of particular capabilities. Different societies have different priorities at each given 
time and such priorities can become known through public discussion. It is mainly for this reason 
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that Sen discourages providing a list of capabilities cast in stone, as that would displace the need 
for continued public reasoning (Sen 2005:157).  
Sen’s position above has largely been unacceptable to the majority of capability approach 
adherents. Thus Alkire (2005:122) argues that, without specification of valuable capabilities, the 
capability approach is fundamentally incomplete. Researchers insist that capability theories of 
well-being should include lists of basic capabilities, arguing that without such lists attempts to 
operationalize the approach would not succeed (see Srinivasan 2009; Nussbaum 2003; Smith and 
Seward 2009). They argue that Sen should have been specific about which capabilities matter, 
which ones matter more than others, and why. Accordingly, Srinivasan (2009:460) argues that, 
from a purely practical perspective, Sen’s “silence” on this is an obstacle for operationalizing the 
capability approach. In the same vein, Nussbaum (2003:35) believes that Sen’s argument for the 
importance of capabilities does not take us very far, because, although his consideration of 
capabilities gives us a general sense of what societies ought to be striving to achieve, the reluctance 
to make commitments about substance (which capabilities a society ought most centrally to 
pursue) means that the guidance remains but an outline (Nussbaum, 2003:35). For Sen’s critics, it 
is precisely this shortcoming that begets the operational weakness of the capability approach.  
Secondly, the capability approach’s strength as a strong normative foundation is argued to be weak 
at the practical level, because the relatively abstract nature of the capabilities/functionings 
language leaves a lot of room for misinterpretation, rendering the approach difficult to 
operationalize. In addition, deliberation on such concepts proceeds through the philosophical 
method of practical reason, which is the general human capacity for resolving, through reflection, 
the question of what one is to do. But such deliberation raises two sets of philosophical problems. 
First, there are questions about how deliberation can succeed in being practical in its issue. 
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Practical reason takes a distinctively normative question as its starting point. It typically asks which 
set of alternatives for action none of which has yet been performed, what one ought to do, or which 
it would be best to do. It is thus concerned not with matters of fact and their explanation, but with 
matters of value, of what it would be desirable to do. Governments and some policy makers who 
may need to make use of the CA, however, may not have the patience or the luxury to regularly 
go through the rigorous process demanded by the ethics of practical reasoning. They require 
concrete descriptions of capabilities and of the specific goods that they should provide to the 
citizens. The capability approach can provide useful guidance in this regard “only if we formulate 
a definite list of the most central capabilities, even one that is tentative and revisable” (Nussbaum, 
2003: 36). 
It should be pointed out, however, that Sen is not completely against formulating lists of 
capabilities. He admits that he has on several occasions discussed the relevance of many 
capabilities that would seem to demand attention in any theory of justice, and more generally in 
social assessment – such capabilities as the freedom to be well nourished, to live disease-free lives, 
to move around, to be educated, to participate in public life, and so on (Sen 2004:78). He is, 
however, against the fixing of a cemented list of capabilities which is absolutely complete (nothing 
could be added to it) and totally fixed (it could not respond to public reasoning and to the formation 
of social values).  
In this dissertation, I argue that the capabilities approach is a better framework for conceptualizing 
and evaluating human well-being. In my view, understanding development as the process of 
expanding the real opportunities (capabilities) people require in order to live valuable lives is far 
more justifiable than thinking of development in terms of increasing utility, command of resources 
or income. However, I also subscribe to Nussbaum’s (2003:36) argument that the capabilities 
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approach can supply definite and useful guidance, and prove useful to the cause of human 
development, only if we formulate a definite list of the most central capabilities, even one that is 
tentative and revisable, using capabilities so defined as to elaborate and make clear what societies 
should strive for. There is no harm in proposing revisable lists, and in fact public debate proceeds 
from given proposals. Although I am following Nussbaum’s argument on the need to specify 
capabilities, my focus is nevertheless narrower than hers, owing to the fact that I am only 
concerned with human capabilities (at least in this dissertation), whereas Nussbaum’s concept of 
capabilities is broader. In this dissertation, I am proposing a particular way of completing the CA 
with regard to human well-being. In order to prepare the ground for my own argument, I first 
analyse a number of other proposals for giving content to well-being and thus completing the CA 
in the following section.  
3. Attempts at completing the CA 
I have stated in the Introduction and in Section Four above that the CA can become more useful if 
it is completed by adding content to it through either clearly defining these capabilities or 
endorsing a revisable list of capabilities, which can be refined from time to time, if need be, through 
a process of public discussion. There are several attempts in that direction, but I discuss two of 
them, one by Nussbaum (2003) and the other by Robeyns (2003). I have chosen the two lists 
because they have shaped the development of my argument in Chapter Five. In arguing that well-
being capabilities are essentially citizenship rights, I am making a similar proposal to the two lists, 
the only difference being in my focus. Although Robeyns’ methodology for selecting capabilities 
provides clear guidelines for those wishing to recommend some capabilities, her eventual list of 
capabilities is concerned more with the special freedoms of women and is thus specific with respect 
to that group. There is, however, a central theme running through both Nussbaum’s and Robeyns’ 
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proposed lists below, namely the vital role of the state or government in securing or ensuring 
capabilities. This is important for my own attempt to conceive of citizenship as a core or 
architectonic capability. I analyse the two capability lists one after another. Of the two lists, 
Nussbaum’s is the most debated, and I analyse it first. 
3.1 Nussbaum’s list of capabilities 
Nussbaum (1995, 2001, 2003, 2005, 2011) presents a list of central human capabilities that are 
anchored on two levels of a universalistic conception of the human being. She claims that her 
approach is “universalistic” and “essentialist”, meaning that focus is on universal or essential 
human attributes. The idea is to avoid the prejudices, biases, discriminations and inequalities that 
come with relativistic approaches that define, say, men and women separately. The key question 
is, “What similarities do all human beings share?” Her aim is to develop a list of capabilities and 
functionings based on what we all have in common, not our differences. As human beings there 
are things that we all must have. In view of this, she presents what she refers to as two levels of 
the conception of the human being. The first level defines the shape of the human form of life 
necessary for a life to be human, and these are: mortality, the human body (which needs food, 
water, shelter, and desires sex, and desires mobility), capacity for pleasure and pain, cognitive 
capability (perceiving, imagining, thinking), early infant development, practical reason, affiliation 
with other human beings, relatedness to other species and nature, the need for humor and play, and 
separateness (Nussbaum 1995:508-512). The first level thus defines the concept of human being.  
From this first-level conception of the human being, Nussbaum moves to the second. Here, she 
specifies certain basic functional capabilities at which societies should aim for their citizens, and 
which quality of life measurements should measure (Nussbaum 1995:515). She presents the list as 
a list of capabilities to function, rather than of actual functionings because she thinks that 
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capability, not actual functioning should be the goal of public policy. Promoting capabilities leaves 
room for people to choose the lives they want themselves. Promoting functionings for people might 
be interpreted as being paternalistic, and therefore a violation of individual agency. Below is a 
general list of ‘central human functioning capabilities’ that she proposes should be incorporated in 
all constitutions, and which all governments should endorse:   
1. Life. Being able to live to the end of a human life of normal length; not dying 
prematurely, or before one’s life is so reduced as to be not worth living. 
2. Bodily Health. Being able to have good health, including reproductive health; to be 
adequately nourished; to have adequate shelter. 
3. Bodily Integrity. Being able to move freely from place to place; to be secure against 
violent assault, including sexual assault and domestic violence; having opportunities 
for sexual satisfaction and for choice in matters of reproduction. 
4. Senses, Imagination, and Thought. Being able to use the senses, to imagine, think, and 
reason – and to do these things in a truly “human” way, a way informed and cultivated 
by an adequate education, including, but by no means limited to, literacy and basic 
mathematical and scientific training. Being able to use imagination and thought in 
connection with experiencing and producing works and events of one’s own choice, 
religious, literary, musical, and so forth. Being able to use one’s mind in ways protected 
by guarantees of freedom of expression with respect to both political and artistic 
speech, and freedom of religious exercise. Being able to have pleasurable experiences 
and to avoid non-beneficial pain. 
5. Emotions. Being able to have attachments to things and people outside ourselves; to 
love those who love and care for us, to grieve at their absence; in general, to love, to 
grieve, to experience longing, gratitude, and justified anger. Not having one’s 
emotional development blighted by fear and anxiety. (Supporting this capability means 
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supporting forms of human association that can be shown to be crucial in their 
development.) 
6. Practical Reason. Being able to form a conception of the good and to engage in critical 
reflection about the planning of one’s life. (This entails protection for the liberty of 
conscience and religious observance.) 
7. Affiliation. 
a) Being able to live with and toward others, to recognize and show concern for 
other human beings, to engage in various forms of social interaction; to be able 
to imagine the situation of another. (Protecting this capability means protecting 
institutions that constitute and nourish such forms of affiliation, and also 
protecting the freedom of assembly and political speech.) 
b) Having the social bases of self-respect and non-humiliation; being able to be 
treated as a dignified being whose worth is equal to that of others. 
This entails provisions of nondiscrimination on the basis of race, sex, sexual 
orientation, ethnicity, caste, religion, national origin. 
8. Other Species. Being able to live with concern for and in relation to animals, plants, 
and the world of nature. 
9. Play. Being able to laugh, to play, to enjoy recreational activities. 
10. Control Over One’s Environment. 
a) Political. Being able to participate effectively in political choices that govern 
one’s life; having the right of political participation, protections of free speech 
and association. 
b) Material. Being able to hold property (both land and movable goods), and 
having property rights on an equal basis with others; having the right to seek 
employment on an equal basis with others; having the freedom from 
unwarranted search and seizure. In work: being able to work as a human being, 
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exercising practical reason, and entering into meaningful relationships of 
mutual recognition with other workers (Nussbaum 1995:515-517).  
Nussbaum argues that, “a life that lacks any one of these capabilities, no matter what else it has, 
will fall short of being a good human life” (Nussbaum 1995:517). A closer look at her specific 
capabilities confirms Robeyns’ (2003:75) and my observation above that, for Nussbaum, 
capabilities are related more to people’s skills, innate capabilities and personality traits than being 
understood as real or effective opportunities, and thus Nussbaum’s twin concepts of “internal” and 
“combined” capabilities obscure what she and other CA theorists define as capability. The listed 
capabilities are what Nussbaum calls internal capabilities. I have already shown that Nussbaum is 
not coherent on this point, as she is taking a component of a capability to be the whole capability. 
Although Nussbaum’s list looks attractive at first sight, a closer analysis reveals some serious 
conceptual and practical concerns, as highlighted below.  
Fabre and Miller (2003:8) explain that Nussbaum’s list of capabilities is problematic in at least 
two crucial respects. In the first place, some of the capabilities Nussbaum claims to be central to 
all human beings are contestable. For instance, it is questionable whether a capability such as 
“being able to express oneself artistically” (capability 4) is a capability of paramount importance, 
or that to “live with concern for and in relation to animals, plants and the world of nature” 
(capability 8), is crucial universally. Some people may choose to live without concerning 
themselves with issues such as elephant population, global warming and so on, without any 
consequences to their well-being. In the same vein, some people choose not to practically make 
use of their singing, dancing, or drawing skills, but still are content with their lives. One can also 
argue that Nussbaum concentrates on innate capabilities connected to such a degree with nature or 
psychological inclinations (see capabilities 1, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 9 above) that they are insecurable by 
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the state and also very difficult to evaluate or assess. In as much as they are important capabilities, 
they are beyond the control of positive legislation. What, for example, do states have to do to 
facilitate capabilities of love, or grieving, justified anger (capability 5), or facilitate that people are 
satisfied sexually (capability 3)? What governments can do is protect girls from early and forced 
marriages, protect women from sexual abuse and from cultural practices that may include genital 
mutilation. It is not clear whether this is what Nussbaum recommends that governments do to 
protect the capability of sexual satisfaction. Most of Nussbaum’s capabilities are thus either too 
abstract or so encompassing that it is very difficult to see how they can and ought to be translated 
into practice. Resources permitting, the state can guarantee that that people have adequate 
education, both humanistic and scientific. To that end we can assess (at the capability level) 
whether people have real opportunities to be adequately educated, or we can assess at the 
functioning level whether people are adequately educated, perhaps by looking at the quality of 
their work or their scientific and humanistic products. This is different from assessing whether 
people are imagining or are grieving in particular ways. I therefore strongly disagree with the all-
encompassing nature of Nussbaum’s list of capabilities. 
Secondly, Nussbaum’s approach to capabilities, which she claims to constitute a partial theory of 
justice, is criticised by Macleod (2010:185) for proposing an account of justice founded on human 
agency that is insensitive to the intrinsic goods of childhood. For him, the manner in which all the 
valuable functionings that figure in the definition of capabilities are to be identified and valued 
seems to be a closely associated with the development and exercise of mature agency. Macleod 
particularly attacks Nussbaum’s (2000:72) contention that the true human being that is dignified 
and free is one that uses the human powers of practical reason and sociability to shape its own life 
in cooperation and reciprocity with others, rather than being passively shaped or pushed around 
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by the world like a herd or flock of animals. The conclusion that Macleod draws from this is that 
valuable functionings can only be attained by mature agents who are able to make use of practical 
reason in the adoption and pursuit of ends (ibid: 185). The CA is thus an inadequate account of 
justice if children lack the moral capacities to negotiate choice sets effectively and meaningfully.  
For Richardson (2000:314) Nussbaum’s capability proposal seems to reflect a contemporary 
conception of our duties, duties that we did not have traditionally. For instance, philosophers who 
argue for our duties to other species are divided as to whether these can or should be made out on 
the basis of an appeal to human well-being. It is thus debatable whether this concern belongs on a 
list of basic functionings constitutive of a good human life. A plausible solution would be to 
present human and animal capabilities separately. Mixing different capabilities with a different 
motivation is to some extent problematic. Human beings and animals have different capability 
requirements. This is why Richardson has problems with Nussbaum’s list. Regardless of these 
shortcomings, Nussbaum’s list remains useful for purposes of guiding policy, especially on issues 
of human well-being and justice. In being universalistic, her proposed capabilities appeal to every 
human being and are blind to sex, race, culture or religion.  
Another philosopher who has proposed a determinate list of capabilities is Ingrid Robeyns (2003). 
Her list is, in my view, much clearer for practical purposes, even if she claims that her list is not 
meant for policy decisions. While Robeyns claims that her proposed list of capabilities is 
specifically aimed at women in post-industrialized societies, I see no reason to limit the scope of 
applicability of her capability list in this way. As I hope to show, Robeyns provides us with a 
conception of capabilities that is just as applicable to women in the developing world – and Africa 
in particular – as in the developed world (see Chapter Five, Section Two). Robeyns’s list is 
discussed below. 
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3.2 Robeyns’ list of capabilities 
Robeyns (2003) develops a list of capabilities for the conceptualization of gender inequality in 
what she terms post-industrialized Western societies. Why she chooses to confine the capabilities 
to Western societies is unclear, but she might have been trying to sidestep the complexities of 
cultural and religious differences. It is however desirable that with regard to a particular variable, 
a proposed capability assumes a universal appeal so that we are able to overcome the prejudices 
of local cultures or religions. Even though Robeyns’ list is less commented on than Nussbaum’s, 
I view her list as clearer and more useful for practical purposes than that of Nussbaum. In addition 
Robeyns’ concept of capability closely coheres with that of Sen, as she, just like Sen, focuses on 
real opportunities. She presents her list of essential human capabilities as follows: 
1. Life and physical health: being able to be physically healthy and enjoy a life of normal length.  
2. Mental well-being: being able to be mentally healthy.  
3. Bodily integrity and safety: being able to be protected from violence of any sort. 
4. Social relations: being able to be part of social networks and to give and receive social 
support.  
5. Political empowerment: being able to participate in and have a fair share of influence on 
political decision-making. 
6. Education and knowledge: being able to be educated and to use and produce knowledge.  
7. Domestic work and nonmarket care: being able to raise children and to take care of others. 
8. Paid work and other projects: being able to work in the labor market or to undertake projects, 
including artistic ones. 
9. Shelter and environment: being able to be sheltered and to live in a safe and pleasant 
environment.  
10. Mobility: being able to be mobile. 
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11. Leisure activities: being able to engage in leisure activities.  
12. Time-autonomy: being able to exercise autonomy in allocating one’s time.  
13. Respect: being able to be respected and treated with dignity.  
14. Religion: being able to choose to live or not to live according to a religion”. (Robeyns 
2003:71-2) 
Robeyns’ list also adheres to Sen’s criterion that a list of capabilities must be context-dependent, 
where the context is both the geographical area to which it applies, and the sort of evaluation that 
is to be done (Robeyns 2003:68). I disagree with emphasizing the importance of geographical area 
when recommending lists of capabilities, mainly for the reason that we will then remain 
imprisoned in the problem of adaptation. If for example, we are to respect what women in some 
parts of Africa, Asia and the Middle East value, we are telling ourselves to turn a blind eye to 
injustices they have adapted to – injustices that may however shock the moral conscience of the 
rest of humanity. By presenting a capability list that is sensitive to the values of women in the 
West, Robeyns is implying that oppressed women in other regions should recommend their own 
lists, but the futility of this is that, having adapted to and accepted their cultural and religious 
situations, chances are that such women may recommend real opportunities to be “oppressed”. 
Proposing central capabilities that apply, say, to all women helps us avoid leaving out those women 
who have adapted to conditions of great hardship or deprivation and may claim to prefer such 
conditions to any alternative. Yet it would be highly improbable to suggest that such preferences 
are in the best interests of these individuals’ well-being. Coming up with capability lists that cater 
for specific society is also against the spirit of the capability approach, which argues that all 
individuals should be entitled to certain capabilities regardless of their satisfaction without them 
(see Begon 2014:241). For Begon, instead of a person’s preference determining their specific 
entitlement, “we should come to an overlapping consensus on the opportunities necessary for a 
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flourishing life, which all individuals are then entitled to.” It is for this reason that I think that 
capabilities for evaluating gender inequality should be inclusive of all women anywhere. The 
context and purpose in this case is addressing women’s concerns and gender inequality. As 
Nussbaum (2000:1) argues, women in much of the world suffer similar problems. Women 
everywhere in the world are vulnerable to physical violence and sexual abuse, at home or in the 
workplace. As I will also show in Chapter Five, women in general are exploited in matters of 
property ownership. The degree of exploitation might differ from one society to another, but the 
fact remains that women in general suffer similar challenges. Women in advanced societies like 
Europe, admittedly, are more literate and have better legal protection, but here and there they suffer 
from the same abuses suffered by, say, their African counterparts. In any case, if we are proposing 
a list of capabilities, we propose these at an ideal level, and arguably, when we set models or 
standards, we try as much not to be limited by prevailing circumstances. Models must always be 
pitched above cultural prejudices. If we propose capabilities that rely on or are modelled by a 
particular culture, chances are that we won’t be able to correct the wrongs of that culture because 
there is no higher standard to look up to. 
Robeyns’ list for conceptualizing gender inequality as stated above can be adopted for practical 
purposes – for the purposes of government legislation or policy formulations; but for some reason 
she has exempted her list from such purposes. She has weakened her position by stating that her 
list is appropriate for a range of measurement and evaluative problems, but not for political or 
policy decisions (Robeyns 2003:72). She claims that for political and policy purposes much more 
would need to be said on the importance and type of public debate, and hard issues would need to 
be discussed, such as deciding points on the list where deep disagreements exist. However, most 
capabilities are impossible to achieve or secure without some policy and legislative changes that 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
85 
 
ultimately lead to desired social change. As I have argued in the sections above, a recommended 
list of capabilities can be an ingredient in public debate where adjustments, improvements, 
rejections and refinements can be applied. My aim so far has been to demonstrate my allegiance 
to the CA as a framework for assessing human well-being. As I have so far shown, all CA theorists 
agree that the space of evaluating well-being is the space of capabilities; in other words, a person’s 
well-being is reflected in their capabilities or freedoms to be or do what they have reason to value. 
All of the CA researchers also agree that the goal of social, economic and political processes should 
be to advance a person’s well-being. What is still to be agreed on is the nature of the capabilities 
that should count as being part of the evaluation space. What should be the form of these 
capabilities? Nussbaum and Robeyns have responded by recommending what they deem to be 
central capabilities, but, as the above discussion has shown, their lists have not received the same 
acceptance as the CA itself. However, only some capabilities on these lists have been contested, 
and therefore some of their capabilities can be strongly defended. Those capabilities that widen 
the choices of citizens have, in my view, a strong case in their favour. I discuss this in detail in 
Chapters Four and Five. In the following section, I analyse some of the general criticisms that have 
been levelled against the CA. I intend to demonstrate that most such criticisms only refer to some 
parts of the CA and therefore do not significantly detract from its general appeal.  
 
4. General criticisms against the capability approach  
  
Despite its tremendous influence globally, as evidenced by the ever-increasing quantity of 
supporting authors and literature, the CA has been criticized from several angles. The most 
common criticism against the CA is that it is a liberal-individualist approach that prioritizes 
individual liberty, not social solidarity; the freedom to choose, not the need to belong (Dean 
2009:266). This is essentially a common communitarian criticism against liberalism in general: 
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that human beings cannot be free from their dependency upon other human beings. Secondly, for 
Dean, under capitalist social relations of production, individuals can be free neither from 
hegemonic controls over their participation in the public realm, nor from the direct or indirect 
consequences of the exploitation of human labour (ibid: 267). All in all, the complaint here is that 
the Capability Approach suffers from the same weaknesses as liberalism in general. But is the CA 
excessively individualistic? Does it pay lip service to communal values and inter-personal goods 
such as friendship, respect, and care? My take on this is that friendship and other social relations, 
constitute a part of what people have reason to value. Having a capability to live a life what one 
has a reason to value means, among other things, being able to form relationships and live lives 
free of racial strife. In addition, ontologically speaking, it is by and large the liberal position that 
society is made of individuals. By focusing on the well-being of the individual, we are ultimately 
concerned with the well-being of the collective because the individual is the building block of 
society. Conversely, what would be the justification of concerning ourselves with the well-being 
of the community except in so far this matters to the (current and future) individuals who comprise 
it? In addition to this, philosophers such as Marshall, Rawls, Dworkin, Sen and Nussbaum, among 
others, are welfare liberals. Welfare liberalism, according to Selznic (1987:447) leans toward a 
communitarian perspective, and therefore the antagonism between the CA and communitarianism, 
is to a greater degree exaggerated.15 It is true that welfare liberalism is still committed to individual 
choice. Unlike classical liberalism, however, it reaffirms the role of the political community in 
providing a balance between individual and communal interests. For example, with the doctrine 
he calls the “difference principle”, Rawls (1971) argues that social and economic inequalities may 
                                                          
15 I situate the CA within welfare liberalism 
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be unavoidable, but their moral worth must be evaluated by what they contribute to the well-being 
of the least advantaged members of society. 
From a different perspective, Clark (2006:9) accuses the CA of underplaying the importance of 
negative freedom vis-à-vis positive freedom. The argument is that Sen’s version of the CA seems 
to pay lip service to negative freedoms such as the freedoms of expression and conscience.    
Admittedly, Sen (1999) in particular takes freedom to be the central value in human development. 
For him the expansion of freedom is both the principal means and the primary end of development 
(Sen 1999: xii). This freedom is positive; it is the capacity to be and do and this seems to go in the 
opposite direction to negative freedom, which is freedom from interference. ‘‘Expansion of 
freedom is viewed, in this approach, both as the primary end and as the principal means of 
development’’ (ibid: xii). Clark’s criticism above, in my view, fails to appreciate the connection 
between positive freedom, understood in Sen’s usage of the term, and negative freedom. Having 
the capacity to do or be effectively means there exists a correlative state of non-interference. 
Capacity equals freedom or the absence of obstacles, or what Sen calls “unfreedoms”. Domination 
or interference effectively takes away freedom. The key difference between positive and negative 
freedom is that the former requires intervention, while the latter demands state inaction on 
individual freedoms. To an important extent, these two sets of freedoms work together. Arguably, 
negative freedom is buoyed by positive freedom. A minimum level of, say, economic 
independence and education is necessary for the full exercise of negative rights. For instance, the 
freedoms of expression and political participation necessarily require a certain level of literacy. 
Clark also thinks that the CA concentrates too much on the ends and pays insufficient attention to 
the means of freedom, although these also matter (ibid: 11). The CA, so the argument goes, only 
pays lip service to the important means of freedom such as food, income and other resources. 
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However, Sen does not fail to distinguish between means and ends, and he certainly does not deny 
the importance of means to achieve valuable ends (see Sen 1999: 14-15). The CA does, however, 
require that, when valuing something, we should ascertain whether we value it as an end in itself, 
or as a means to a valuable end. Since the ultimate ends of interpersonal comparisons for the CA 
are people’s capabilities, evaluation of policies and other aspects should be done while focusing 
on their impact on people’s capabilities as well as their actual functionings. Interest is therefore in 
assessing whether people are being educated, are healthy and so on. Consequently, the CA is 
critical of approaches that value the means to well-being to the detriment of the ends, arguing that 
people differ in their ability to convert means into valuable opportunities (capabilities) or outcomes 
(functionings) (Sen 1992: 26–28, 36–38). At the end of the day, it is the ends that matter. 
Another common criticism of the CA is that CA theorists, particularly Sen, appear to suggest that 
the well-being metric should be capabilities (opportunities) rather than functionings 
(achievements) (see Richardson 2000:331). Surely, even a liberal government will sometimes 
rightly be concerned with how citizens function – how healthy or educated they are, and not just 
with how they are capable of functioning? Admittedly, Sen prefers the metric to be capabilities, 
even though he concedes that we can use functionings as well. Sen’s preference for capabilities is 
understandable given the fact that the CA is anchored in Kantian liberalism, which accords central 
importance to the capability to choose for oneself how to live (which, of course, is entirely 
compatible with choosing to live in community with others). In line with the liberal tradition, 
capabilities allow individuals to choose from a range of possible beings and doings, while a focus 
on achievements may suggest some form of paternalism or the privileging of some lives or 
functionings over others.  
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In addition to the above, Richardson is concerned that the CA focuses on the freedoms available 
to each person, while certain crucial concerns of social justice arise and are dealt with only at the 
institutional level. For example, the capability of “living in a non-discriminatory society” is not a 
matter under any one person’s control, and equally obviously depends upon the voluntary choices 
of several thousands of people. It is therefore a social condition, the promotion of which may 
directly form an aspect of the public good (Richardson 2000:331). A possible response to 
Richardson may arise from Nussbaum’s (2006, 2011) recent application of Rawls’s political 
liberalism, particularly the idea of an “overlapping consensus”, which proposes that citizens with 
diverse conceptions of the good can commit to have a consensus on fundamental issues of social 
justice, including issues of individual liberties (see Nussbaum 2006: 388). Such capabilities as 
living a life free from discrimination, or living a life free from violence, emerge and are sustained 
by this overlapping consensus, even though different groups may retain their respective 
conceptions. I am, however, aware that some scholars like Robeyns (2016) and Biondo (2008) are 
critical of Nussbaum’s credentials as a political liberal.  
Given the various criticisms of aspects of the CA discussed above, supporters of a capabilities 
approach may at times struggle satisfactorily to implement it (Dean 2009:266). Thus, despite its 
attractiveness, there is no clear path to translate the CA into practice. However, most criticisms of 
the CA have so far failed to undermine it basic tenets. This is largely due to the fact that the CA is 
continuously being refined, and in fact CA theorists have formed an active association – the Human 
Development and Capability Association (HDCA) – in which the theory is continuously being 
refined and improved in view of emerging criticisms, some of which are cited above. This 
dissertation is one effort to translate the CA into practice in a particular respect, and hence 
contributes to the refutation of the above criticisms. 
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Conclusion 
The main objective of this chapter was to define the CA and the concept of human development 
that developed from it. The sheer amount of available literature on the CA, and the fact that it is 
now used in various ways and in various fields, makes it imperative that anyone who wishes to 
make use of the approach clearly states the conception that he or she has adopted. I have made 
clear in this chapter that I am situating my own analysis and defence of the CA within the human 
development paradigm. This means that even though I will benefit immensely from both Sen and 
Nussbaum’s approaches, I will set aside some aspects of Nussbaum that deal with non-human 
capabilities. Having defined capabilities and human development, the next step in my argument is 
to analyse citizenship in Chapter Three and then defend the position that citizenship is a capability 
in Chapter Five.  
My claim at this stage is that, as compared to theories discussed in Chapter One, the CA is a richer 
and more appropriate framework for evaluating human well-being. It is clear from the discussions 
in this chapter that the CA underscores the position that well-being is multidimensional and it 
therefore provides a richer vantage position for assessing well-being. In other words, by focusing 
on actual freedoms and functionings, the CA is better placed as a framework for evaluating well-
being than the utilitarian or income-based approaches. Theoretical and legal pronouncements are 
meaningless if we do not focus on actual lives. Though useful, the CA as discussed in Section Six 
above is still being refined and as such, some ambiguities and gaps remain. Two common concerns 
that can be singled out are firstly, the lack of agreement on the specific capabilities that matter for 
human well-being, and secondly, it is not yet fully appreciated as to how the CA can be 
implemented in practice. My argument that citizenship is a capability, aims to close some of the 
above gaps. By so arguing, I clarify what I deem to be capabilities and this subsequently provides 
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useful indicators of how the CA can be adapted and adopted for practical use. In Chapters Three 
and Four that follow, I am analysing the concept of citizenship, with the ultimate aim of 
demonstrating that it is a capability. I make the ultimate demonstration of this thesis in Chapter 
Five. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
CITIZENSHIP 
 
Introduction 
Having dealt with the general features of the capability approach and human well-being, and 
having argued that the capability approach is the most appropriate means for assessing well-being, 
I now wish to demonstrate the necessary relationship between citizenship and capability. Through 
this demonstration, which spans this and the next two chapters, I bring out my own proposal for 
completing the CA. At the end of this dissertation I hope to have shown that citizenship – in brief: 
enjoying the formal status of being an equal or full member of the community – is a fundamental 
or architectonic capability, in the sense that it is the condition we require for achieving civil, 
political and social capabilities central to well-being.   In view of this task, I devote the present 
chapter to the notion of citizenship. As the discussion below demonstrates, citizenship is a complex 
and often contested concept that lacks a straightforward definition16 However, my aim here is not 
to offer a final, all-encompassing definition of citizenship, but rather to argue for a particular 
conception of citizenship – that is, one possible interpretation of the concept of citizenship – 
namely citizenship as an architectonic human well-being capability.17 My approach here is largely 
normative, meaning that I will concentrate on how we ought to conceive of citizenship from a 
moral standpoint rather than on how different societies happen to define citizenship in their 
respective jurisdictions. My starting point is an overview of major philosophical discourses on the 
concept of citizenship. 
                                                          
16 For an exposition of “essentially contested concepts”, see Collier et al (2006:214). 
17 For the distinction between concept and conception, see Rawls (1971: 5-6). 
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In recent decades, there has been heightened interest in the topic of citizenship across academic 
disciplines, among them political philosophy, political science, sociology, and law. This interest 
has been informed by the twin processes of general social change and increased human mobility. 
With regard to the former, Miller (2000: 41) notes that members of modern states are in the process 
of adopting an ever more disparate set of personal identities based on religion, personal morality, 
and personal values in general. In addition, increased human mobility has created increasingly 
multicultural and multiracial states, to the effect that modern states have become culturally 
fragmented (see Kymlicka and Norman 1995: 283, Kostakopoulou 2008: 2). As a response to 
increasing internal diversity and the ever-increasing movements across borders, states are 
reconfiguring citizenship and citizenship laws in different ways in an attempt to establish a shared 
basis for living together politically (Miller 2000:41).  
From the perspective of social and political philosophy rather than political practice, there is 
similarly no shared conception of citizenship among researchers. Most analyses of citizenship 
distinguish between liberal and republican models of citizenship (see Abowitz and Harnish 2006; 
Kartal 2002).18 Other theorists, like Delanty (1997), further divide conceptions of citizenship into 
four models which emphasize different dimensions of what membership of a political community 
entails: the rights model (which is founded upon liberalism), the duties model (founded upon 
conservatism), the participation model (founded upon democratic radicalism) and the identity 
model (which is founded upon communitarianism). While I recognise that these are useful analytic 
distinctions that serve to draw our attention to (a) particular feature(s) of citizenship, I will confine 
my focus here to the distinction between the republican and liberal conceptions of citizenship, with 
                                                          
18  I am aware that there is a distinction (though thin) between republicanism and communitarianism. 
Communitarianism is better viewed as a variant of republicanism. I clarify this in sections below.  
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the aim of arguing in favour of a liberal conception of citizenship as being more suited to the 
capability approach (see Robeyns 2003). As the discussion spanning this and the next chapter will 
show, some elements of the civic republican model of citizenship are contrary both to the letter 
and the spirit of the capability approach. In this regard, my argument that citizenship is an 
architectonic capability makes use of the liberal, rather than the civic republican conception of 
citizenship. To reiterate: by arguing that citizenship is a capability, I am not attempting a full and 
final definition of citizenship, but defending a particular normative conception of citizenship 
which, so I will show, is an improvement over other influential conceptions that appeal to more 
restrictive criteria.19  
This and the next chapter are a foundation for the capstone argument in Chapter Five, namely that 
citizenship ought to be understood as the capability to have capabilities. I locate the concept of 
citizenship that I have adopted in the human rights tradition, which I examine in Chapter Four. 
The success of my argument in Chapter Five depends partly on the clarity of the concept of 
citizenship which I develop here. Thus, in Section One of this chapter, I analyse what has come to 
be known as the “thick” (civic republican) conception of citizenship. This conception arguably has 
its origins in the works of Aristotle, particularly in the Politics and The Nicomachean Ethics (see 
O’Ferrall 2001:126). After Aristotle, civic republicanism is traced to Cicero in Roman times, 
through to Machiavelli in the Renaissance, to Harrington in the seventeenth century, and to 
Rousseau, Montesquieu and Paine in the eighteenth century. During the modern era, it has been 
associated with Hannah Arendt and its more recent adherents are, Oldfield, Dagger, Miller and 
                                                          
19 I am aware of efforts to develop an African communitarian notion of citizenship (see, for instance, Mamdani 1996). 
However, for reasons that will become clear, I will argue that liberal citizenship – understood in a particular way – is 
more suited to the operationalizing the CA than either African or European communitarian citizenship, even assuming 
that that it is possible to draw this kind of distinction in the first place.   
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Pettit (O’Ferrall 2001: 126). Central to this civic republican tradition is the idea of res publica, 
meaning, the good of the public (Dagger 2004:167). Republicanism, in brief, is the view that 
government is a public matter to be directed by the members of the public themselves (ibid: 168). 
It is this belief in self-government that makes political agency and civic duty sacrosanct elements 
of civic republican citizenship. This idea of the res publica distinguishes republicanism from a 
related but different school of thought, namely communitarianism. While republicanism concerns 
itself with the good of the republic, communitarianism is about “communitas”, meaning, the 
common life of people who form a community (ibid: 167). Communitarianism is simply put, a 
belief that in political theory, in social thought and action and in moral considerations, society is 
prior to the individual. Communitarianism may sanction certain actions that may be thought to 
benefit society, even if such actions may be at the disadvantage of some individuals. 
Communitarianism thus entails a holistic view of society. Civic republicanism, on the other hand, 
is concerned with political agency and dedication to civic duty. Republicanism and 
communitarianism, however, are both opposed to – or at the very least distinguishable from – 
liberalism. According to Dagger (2004:167), the emergence of both communitarianism and 
republicanism in recent years stems from an uneasiness with liberalism, which is accused of 
promoting some form of excessive or misguided individualism, and emphasising rights and 
liberties of the individual that are corrosive to society. As will become clear, I consider these 
accusations to be misguided, and I defend the liberal conception of citizenship against the 
republican and communitarian models. 
In Section Two, I analyse what scholars like Miller (2000) refer to as the thin or liberal model of 
citizenship. Marshall (1950) is usually cited as the forerunner of its modern version, with its most 
prominent defenders being Rawls and Kymlicka. Liberal citizenship is more narrowly defined as 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
96 
 
a legal status or alternatively a set of rights (political, civil and social) enjoyed equally by every 
member of society in question (see Miller 2000:44). Citizenship in the liberal model, by and large, 
means being protected by the law rather than necessarily participating in its formulation or 
administration (although the liberal model does not preclude such participation). In defining 
citizenship, Marshall, in my view was not oblivious to the importance of political agency. As I 
will show, the equal right to political participation is an essential attribute of liberal citizenship.  
In the third section, I justify the position that citizenship should ideally be confined within states. 
In this work, I use the terms state, nation and nation-state interchangeably, although these terms 
were in some instances understood to carry different meanings. For instance, a nation was in some 
cases defined as a large ethnic group united by common history, culture, language, and so on (see 
Oomen 1997). However I follow Hobsbawn’s (1990:18) view that the state is simply the political 
expression of the nation. The nation and the state thus refer to the same body of people, living 
together within a defined territory, who consider this territory their home, regardless of their 
background. This clarification is important because I am arguing for bounded citizenship, but such 
citizenship is not based on ethnic, racial, ancestral, or linguistic considerations. Although I argue 
against cosmopolitan or international citizenship, I have not assumed a communitarian position, 
because I am arguing for an inclusive, pluralized but bounded citizenship, and this position is 
founded upon feasibility or practical considerations. We can and ought to develop cross-national 
solidarity on issues of global concern like human rights, global warming, cyber-crime, fair trading 
and the like, but in my view, with regard to the day-to-day well-being of people, it is the state-
citizen relationship that really matters. The capabilities of citizens are usually capabilities limited 
to the space that effectively grants such status.  
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1. The civic-republican conception of citizenship 
1.1 Origins  
The civic-republican conception of citizenship is directly influenced by the republicanism of the 
ancients. However, there is no consensus on the exact meaning of republicanism, and on who 
should count as a republican, whether in the ancient world or contemporary times (Dagger 
2011:70). The republican conception of citizenship suffers from the same problem. For Dagger, 
the most salient feature of this conception is the conviction that government is a public matter the 
res publica to be directed by self-governing citizens. With respect to the civic-republican model 
of citizenship, the general position is that it has its clear origins in the works of Aristotle, although 
some scholars trace the name and origins of republicanism to ancient Rome (see Dagger 2004, 
O’Ferrall 2001). It was, however, in Aristotle’s works (particularly the Politics and the 
Nicomachean Ethics) that citizenship was clearly defined with reference to political agency, and 
political agency is arguably the most important defining characteristic of both old and new civic 
republican theories (see Oldfield 1990:5). Aristotle argues that, although there are many forms of 
government and therefore many varieties of citizenship, the criteria of assigning citizenship in each 
form of government remains the same: “a citizen in the highest sense is one who shares in the 
honours of the state or one who shares in the administration of justice” (Politics Book III, 1278). 
In other words, in any form of government, a citizen is one who actually takes part in the 
deliberative or judicial administration of the state, while the mere fact of living in a particular 
territory without participation would not be a sufficient criterion for according citizenship (Politics 
Book III, 1275). Participation is thus the hallmark of civic-republican citizenship. In fact, for civic-
republicans, citizenship is a duty, and in this regard, the test by which the individual becomes a 
citizen is through the “performance of the duties of the practice of citizenship” (Oldfield 1990:5). 
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Thus, from its earliest understandings, citizenship in the eyes of civic republicans was an activity 
or practice that was the exercise of a duty. This is the reason why Aristotle found it problematic to 
ground citizenship on any other criterion such as descent, territory or birth, as these are simply 
accidental properties of citizenship. The substance of being a citizen is in being actively involved 
in the polis. For the same reason(s), Aristotle refuses to designate as citizens any resident aliens, 
women, the elderly and children who, for one reason or another, were not able to exercise fully-
fledged political duties.20 For him, the term citizen would at best be used of them in a qualified 
sense; for example, children are potential citizens. Individuals are thus eligible for the status of 
citizen by virtue of being born and living within some territory, but they only achieve this status 
by acting accordingly (political participation). In this sense, citizenship is a realized possibility 
that is itself a function of political participation. Participation, as Oldfield would have it, “sets the 
citizen apart from those who regard politics as a nuisance to be avoided or a spectacle to be 
witnessed” (Oldfield 1990:3). Political agency is thus the hallmark of Aristotle’s classical 
republican citizenship. However, this is a very restrictive conception, as it restricts citizenship to 
males (and not even all males, as male slaves were excluded), but more importantly – for the 
purposes of the present argument – to those who are active participants in polis life.21  
I do not intend to analyse the contributions of each of the theorists of republican citizenship, but I 
will delineate and summarise what I take to be the defining features of the civic-republican model 
that remain intact throughout its various permutations. As we have seen, the classical republican 
                                                          
20 Of course, it is precisely the refusal to accord slaves, women and resident aliens full political rights that prevents 
them from participating in the affairs of the polis and hence from becoming citizens in Aristotle’s sense. The 
deficiencies of Aristotle’s argument are well known, and I will not rehearse them here. However, the conception of 
citizenship as the capability to act in certain ways is important for my own argument, and is a point to which I will 
return.  
21 Thus, even if we abandoned the citizenship restrictions on women, slaves and resident aliens, as has been the case 
in post-Aristotelian civic republican tradition, the connection between citizenship and political participation would 
still make it a more restricted conception than is the case with the liberal model.  
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model citizenship is quite demanding, in so far as it conceives of citizenship as an activity or 
practice, with the implication that not to engage in the practice is not to be a citizen (Oldfield 
1990:5). The essential point of this practice is that citizens govern themselves. This idea of self-
governance features prominently in Rousseau’s (1762) idealized social contract. For Rousseau, 
citizenship is both a way of thinking and a way of acting. One becomes a citizen by reasoning in 
accordance with the general will with the view towards the public good, and not according to one’s 
private will aimed at secure one’s private good (Rousseau 1968:61). Far from demanding space to 
pursue individual interests, as is the case with citizenship in the liberal-individualistic tradition, 
citizenship for Rousseau means subjecting oneself to the common good. That is what it means to 
think under the direction of the general will. A citizen is one who does not pursue his or her 
interests by being an egoist, but one who subordinates him/herself to the law authored by the 
citizens as a collective (ibid: 62). From Rousseau, we can therefore single out two features of 
classical republican citizenship: commitment to the common good and participation. Participation 
in the form of co-authoring the laws that govern the state is the expected action of citizens, and 
through such participation, a citizen rules herself or himself. This means that it is possible to be 
ruled and be free or sovereign at the same time. Being governed by the laws that you have created 
for yourself is an expression of freedom, and if you violate such laws, then you ought to be forced 
to be free (ibid: 64). Rousseau represents one aspect of classical civic republicanism, which 
emphasizes participation in the civil community. He differs from Aristotle in the sense that his 
citizenship is inclusive; women, people without property and children are included. 
In a fashion of classical civic-republican thinking on citizenship Rousseau argues for what appears 
to be some form of direct democracy as a foundation for citizenship; but this form of democracy 
has some difficult requirements. It demands the suppression of all private selfish interest in favour 
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of the common good. For Rousseau (1968:174-5), an ideal state ought to be organised and 
governed by all citizens, who prioritise the common good over their individual wants that may 
conflict with the former. Hence, “[e]ach associate puts his person and all his power under the 
direction of the supreme direction of the general will” (ibid: 10). I do not intend to present a more 
detailed discussion of the general will or the common good. Suffice it for now to say that, what is 
common to the civic-republican model is a particular political and civil way of life based upon 
political participation (O’Ferrall 2001:126). In the following section, I analyse what I deem to be 
the most important traits of contemporary civic-republican conceptions of citizenship. 
1.2 Most influential contemporary civic-republican theories of citizenship 
Contemporary republican theories of citizenship can either be found directly or are implied in the 
work of Skinner (2002), Pettit (1997, 2009), Viroli (2001), Honohan (2002) and Richardson 
(2002), among others. Contemporary republican theorists have applied the term ‘neo-
republicanism’ to the works of current political scientists, philosophers, historians, lawyers, and 
others who draw on the classical republican tradition to develop a republican philosophy revised 
and adapted for contemporary purposes. Lovett and Pettit (2009:12) identify three main ideas 
running through neo-republican thought. Firstly, neo-republicans work with the concept of a free 
person: one who does not live under the arbitrary will or domination of others. Secondly, and 
related to the preceding point, they believe in a free state that promotes its citizens’ freedom from 
domination, (the condition of not being subject to the arbitrary or uncontrolled power of any person 
or group) without itself coming to dominate them (ibid:12). Thirdly, neo-republicans argue that 
good citizenship consists in a vigilant commitment to preserving the state in its function as an 
undominating protector against domination (ibid:12). Whereas classical republicanism emphasizes 
political agency and commitment to civic duty, at the heart of neo-republicanism is the importance 
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of political liberty, understood as non-domination or independence from arbitrary power. Citizens 
are members of state who are free from any domination, be it from the state or other groups within 
the state. 
In contemporary political philosophy, we can piece together the neo-republican conception of 
citizenship from Skinner’s (2002) and Pettit’s (1997, 2008) general discussion of republican 
liberty. I hereby summarise the main ideas that I deem to have a bearing on citizenship. Both 
Skinner and Pettit argue for what they have called a third concept of liberty – third in the sense 
that it is falls outside the two concepts previously developed by Berlin (1969). In his famous essay, 
“Two Concepts of Liberty” (1969), Berlin argued that there are two ways of thinking about liberty. 
The first sense is freedom as non-interference, and this is freedom in the negative sense. Secondly, 
there is freedom in the positive sense, which derives from the desire on the part of the individual 
to be her own master with regard to her life and decisions. Berlin famously argues that these two 
kinds of freedom cannot be reconciled with one another – at least not permanently so – and that 
only the first, negative, conception of liberty can be secured by the state. Skinner and Pettit, 
however, argue that defining freedom as non-interference is misleading. A slave serving under a 
compassionate master may enjoy a great deal of non-interference, but we would not intuitively and 
morally see such a slave as free; hence the need for a third conception of freedom. This is the 
conception of freedom as a status: specifically, the status of being free from domination rather than 
simply being free from state interference (Pettit 1997:80, 2002:340). The negative or non-
interference view is problematic in the sense that one can enjoy non-interference while still being 
dominated. It is not enough to be a “free slave”. From the foregoing, we can deem citizenship, for 
neo-republicans, to be some kind of status – a status of freedom understood as non-domination. A 
citizen is a permanently free person enjoying the rights and privileges attached to the status, 
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whereas being unfree means being vulnerable to interference at any time (even if this doesn’t 
happen in practice). A dominated wife may enjoy long periods of non-interference from the 
abusive husband, but this is pseudo-freedom in the sense that the abuse can come back at any time, 
randomly or unpredictably. Freedom as non-domination means freedom not in the liberal sense of 
non-interference, but in the sense of “absence of dependence” (see Dagger 2004:175). In this 
regard, one is not a citizen in the republican sense in so far as one lacks the freedom from 
domination. Thus, in the place of virtuous participation, the hallmark of classical republican 
citizenship, the neo-republicans place freedom from domination as the defining feature of 
citizenship. As briefly stated above, neo-republicans are thus committed to defining freedom as 
non-domination, and secondly, to holding a positive conception of freedom as collective self-
mastery, which entails a form of self-government marked by an active citizenry that collectively 
charts its own political destiny. In the next section, I survey the most common criticisms of the 
civic republican conception of citizenship. 
1.3. Criticisms of civic-republican citizenship 
In this section, I discuss specific criticisms of civic-republican model that inform my preference 
for a liberal model. First and foremost, I am concerned with the central place accorded to the notion 
of the common good in the republican theory of citizenship. There is potential danger that, in a 
search for such a “common good”, particularly in plural societies, we might end up manipulated 
by those that speak loudest. As Seidenfeld (1992:1536) rightly points out, the “common good” is 
hardly agreed, and what we usually have are individuals’ aggregate private preferences. Thus, the 
state may be granted room to impose on the populace what is in fact an inaccurate conception of 
the common good. For Seidenfeld, because people are naturally inclined to pursue self-interest, 
the operative elements of civic-republicanism will not preclude politically powerful groups from 
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cutting deals to serve their separate interests (ibid: 1537). In addition to this, I see an uncomfortable 
relationship between the republican concept of freedom and the concept of the common good. The 
idea of equal freedom of citizens, in particular their freedom as non-domination, the freedom that 
goes with not having to live under the power of another (see Pettit 2008:170), seems to conflict 
with the equally republican central idea of the common good. It is not clear how a balance is to be 
established between these two republican ideals. Where there is a chance that, in some instances, 
community interests can trump individual interests, it may sometimes mean individual rights are 
compromised or are absent altogether. It would then require a conceptual sleight of hand to claim 
that the sacrifice of individual ends or interests to the common good would still be a form of self-
mastery or freedom from domination. I am also not convinced that the willing submission of one’s 
own ends to a common good is not freedom merely because one submits willingly. I am 
nevertheless cognisant of the fact that the problem of the “loudest voice in the room” may also 
feature in liberal citizenship. It is arguable that even an “overlapping consensus” (to be defined in 
the next section) in liberal democracy can be achieved through a manipulation of the weak by the 
powerful. However, the problem, in my view, is more pronounced in civic republican societies 
owing to the fact that in such societies there is no room for people to keep their pre-political 
differences, whereas an overlapping consensus may, to some extent, allow citizens to maintain 
their pre-political differences.  
Moreover, there is the danger that the republican conception of the common good and the general 
will would be a threat to an open, egalitarian, and pluralistic society. As Young (2003:222 points 
out, the ideal of the “civic public” that results from the common good might well exclude women 
and other groups defined as different from citizenship, on the grounds that they could not adopt 
the general point of view, or that their inclusion would disperse and divide the public. In this way, 
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the ideal of a common good, a general will, a shared public life, might lead to pressures for a forced 
homogeneous citizenry (ibid: 222). Young’s argument is thus that civic republican citizenship is 
both exclusive and divisive – or at the very least, it is potentially so – and thus defeats the purpose 
of citizenship as a catalyst for inclusion. Gey (1993:897) agrees on this point: the emphasis on the 
common good in civic republican theory is based on the unjustified assumption that citizens are 
able to deliberate and agree on the same version of the common good. In fact, the problem of 
diversity emanates from the realization that people are unable to agree on the good, and in this area 
civic republicanism does not offer any solution.  
With regard to the concepts of freedom as non-domination and self-mastery, it can be questioned 
whether these are in any way uniquely republican (Honohan 2002:182). For instance, a similar 
conception of freedom is clearly deducible in Mill’s (1859 [2001]) essay On Liberty, a core text 
of the liberal tradition.22 Thus Mill (2001:52) argues that “…the only purpose for which power can 
be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent 
harm to others. … In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, 
absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign”. We can hardly 
distinguish Mill’s concept of freedom from the one presented by civic republicans. In my view, 
Mill, just like the neo-republicans, was arguing for non-domination and self-mastery. The terms 
“absolute independence”, and “sovereign” in Mill’s definition are synonyms of the terms non-
domination and self-mastery, which are deemed central to neo-republicans’ concept of freedom. 
In addition, CA theorists like Nussbaum offer similar concepts of freedom. Nussbaum’s 
capabilities, particularly capabilities 3, 4, 6, 7, and 10 (see Chapter Two Section 3.1), demand the 
                                                          
22 Some scholars, such O’Ferrall (2001), situate Mill within the republican tradition, while some claim that he is a 
classical liberal. I tend to support the latter view on the grounds that Mill is silent on the ideas of civic duties and 
political agency. 
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total independence of the individual, something that neo-republicans seem to say by non-
domination and self-mastery. It is thus debatable whether republicanism itself offers unique and 
distinctive concepts of freedom and citizenship. Civic republican theorists do admit that it is not 
easy to delineate the distinctive features of republican citizenship (see Dagger 2004, Sandel 1999). 
For instance, Dagger (2004: 168) avers that, the idea of self-government is not uniquely republican 
as it is also claimed by liberals, conservatives and socialists. The latter also claim to promote 
government of, by and for the people. In addition, it is for Dagger a mistake to go to extremes 
when opposing liberalism. He supports this position saying that “Any republicanism worth 
defending must include a commitment to liberal principles, such as tolerance, fair play, and respect 
for the rights of others” (Sandel 1999: 209).  
In summary, the civic republican conception of citizenship is influenced by the ancient republican 
tradition, at the heart of which is the idea of self-governance. The earliest theorists of this model, 
Aristotle and Cicero for instance, argued for the ideal of self-governance to be expressed through 
political agency – some direct involvement in political deliberations or law-making processes. 
Influential contemporary theorists of this model, such as the likes of Skinner and Pettit, argue that 
self-governance finds expression in freedom, understood here as non-domination and self-mastery. 
The ideal citizen of both ancient and neo-republicanism is one who is not guided by private interest 
but by the common good – or rather, for whom private interest is aligned with the common good. 
For the critics of civic-republicanism, among them feminists and critical race theorists (see Bell 
1992, Tate 1997, Delgado 1988b), this model opens doors for the powerful to impose their own 
interests on their fellow citizens in the name of the common good. Here, the problem of adaptive 
preferences rears its head (see the discussion in Chapter One, Section 1.1.3 above). Moreover the 
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feasibility of the civic-republican conception of citizenship is thus doubtful, particularly in 
increasingly diverse societies. 
I acknowledge that the focus on the common good by civic republicans has in recent decades 
gained increasing prominence in the attempt to highlight the alleged failures of liberalism. Selznick 
(1987:447), for instance, argues that liberalism is mistaken in many ways, the chief mistake being 
the belief that the individual is the proper locus of moral choice and therefore should be left to 
decide for himself what it means to be free and which ends to pursue. Civic republicans insist that 
the public is neither an individual nor a group of individuals, but rather it is a sphere of life, a unit, 
with its own claims and considerations. Focus should therefore be on civic duties that promote the 
common good, and that restrain the possible abuse of individual rights (see Dagger 2004:168, 
Sandel 1999:209). Society is not the individual and therefore humans are social animals that 
depend on each other for psychological sustenance, including the formation of their personalities. 
Accordingly, moral competence depends on the nature and quality of social participation, and 
hence morality is to be encouraged and taught.  
However, while civic republicans are rightly critical of particular aspects of the liberal model, they 
nevertheless fail to offer us a viable alternative to the liberal citizenship model. I demonstrate this 
at length in the following section.  
2. The liberal conception of citizenship 
2.1 Origins 
Just as the republican conception of citizenship emerged from the republican school of thought, 
the liberal conception citizenship is a core component of the liberal tradition of political theory. 
The term ‘liberalism’ gained popular usage starting in the nineteenth century, although its central 
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tenets are agreed to hail from seventeenth and eighteenth century thinkers, particularly John Locke, 
who is generally accepted as the founding father of liberalism. However, Locke’s predecessor, 
Thomas Hobbes, should be given due recognition within the liberal tradition for arguing, firstly, 
that human beings are equal, and secondly, that political obligation should be based on a contract 
or agreement (see Leviathan 1962). Arguably, Hobbes was the first modern thinker to clearly reject 
the then accepted idea of divine right of kings. Legitimate political power, for Hobbes, was not a 
matter of inheritance, but the outcome of an agreement. In arguing for equality and the self-
interestedness of all mankind, Hobbes laid the groundwork for the philosophical ideas that were 
further developed by Locke, Kant, Mill and others.  
The liberal conception of citizenship that is most relevant for my purposes, and which I will discuss 
in this section, can be called social liberalism, in distinction from the classical liberalism of 
Locke.23 Both versions of liberalism view the individual as prior to society, be it in moral thought 
and action, or in political practice, and all liberals are committed to a conception of freedom and 
of respect for the capacities and the agency of individual men and women (Waldron 1987:128). 
However, notable differences exist between classical and social (or modern) liberalism. Classical 
liberals consider personal and economic liberty as conditional upon maximal limitation of state 
power – limited to the protection of people’s natural rights of life, liberty and property. In 
economics, classical liberals are in favour of a self-regulating laissez-faire capitalist market, as 
free as possible free from government intervention or any forms of redistribution (see Smith 2005).  
Social or welfare liberalism, on the other hand, is not adverse to a more extensive role for the state, 
and is against unregulated capitalism on the grounds that an unregulated market can produce new 
                                                          
23 Social liberalism is also sometimes called welfare liberalism or modern liberalism.  
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forms of injustice, including incursions in individual freedom (see Dworkin 1988). For social 
liberals, the state should also concern itself with other issues that affect people, issues like poverty, 
education, and health, among other issues of importance to human well-being. In this regard, social 
liberalism rejects the laissez-faire attitude of nineteenth-century liberalism, but instead 
recommends state welfare measures and regulation, precisely with the purpose of enhancing 
individual liberty. For social liberals, freedom is not just absence of constraints, but also personal 
development that is realized through good health and a good education, among other provisions. 
Examples of social liberals are Green (1836- 1882), Marshall (1893-1981), and Rawls (1921-
2002).24 There are therefore some notable differences between classical and social liberalism, even 
though the fundamental principles of liberalism – principles of individual liberty and the desire for 
a limited government – are present in both versions, though in varying degrees. Arguably, social 
liberalism is an improvement on classical liberalism, and this is the usage that I adopt in this 
dissertation. Unless indicated otherwise, I shall be using the term ‘liberalism’ to refer to social 
liberalism. This also means that the liberal citizenship model I discuss is anchored in the principles 
of modern liberalism. Classical liberalism is difficult to sustain, mainly because it does not have 
room for distributive justice, and, as a result, may have to condone – even if it does not actively 
promote – a society characterized by huge inequalities. This is a problem because such inequality 
itself undermines the basic tenet of liberalism, namely the fundamental equality of all persons. 
Another defining characteristic of liberalism that has a bearing on citizenship is its tendency to 
prioritize “the right” over “the good”. This means that liberalism is concerned with conditions 
under which individuals and groups can pursue the good life as each defines it, with full protection 
                                                          
24 For typical social liberal views, Please refer to my discussion of Rawls in Chapter One and my discussion of 
Marshall in Section 2.2 of this Chapter. 
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by the state, but it does not prescribe or try to promote any particular conception of the good 
independent of the principles of right. In the sections below, I analyse the specific elements of 
liberal citizenship that are relevant for my own argument about citizenship as a capability. These 
are: individual rights and freedom, public reason, toleration and pluralism.  
2.2 Citizenship and rights 
The conception of citizenship as a set of rights is the most distinguishing feature of the liberal 
model of citizenship. The civic republican conception, as already indicated, is concerned more 
with civic duties such as political agency and a concern with the common good. T. H. Marshall 
(1950) is credited for developing the clearest initial conception of citizenship as rights (see Kartal 
2002, Kymlicka and Norman 1995, King 1988). In his view, the status of citizenship is achieved 
when one realizes the elements of (a) civil rights (b) political rights and (c) social rights (Marshall 
1950:10-11). The expansion of the rights of citizenship was the expansion of individual freedoms, 
and subsequently the expansion of the class of citizens, making the status inclusive. The concept 
of citizenship Marshall developed was a direct effect of his study of the history of citizenship in 
Britain spanning three centuries. He argues that the development of citizenship was a gradual 
process, which started with the development of civil rights in the eighteenth century, followed by 
political rights in the nineteenth century and social rights in the twentieth century (ibid: 6). 
Although I am not in this work concerned with the history of the development of citizenship in 
Britain, I am however concerned with the concept of citizenship that Marshall drew from that 
history. From his analysis, Marshall concludes that citizenship should be understood both as a 
status and a set of rights – specifically, “a status bestowed on those who are full members of a 
community. All those who possess the status are equal with respect to the rights and duties with 
which the status is endowed” (Marshall (1950:28).  
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This concept of citizenship is liberal in the sense that the three sets of rights are aimed at the 
expansion of liberty or freedom of the individual. Civil citizenship rights comprise the freedoms 
of speech, religion, conscience and assembly, access to courts and the right to own property, among 
other civil rights. Political rights are freedoms to political participation, either as a candidate or as 
a voter (ibid: 10-11). Now, while civil and political rights ensure that all people are equal in terms 
of moral worth, this equality in moral worth remains unrealized if some people we deem equal to 
us are unable to access basic services like health and education, or are starving due to factors not 
of their own making. Marshall therefore adds a third set of rights: social rights, understood as 
rights to moderate economic welfare and security (ibid:11). The duty bearer of these rights is the 
state, and these rights can be categorized as entitlement to the whole range of social goods, “from 
the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the 
social heritage and to live the life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in 
society” (Marshall 1950:11). In addition to ensuring that every person is equal in terms of moral 
worth, social rights also ensure that every person is equal in terms of their “social worth”, which 
is at the core of social liberalism. Social worth here means having a personal status that makes one 
acceptable in social or interpersonal relations. One who lacks basic social rights, one who lacks 
basic education and is hungry, lives a harsh life, loses the sense of her own value, and is 
consequently unable to effectively participate in the public life of society. Social rights give 
individuals the right to claim social protection from the state, thereby protecting them against 
social and economic insecurities. In this regard, social rights are also a source of freedom, in so 
far as they expand citizens’ opportunities to exercise their well-being agency or live the lives they 
value (Sen 1999: xii). Social rights are thus one of the hallmarks of the liberal conception of 
citizenship. By guaranteeing political, civil and social rights to all, liberal citizenship ensures that 
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every member of society is a full member who is able to participate in and enjoy the common life 
of society (Kymlicka and Norman 1995:286). In the absence of the above rights, or if the rights 
are violated, the members of a society will be marginalized and unable to participate.  
Two contemporary theorists of liberal citizenship (Kymlicka and Rawls) by and large agree with 
Marshall’s view on rights, but their main concern is to define liberal citizenship in terms of cultural 
and moral plurality. I discuss this feature of liberal citizenship separately in the next section. 
2.3. Liberal citizenship and pluralism 
As Miller (2000:41) points out, the problem of plurality, together with its implications for how we 
conceive of citizenship, is a consequence of the increasing fragmentation of contemporary states, 
which are now made up of people from diverse backgrounds owing to historical and recent causes 
(see Kymlicka 1995:11). Historical reasons range from slavery to colonization, while major recent 
causes are the voluntary migrations of individuals and families. As a consequence, most states are 
now made up of people with an ever increasing disparate set of identities, as evidenced by their 
ethnic, religious and moral allegiances, as well as disparate beliefs about what is valuable in life. 
In so far as individuals and groups in such states demand the recognition of their identity and 
accommodation of their cultural differences on the grounds of equal citizenship, it becomes a 
challenge to accommodate these cultural and moral differences in a stable and morally defensible 
way. In liberal democracies, one of the major mechanisms for accommodating these differences is 
the protection of the civil and political rights of individuals (ibid: 26). The constitutionally 
guaranteed freedoms of association, religion, speech, mobility and political organization enable 
individuals to form and maintain various groups and associations. By not insisting on the common 
good, and thereby allowing individuals to define their own ends, the liberal model of citizenship 
provides a suitable environment for maintaining a wide range of social relationships.  
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Rawls (2005, 2003) buttresses the liberal solution to pluralism by introducing the concepts of 
“reasonable pluralism” and “overlapping consensus”. He attempts to answer the question: “how is 
it possible that there can be a stable and just society whose free and equal citizens are deeply 
divided by conflicting and even incommensurable religious, philosophical and moral doctrines?” 
(Rawls 2005:133). In his view, the diversity of comprehensive religious, philosophical, and moral 
doctrines found in modern democratic societies is not merely a passing historical condition that 
might soon pass away, but a permanent feature of modern democratic polities (Rawls 2003:161). 
To this problem of diversity, Rawls introduces the idea of an overlapping consensus. An 
overlapping consensus occurs when a diverse community of people agree on key principles of 
justice, even as they disagree on the fundamental reasons for those principles, and on more 
comprehensive details about how lives should morally be lived and what is valuable in human life. 
It is thus a genuine commitment to shared principles. This is possible because, according to Rawls, 
humans have at least the capacity for genuine toleration and mutual respect, which can be activated 
under specific conditions. This capacity gives hope that the diversity of worldviews in a democratic 
society may represent not merely pluralism, but reasonable pluralism (Rawls 2003: 168). Rawls 
hopes, that is, that the religious, moral, and philosophical doctrines that citizens accept will 
themselves endorse toleration and accept the essentials of a democratic regime. In the religious 
sphere, for example, a Rawlsian reasonable pluralism might contain a reasonable Catholicism, a 
reasonable interpretation of Islam, a reasonable atheism, and so on. Being reasonable, none of 
these doctrines will advocate the use of coercive political power to impose conformity on non-
believers (Rawls 2005: 24-5). This is a viable way of mitigating the effects of pluralism. People 
from diverse backgrounds are unlikely to have consensus on ideas of the good, and they will hardly 
want to completely dispense with their personal interests; toleration of reasonable differences is 
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the most viable way to ensuring peace and stability in society. This means people with very 
different views of the good life may be able to agree on political principles and institutions that 
can cater for all their different ends in life. Rawls demonstrates how liberal citizenship promotes 
both individual agency (freedom to pursue one’s ends), and diversity (the co-existence of people 
with disparate cultures). By promoting these values, the liberal model of citizenship fosters 
equality, an attribute that I take to be foundational for citizenship. Equality creates equal 
opportunities for enjoying the rights that come with the status of citizenship. 
The liberal model of citizenship thus takes pluralism seriously, and proposes the protection of 
individual rights and toleration of reasonable differences.25 The same cannot be said with regard 
to republican citizenship. The republican citizenship model does not allow members to keep their 
reasonable pre-political differences. By insisting on achieving the common good, the republican 
model of citizenship arguably runs the risk of being coercive, by absorbing disparate individual 
and communal ends into a single, “dominant” one. In addition, under the republican scheme of 
things, pre-political differences are an inadmissible basis for the resolution of political controversy 
(Gey 1993:807). For civic republicans, whatever virtue a citizen develops outside his or her 
political involvement should be left at the door when that citizen enters the government’s 
chambers, since the republican theory of government “depends on an expectation that citizens 
should entirely abandon their private identities when they come to politics” (ibid: 807).  Regardless 
of how reasonable and harmless some identities and behaviours may be, they are inadmissible in 
a republican society, as long as they are assumed to be in conflict with the common good. I have 
                                                          
25 Of course, a great deal rides on the definition of “reasonable” here, and many critics of liberalism have tried to show 
the unwarranted assumptions about reasonableness and consensus. I cannot delve into these disputes here, much less 
resolve them. My aim is not to offer a full-scale defense of the liberal project as a whole, but to outline a specific 
conception of citizenship that is most suited to the capability approach. In so far as the liberal model is predicated on 
individual freedom, together with recognition of insurmountable pluralism, I submit that it is the most suitable 
candidate for an architectonic capability that allows the development of other capabilities. 
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already argued that this version of the common good is impossible to attain. The liberal model of 
citizenship, on the other hand prioritizes individual rights and is thus better placed to develop 
citizens that have the freedom to live the lives they value.  
In the final analysis, the liberal model of citizenship is concerned with individual human agency 
(living in accordance with one’s own ends) and therefore differs markedly from the conception of 
public agency at the heart of the civic republican model, that is aimed at political participation in 
service of the common good, to the detriment – at least in principle, if not always in practice – of 
individual ends. Liberals are committed to a conception of freedom that respects the capacities and 
the agency of individual men and women (Waldron 1987:131). The liberal concept of agency 
entails the capability to choose one’s own ends – including changing them – which precludes any 
prior commitment to the common good, or a final commitment to a common good as the ultimate 
aim of citizenship agency. I flesh out these remarks in relation to citizenship as a capability in 
Chapter Five. At this point, I would first like to address some of the most prominent criticisms that 
are levelled against the main tenets of the liberal conception of citizenship. In arguing that 
citizenship is an architectonic capability, I make reference to liberal citizenship. Hence, it is 
imperative that I show that most criticisms against it do not stand. This does not mean that liberal 
citizenship may not have some shortcomings. My aim is to show that, as compared to the 
republican model, liberal citizenship is better suited to capacitate citizens to live the lives they 
value. This means liberal citizenship is a stronger contender as an enabler of human well-being. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
115 
 
2.4. Criticisms of liberal citizenship and the defence of social citizenship 
Civic republicans and libertarians26, as well as the New Right theorists, disagree with liberal 
conception of citizenship, albeit for different reasons. Civic republicans are critical of what they 
consider to be liberals’ casual approach to active citizenship and civic virtue (see, for instance 
Dagger 2011, Skinner 1992). This criticism comes from what I take to be a wrong view, that liberal 
citizenship prioritizes legal protection over participating in its formulation or execution. I have 
already shown that the three sets of rights that define liberal citizenship include political rights, 
which are rights to political participation. Just like the adherents of republican citizenship, 
supporters of liberal citizenship acknowledge that active citizenship effectively protects citizens’ 
valued interests, which is why political rights are an integral element of liberal citizenship. In 
addition to this, those in favour of republican citizenship need to clearly spell out the connection 
between active citizenship and freedom, as there seems to be no necessary connection between the 
two (see Patten 1996:25). Active citizenship is not a guarantee that a repressive regime will lessen 
its dominance. Some states may use various Machiavellian tactics including some heavy handed 
measures to suppress even a restive citizenry. 
Libertarians and New Right27 theorists, on the other hand, have mounted a fierce attack on the 
social rights component of liberal citizenship. Libertarians oppose social rights on the assumption 
that, in addition to being economically inefficient, social rights necessarily demand that the state 
adopts some redistributive policies. Such policies, Nozick (1973:65) argues, violate some 
individual rights because they are so recipient-oriented that they ignore the entitlements of 
                                                          
26 Recall that I make a distinction between moderate or social liberals, exemplified by Marshall, Rawls, Sen and others 
on the one hand, and libertarians or classical liberals, exemplified by Locke, Nozick and Cranston on the other. 
Moderate liberals view the state as having a more extensive role, concerned with how wealth and rights are distributed 
in society. Libertarians strictly argue for a minimal state.  
27 The New Right generally refers to American conservative political theorists that are largely libertarian, but are 
concerned more with public and private morality.  
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producers, givers and transferors. In most instances people who bankroll these social policies do 
not do so voluntarily. As is the case in taxation, these givers are “forced charity givers”. The New 
Right is further troubled by the fact that adopting social rights leads to the creation of a welfare 
state, and a welfare state is deemed objectionable for several economic and moral reasons. 
Economically, libertarians think that provision of public welfare provides people with a guaranteed 
source of income, making them not want to look for work (especially low-paying jobs) (King and 
Waldron 1988:16-17). For social conservatives on the New Right, the welfare state is seen a source 
of moral corruption through its effect on the family; it provides support when families break down 
and therefore encourages their disintegration, or encourages some people not to enter into marriage 
at all. In addition, morally conservative New Right theorists complain that social welfare saps the 
authority of the male breadwinner and encourages feminism (ibid: 17). There is also a negative 
effect on values such as liberty. New Right theorists claim that the bureaucracy of welfare 
institutions reduces individual freedom and enhances state power. Collective provision limits the 
role of market processes, which are, according to them, the most powerful guarantors of political 
liberty and economic prosperity. “And, being financed out of taxation, social provision involves 
interference with private property and direct coercion of those individual taxpayers who would 
rather not contribute to ‘compulsory charity’ in this way” (King and Waldron 1988:16-17). To this 
end, the inclusion of social rights is viewed as having debilitated the liberal model of citizenship. 
But can we justify and sustain a concept of citizenship that excludes social rights? I think that we 
cannot. The moral case for social citizenship is very strong. I justify this in paragraphs below. 
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I begin my justification of social citizenship with a case example (not a real one)28. The imaginary 
country of Eden is a unitary state with four provinces (Northern, Southern, Eastern, Western), but 
the provincial divisions are just for administrative purposes, as all power and policy formulations 
are centralized. Eden is rich in oil and has an impressive per capita GNP. The oil fields are scattered 
throughout the north and eastern provinces. The inhabitants of all provinces speak the Teko 
language, with the exception of the Southern Province which speaks the local Mosak language and 
is composed of long-time immigrants originating on the Asian continent. These people have, 
however, been citizens of the state of Eden for over two centuries. The Southern province is 
peculiar for its many misfortunes. Owing to the fact that it lies adjacent to a desert, its climate is 
semi-arid and receives very little rainfall. For various reasons the province is seriously 
underdeveloped. Successive leaders of the state of Eden generally overlook this province, although 
all will visit it during election times to seek votes. The Southern is the only province that lacks 
clean drinking water and has few, mostly seasonal, dams. Some villagers have to walk on average 
ten kilometers daily to fetch water from some wells. The province is not supplied with electricity 
and, despite the fact that it is the largest in terms of area, it has only three small clinics, three 
primary schools and one secondary school. As a result of these several challenges, the life 
expectancy of the Southerners is very low and pegged at 36. Infant and maternal mortality rates 
are very high and the literacy rate averages 5%. Many children die from malnutrition, because, 
being semi-arid, the Southern province experiences frequent droughts, and, because politicians 
take little notice of this province, no food aid is extended from the government. Despite all these 
challenges, the Southerners, have full voting rights, and can form their own political parties if they 
                                                          
28 This is my own imaginary demonstrative example and does not exactly represent any existing country on earth in 
all details. 
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so wish. They can even buy property anywhere in Eden. The common sense view is that the 
Southerners have full political and civil rights. 
Several critical issues are at stake regarding the above example. First, even if we were to grant that 
the Southerners possess civil and political rights, we feel reluctant to grant that they are citizens of 
Eden in the moral sense. Some might deem this position unconvincing on the grounds that bad 
citizenship is still citizenship, just as bad poetry is still poetry. Doesn’t a starved dog still fulfil the 
definition of a dog, and should it not therefore be called a dog? It is true that we can talk of deficient 
citizenship, but there is a sense in which poor citizenship is different from, say, a starving dog. A 
dog is born as a dog, but human beings are born as human beings not as citizens. Citizenship is not 
a natural fact, but a feature of humanly devised – and therefore changeable – social arrangements. 
Moreover, the concept of citizenship applies to what we do and what we get as full members of a 
state, which demands that all those accorded the status of citizens be equal in terms of 
opportunities. For one to be regarded as a citizen, one has to be equal to other members accorded 
the same status. Secondly, any concept of citizenship that excludes social rights does not meet the 
threshold of genuine citizenship, because in the absence of basic intervention by the state relating 
to basic social services, like health and education, the moral case for the Southern province to 
secede is high, and it will lose very little by doing so. Its ties with mainstream Eden society are 
essentially weak, and the advantages of being a member thereof are for the Southerners non-
existent. The possession of political and civil rights in such circumstances seems hardly adequate 
for one to be called a citizen. In the absence of the social component, talk of citizenship becomes 
meaningless for such people. Formal membership of a state that allows one to remain sick, hungry 
and illiterate – especially when one’s fellow citizens are better off on all these measures – offers 
little or no prospect for meaningful political participation. I also do not see any reason why the 
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Southerners of Eden should be willing to be patriotic and nostalgic about Eden. There is no 
common good to appeal to here.  
In light of the above considerations, it seems justifiable to claim that a rights-based account of 
citizenship that disregards social rights would be incomplete. It is imperative that social rights be 
an integral element of citizenship. Any concept of citizenship without these fails the test of genuine 
citizenship (see King and Waldron 1988:423). As Ignatieff (1989:72) argues, Marshall’s argument 
that people can be full members and participants in the common life of society only if their basic 
needs are met is as strong now as it ever was. It should be acknowledged that sympathizers with 
social citizenship do not justify a culture of passive dependency. Social citizenship provides just a 
minimum condition that enables every citizen to live a life that at least meets the basic standards 
of a civilized life, and social citizenship is therefore not a substitute for work, all things being 
equal.  
To conclude my analysis of citizenship, I now discuss one emerging contentious issue in 
citizenship conceptualizations, namely, global citizenship. Mainstream liberals argue for 
cosmopolitan rather than global citizenship, which carries a different meaning to, say, transnational 
citizenship. I clarify the distinction in the next section. I argue against transnational citizenship, 
but arguing this way does not in any way undermine the arguments in support of cosmopolitan 
liberal citizenship, nor does it make my position less of a liberal one. 
3. Justification for a liberal bounded citizenship 
In the above sections, I have argued in support of liberal citizenship. Although there are liberal 
theorists who argue for transnational citizenship, this is not a common liberal argument. My aim 
in this section is to prove that, conceptually and practically speaking, citizenship rights, to be 
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effective, requires a determinate, bounded authority and that transnational citizenship is not 
feasible. Citizenship, in the sense of membership in political societies (or states), is defined in 
territorial terms (see Spiro 2013:43). If states are spatially limited, citizenship is consequently 
spatially limited. The link between the state and the citizen is such that the former is the institution 
that defines the meaning of the latter. The development of states has led to the development of 
citizenship through the provision of rights. The concept of citizenship thus retains its meaning in 
situations where an opportunity for equal membership obtains, and where equal members can 
possibly enjoy the rights of citizenship in full. Even though inequalities exist within individual 
states, the possibilities of equal citizenship are to some extent present. It is relatively easier to make 
constitutional and legal guarantees for civil, political and social rights to all people within a single 
state, as opposed to a single administration extending such rights to everyone in the world. Since 
I argue that citizenship is a capability, it is imperative that I defend a concept of citizenship that 
bears a clear relationship to real freedoms, and liberal bounded citizenship is one such concept. 
Transnational citizenship is but a metaphorical concept. Although we can have common visas and 
common currencies, international trade and humanitarian activities, and solidarities on matters of 
human rights across borders, such issues do not conceptually fall under the purview of citizenship. 
Families close to each other in a residential area can arrange to use one car to take their children 
to school and work together in matters of common interest, but that does not make them one family 
except in symbolic or sentimental terms. When we are talking of world citizenship, we are not 
talking about citizenship in the usual legal or political sense. Bosniak (2000:448) argues that the 
phrase “world citizen” is shorthand for a cosmopolitan outlook that expresses loyalty and moral 
commitment to humanity at large, rather than any particular community of persons. The phrase is 
more of an expression of moral universalism (cosmopolitanism) than a legal denotation. 
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Cosmopolitanism, according to Isin et. al. (2002:3) is a moral appeal to defend a stronger sense of 
collective and individual responsibility for the world as a whole, and to support the development 
of effective global institutions for tackling global poverty and inequality, environmental 
degradation and the violation of human rights. While the idea challenges the belief that the 
individual's central moral obligations are tied to the nation-state, it is not a prescription for the 
dissolution of all state boundaries. It is a moral concern for the universal rights and obligations 
that bind all peoples together in a just world order (ibid: 3).29  
In arguing for bounded citizenship, my interest is not so much to argue against global citizenship, 
as to demonstrate that a capable state is the primary instrument for securing substantive rights and 
freedoms and is therefore the most appropriate environment for the enjoyment of citizenship rights 
(see Song 2012:58). The institutions of the modern state serve the legislative, executive, and 
judicial functions necessary for the efficient creation and maintenance of the system of rights. It is 
only the modern state that meets the demands of political equality: equal rights of political 
participation and freedom of conscience and expression, as well as the material conditions that 
ensure equal opportunities to exercise these rights and liberties (ibid:58). The claim here is that 
only the state can really support fundamental liberal values. Of course, borders by themselves do 
not determine whether a particular society is liberal or illiberal. This depends on whether the equal 
individual (social, civil and political) and economic freedoms are secured or violated within these 
borders.  
                                                          
29 Note, however, that arguing for bounded citizenship is emphatically not an argument for closed borders. In so far 
as the liberal state is founded on the principles of freedom and equality of persons, it has a prima facie duty towards 
the protection of refugees and other contested migrants. My argument is precisely that those who find themselves 
deprived of the protection of a state are not better served by an amorphous global citizenship. What they require is a 
clear duty bearer that is able to secure their basic social, political and economic rights within a specific territory. 
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Citizenship rights are in my view a form of claim rights; they establish a special relationship 
between the individual and the state.30 The relationship that is established makes the individual or 
the citizen a right-holder while the state is a duty-bearer. Although in many instances the individual 
is the right-holder and the state the duty bearer, there are duties that citizens owe to the state; in 
other words, there are claims that the state makes on citizens, paying taxes being one of them. 
Following this reasoning, the case for bounded citizenship is strengthened. It makes little sense – 
except in metaphorical terms – to talk of a contractual relationship between an individual and the 
whole world. Any contract requires identifiable and limited parties. Ignoring this fact can easily 
become an unrealistic pursuit of the abstract ideal of universal well-being, to the detriment of the 
well-being of those who are within effective reach of specific laws and policies (Parekh 2003:12). 
As Parekh (2003:9) notes, it is faulty to argue that since political communities are contingent 
entities in the sense that their boundaries are arbitrary and membership an accident of birth, they 
cannot generate special moral obligations to fellow-citizens. Although the territorial boundary is 
initially contingent, over time it becomes integrated into the life of the community, forms a 
framework within which the latter builds a common life, and acquires moral and political 
significance. It separates its members from others and forms an important part of their individual 
and collective identity. The importance of this legal and moral entity is that it gives hope for the 
realization of rights or benefits of membership, something impossible on a global scale. Without 
a world state, there cannot be world citizenship. Citizenship worked most effectively at the level 
of bounded city-states in Ancient Greece where interaction among citizens and between the state 
and citizens was really strong. The move from the level of city-state to the nation-state 
considerably weakened cohesion among the membership. To think of further pushing the bounds 
                                                          
30 I discuss the relationship between citizenship and human rights in detail, in Chapter Four. 
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of citizenship beyond the nation-state, is to disregard the value of citizenship. If the nation-state 
can no longer operate as the site of a viable form of citizenship and abdicates that role to the ‘whole 
world’, citizenship loses its meaning. We value citizenship for what we hope to benefit as citizens. 
I am arguing for bounded citizenship in so far as citizenship is conceived as a bundle of rights, and 
I do not see an entity larger than the nation-state able to fully secure these rights. As Isin and 
Turner (2007:14) note, it is doubtful whether citizenship can become global, since it remains a 
state institution, and it is based on contributions that presuppose a reciprocal relationship between 
rights and obligations, and imply a relationship between rights and territory. To employ the notion 
of citizenship to understand rights claims outside the confines of the state often neglects the 
effective conceptual domain of the concept. “A citizen exists originally within the political 
confines of a state, and until a genuinely global state exists that has sovereign powers to impose 
its will, it is misleading to talk about the global citizen” (Isin and Turner 2007:14). 
Conclusion 
My overall aim in this Chapter has been to define citizenship and to clarify the meaning of 
citizenship that I am using in this dissertation. As stated earlier, the success of my argument hinges 
on how I relate three concepts, namely, well-being, capability and citizenship. At this stage, I have 
analysed all three of them. I have also clarified my positions regarding the main contested aspects 
of each of these concepts. What remains is to substantiate my claim in the chapters to follow. With 
regard to the specific conclusions of this chapter, I analysed the central features of the republican 
and liberal models of citizenship – the two models that have been extensively debated with regard 
to the status, rights and duties of citizens in political society. I showed that central to the republican 
citizenship is the ideal of the common good, and notions of political agency, freedom and civic 
duty. At the heart of liberal citizenship, on the other hand is the concept of citizenship as a set of 
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individual rights that trump the notion of a common good, which I have shown to be conceptually 
vague.  Furthermore, in so far as citizenship is understood in terms of rights, it can only be possible 
to talk about citizenship in relation to a state that is limited in its extent. In this regard, citizenship 
rights are a special form of rights that differ from universal human rights. This point relates to my 
general claim that citizenship rights are intimately connected to the development of important well-
being functionings and that the lack thereof prevents the full development of such functionings. 
Since this dissertation aims among other things, to complete the CA by clearly spelling out the 
nature of well-being capabilities, I am proposing that citizenship rights can possibly clarify the 
notion of citizenship as an architectonic capability with regard to human well-being. I have so far 
analysed the concepts of capabilities (Chapter Two), and citizenship (in Chapter Three), and have 
taken two important positions. Firstly, I am arguing that compared to the other approaches that I 
have looked at, the CA is a better framework for assessing human well-being. This dissertation 
aims to close some of the gaps of this approach. Secondly, in arguing for citizenship as a capability, 
I have adopted the liberal citizenship model which coheres with the capability approach. Having 
argued for citizenship rights, namely civil, political and social rights, which to me are well-being 
capabilities, it is imperative that I justify why, in my analysis of human well-being, I have adopted 
the capability approach instead of the human rights approach which has clear connections with 
universal human rights. I justify my preference for the former in Chapter Four. My task in Chapter 
Four is to discuss universal human rights in detail with a view to show that several unresolved 
conceptual contestations regarding human rights make it inadvisable to use universal human rights 
alone as a yardstick for assessing human well-being. I intend to show that using the CA, in 
conjunction with (social) liberal citizenship rights as a foundational capability, circumvents the 
conceptual problems bedevilling universal human rights.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE CAPABILITY APPROACH AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
Introduction 
Having defined the concept of capability in Chapter Two and delineated a normative conception 
of liberal citizenship in Chapter Three, I deal in the present chapter with the concept of human 
rights. As the preceding discussion has shown, I am proposing a conception of citizenship as 
involving both a legal status and an expansive set of rights. Although securing human rights has 
been a huge positive step in advancing human well-being, some theoretical contestations continue 
to hamper their (human rights) adaptation or adoption for practical use. The aim of the present 
chapter is to offer a more detailed investigation into the concept of human rights with the aim of 
setting the scene for my demonstration (with the aid of a case example) in Chapter Five, that 
citizenship, as a special case of human rights, best understood as an architectonic capability. As 
Vizard et al (2011:2) rightly argue, the capability approach can be of help in addressing some of 
the important controversial and unresolved issues in ethical debates about human rights. The 
concept of capability thus provides an important entry-point for defending the validity of a broad 
class of human rights concerns, covering, for example, political, civil, economic and social rights 
(ibid:12). The CA is thus an important step in resolving some controversies associated with 
universal human rights. 
I begin by giving a brief overview of the historical origins of the notion of human rights, before 
examining two central debates about, respectively, the ontological status and the scope of such 
rights. With regard to the former, I examine the question of the relationship between human rights 
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and the law – in particular, whether human rights are natural or are an outcome of positive law. 
Although I am largely persuaded by the argument that rights are a child of law (cf. Bentham 1987 
[1843], Hart 1994), my aim here is not to defend a specific position about the ontological status of 
rights. My claim is simply that human rights, regardless of their origin, can only be fully secured 
within political society rather than outside of it.  
The question of the scope of human rights centres on the question: what are the kinds of rights that 
make up human rights? On the one hand, there are those who argue that human rights are 
comprised of civil and political rights only (e.g. Cranston 1976). On the other hand, the 20th century 
has seen an increasing emphasis on the inclusion of social and economic rights into the concept of 
human rights, sparked, in part, by the United Nations’ 1948 Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights. A significant number of theorists who reject social citizenship ( see Chapter Three, Section 
2.3) reject it on the grounds that it is defined by the provision of social and economic rights; yet 
these social rights are contested as being genuine human rights (see Beetham 1995; Cranston 1967, 
1973; Howard 1987; Nickel 2007). Those who oppose social and economic rights argue that such 
rights are impossible to secure in practice, and are not fundamentally important. To bolster my 
defence of social citizenship in the previous chapter and the next, I show that, to the contrary, 
social and economic rights are genuine human rights that carry the same weight as first-generation 
civil and political rights.  
From Sections One to Three I trace the history of, and analyse the concept of human rights, with 
a view to showing the definitional contestations confronting it. Section Four establishes the link 
between rights and capabilities. I show, first, in what respects the capability approach can itself be 
understood as a human rights approach that is nevertheless an improvement on preceding human 
rights arguments. In recent times, this view has been strongly argued for by Nussbaum (2003, 
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2005, 2007, Riddle 2017). I take this argument to the next stage, where I examine the advantages 
of referring to capabilities rather than human rights in well-being conceptualizations and 
evaluations. In other words, I demonstrate why the language of capabilities has an advantage over 
that of rights. Both Sen and Nussbaum identify several limitations associated with universal human 
rights language – limitations to do with the nature and scope of human rights (some of them 
discussed in Sections Two and Three). I consider each of these limitations in turn, and come to the 
conclusion that there is a convincing case for conceiving rights in terms of capabilities, but that 
this does not imply that all human rights can be deemed capabilities. Only some human rights that 
are immune to the conceptual problems discussed in Sections Two and Three can reasonably be 
argued to be capabilities. I single out citizenship rights as being such rights. Citizenship rights are 
a special form of human rights, but they differ from universal human rights in the sense that most 
citizenship rights can only be secured by the state. A full exposition of citizenship as a capability 
is the subject matter of Chapter Five.  
1. The origins of the notion of human rights 
 Although human rights discourse has become ubiquitous in philosophy and other academic 
disciplines, as well as in public discourse at large, the concept of human rights has a long and 
contested history. The idea of universal human rights that is implicit in contemporary 
conceptualizations has never been universally accepted. Since the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR) the world has witnessed an erosion of the belief in the universality of human 
aspirations, stemming in part, from a widespread conviction that human rights are a Western 
invention being shoved down non-Western throats. Although such attitudes might be partly based 
on selfish political propaganda by leaders who seek to shield their abusive behaviour from 
criticism, the attitudes by and large also reflect the views of many non-Westerners, who are critical 
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of the highly individualistic Declaration (Falk 2004:19). This is the reason why, in 1981, the 
African Union sought to counter the UDHR by developing the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights that emphasized the distinctiveness of non-individualistic African peoples’ human 
rights. The perceived “universality” of human rights is thus marred by controversy and perennial 
conceptual doubts. In this section, I trace the historical origins of the concept of human rights, so 
that contemporary conceptualizations are able to deal with some perennial concerns surrounding 
this concept.  
The modern idea of human rights has its roots in the seventeenth century, in the ‘natural rights’ of 
John Locke (Henkin 1989: 12). The natural rights theory was itself inspired by the natural law 
theory, which can be traced back to the philosophy of the Stoics in classical Athens, but was later 
popularised by Aquinas, Grotius, Locke, Paine, Rousseau, etc. These natural law theorists believed 
that there existed a natural, universal moral code discoverable by reason that should guide human 
relationships and interactions. The notion of the law of nature expressed the idea that there were 
certain moral truths that applied to all people, regardless of the particular community where they 
lived or the conventions they had made. For Locke (1988:86), this code “teaches all mankind that, 
being all equal and independent, no-one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty or 
possessions.” Enjoyment of these fundamental goods (life, liberty and possessions) was to be 
secured by humans’ possession of equally basic and objectively verifiable natural rights. The 
natural law was therefore understood as being pre-political. Even in the absence of political 
society, human relationships were governed by an extensive set of natural laws and natural rights, 
which, if adhered to, would ensure a peaceful and just society (Lessnoff 1986:62). Natural rights 
thus flowed from natural law, and the natural law – at least in Locke’s conception – came from 
God.  
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Locke’s theorizing of natural rights had a huge impact on the crafting of both the American 
Declaration of Independence and France's Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, passed 
by the Republican Assembly after the revolution in 1789.31 In practice, the natural law theory was 
used as a basis for revolting against absolutism in the 18th century (Shestuck 2000:37). For 
example, the war waged by the Whig Party in Britain that led to the fall of King James II (1688), 
and the revolution in France (1789) were both inspired by the natural right theory, which laid the 
foundation for fighting absolutism (see Lessnoff 1986:59).  
After a period of relative dormancy, the idea of natural rights saw a revival at the end of the Second 
World War, triggered partly by shocking and horrific acts that occurred during the war, chief 
among them being the extermination by Nazi Germany of over six million Jews, Sinti and Romani 
(Gypsies), homosexuals, and disabled persons. What followed was a renewed search for 
immutable principles which would protect humanity against such brutality (Shestuck 2000:42). A 
suitable grounding for persons’ dignity everywhere had to be found. The natural right theory was 
one such grounding. Although the natural law and natural right theories were found in European 
thought during the Enlightenment age, they carry overtones of moral universalism, because human 
nature is the same everywhere. This moral universalism is the foundation of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) of the United Nations. 
Contemporary human rights theory has developed against the background of the adoption by the 
General Assembly of the United Nations of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights on 10 
December 1948. Two features stand out in the contemporary conception of human rights, namely 
the idea of universality and the inclusion of economic and social rights under the rubric of general 
                                                          
31 I am aware that Thomas Jefferson also derived inspiration from Rousseau’s social contract in the crafting of the 
same declaration. 
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human rights. I discuss the latter in detail, in Section 2.2. The universality assumption underpins 
the general definition of human rights as the rights humans have simply by being human (Donnelly 
2013, Cranston 1976, Mayo 1976). Connected to the concept of universality are the concepts of 
equality and inclusion. Universality is logically meaningless if some humans are excluded or less 
equal than others. The idea of universality became prominent with the advent of the UDHR, even 
though earlier conceptions contained it, in a rather veiled manner. The crafting of the UDHR 
marked a renewed interest in making human rights universal through the inclusion of people of 
colour and women. Inclusive human dignity replaced bourgeoisie exclusive dignity based on 
property, rationality and reasoning (Vizard et al 2011:4). Instead of being an instrument for 
securing the interests (property interests in particular) of the male white bourgeoisie, human rights 
were supposed to be genuinely inclusive and therefore universal. The change in phraseology, from 
“the rights of man” to human rights, reflects this new thinking on human rights. The phrase ‘rights 
of man’ seemed to suggest that human rights were exclusively male, and that had to be corrected. 
Human rights were now supposed to protect all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or 
religion. 
 In addition to the above, human rights are conceived as equal rights in the sense that each human 
being has the same human rights as every other human being (Donnelly 2013:10). They are also 
said to be inalienable because a person cannot dispose of her humanity in the same manner she 
can dispose of her external possessions. One cannot stop being human, no matter how badly one 
behaves or barbarously one is treated. 
I have so far surveyed the historical development of the idea of human rights, but I am still to give 
a clearer definition of what is meant by the concept of rights. Literature on human rights is on the 
increase, but, as Hannam (2008:115) rightly points out, ubiquity has not been matched by clarity. 
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Increase in human rights rhetoric has often led to more confusion and contestation about the 
meaning of human rights. As Sen (2004:317) points out, conceptual doubts on human rights must 
be satisfactorily addressed if the idea of human rights is to command reasoned loyalty and establish 
for itself a secure intellectual standing. In the following sections I build up a particular conception 
of human rights by analysing the debates about the ontological status of rights as well as the scope 
of such rights.  I begin by discussing the ontology of human rights in Section One and then move 
over to deal with debate on the content of human rights in Section 2.2. 
2. The debates about human rights 
2.1 The ontological debate 
The ontological debate about human rights centres on the nature of rights: specifically on whether 
human rights are natural or simply born out of the law. As I have already intimated, I am not 
interested in defending either of these positions, but out of this debate, I wish to argue that whether 
rights are natural or human-made, they require the state for their protection and enjoyment.  The 
ontological debate grew as theorist after theorist responded either by justifying or rejecting the 
naturalist theory of human rights sketched above. The debate started with a simple question: “Are 
human rights natural or they are a product of human agreement?” I shall term “Lockeans” those 
theorists who argue that human rights are natural, and “Benthamites”, those who believe that 
human rights are man-made (or are a result of human legislation). Because of its influence on the 
contemporary debate, I start by explaining Jeremy Bentham’s response to the Lockean naturalist 
theory of rights above. I then move over to analyse Arendt’s take on the question, after which I 
turn to important recent contributions on the matter by Sen. My use of Arendt on this debate is 
because her position has a bearing on my own argument, in so far as her claim that citizenship 
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gives expression to the ‘right to have rights’ helps me defend my thesis that citizenship is an 
architectonic capability.  
Turning first to Bentham, he was irked by, and sought to criticise, the French Declaration of Rights 
published by the French National Assembly in 1791 (see Waldron 1987). Article II of the 
Declaration states that: “The end in view of every political association is the preservation of the 
natural and imprescriptible rights of man. These rights are liberty, property, security, and resistance 
to oppression.” In Anarchical Fallacies (1843), Bentham not only attacks the French Declaration 
of Rights, but also Locke’s theory of pre-political natural rights that underlies this Declaration. 
Locke, as we have seen, argues that governments are instituted to protect the natural rights that are 
already in people’s possession. Bentham, by contrast, draws a distinction between moral rights 
and legal rights, based on the way in which laws operate. For Bentham, only positive rights, 
understood as legal rights created and instituted by human beings, are real or genuine rights 
because they are enjoyed in practice. Human beings create laws, and laws give birth to rights. 
Laws and the rights that flow from them require government for their existence and enforcement. 
The only test for a right according to him is: “Is it actually enjoyed?” A right to freedom of 
expression is a right in so far as it has legal protection; otherwise we have no freedom of expression 
to talk about. Something that you do at your own risk cannot be called a right. Bentham thus rejects 
the view that there could be rights which pre-existed the establishment of government. He had in 
mind something like what Hobbes (1962: 96) had strongly argued for earlier, that where there is 
no political authority, “the notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice have no place. Where 
there is no common power, there is no law: where no law, no injustice”. The position argued here 
was that it does not make sense to call a right something that was beyond your enjoyment. 
Possessing such a “right” is indistinguishable from not possessing it. Since there are no rights 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
134 
 
anterior to government, to live without government simply meant to live without rights (Bentham 
1987: 51). Accordingly, the phrase “natural right” has a merely figurative meaning, at best, and 
anarchical consequences, at its worst. 
 The notion of a natural right is “anarchical” in the sense that it would entail a freedom from all 
restraint – in particular, from all legal restraint. Since a natural right would be beyond the bounds 
of the law, it would not be limited by law, and if everyone had such freedom, the result would be 
pure anarchy. People would use such purported rights to actually resist legal laws, because natural 
rights were incapable of being enforced. In simpler terms, Bentham is here saying that any right 
that resulted from human conventions could not still be called a natural right. A natural right is 
therefore something that is claimed, outside of the law. Bentham therefore famously concludes 
that the term “natural rights” is “simple nonsense: natural and imprescriptible rights, rhetorical 
nonsense — nonsense upon stilts” (Bentham 1987:51). “Real” rights, for Bentham are basically 
legal rights, and he agrees with Edmund Burke (1790) that the real test for a right is: “Is it a positive 
right?” In other words, “Is it something that can be enforced through judicial processes?” If the 
answer to this question is “No”, then there was no right to speak of.  
In recent times, Amartya Sen has criticised the legal-rights position view, arguing instead that even 
though human rights can, and often do, inspire legislation, this is a further fact about, rather than 
a constitutive characteristic of, human rights (Sen 2004:329). In Sen’s view, human rights are 
primarily ethical demands and not “legal or proto-legal” commands. An ethical understanding of 
human rights does not only run counter to seeing rights as legal demands, but also differs from a 
law-centred approach to human rights that sees them as if they are basically grounds for law, 
almost “laws in waiting.” Although ethical and legal rights have a motivational connection, “that 
such a connection exists is not the same as taking the relevance of human rights to lie exclusively 
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in determining what should appropriately be made the subject of coercive legal rules” (Sen 
2004:327). For Sen, it is important to see that the idea of human rights can be, and is, actually used 
in several other ways as well. Thus, the practical implementation of human rights can go well 
beyond legislation, and a theory of human rights cannot be sensibly confined within the juridical 
model in which it is frequently incarcerated (Sen 2004:329). In addition, not all human rights can 
be promoted through legislation, as some recognized human rights are better promoted through 
other means, including public discussion, appraisal and advocacy. However, even though the 
implementation of human rights goes beyond legislation, the political society is still required to 
make possible such processes as advocacy and public reasoning. Arguably, rights that are proposed 
and agreed on the basis of discussions, disputations and arguments through the process of open 
public reasoning are not purely natural but political institutions. Thus, whichever approach we take 
to the ontological status of rights, the implementation of human rights requires a political authority 
that guarantees their enjoyment.  
The last statement above captures what I have been driving at in this section. It does not really 
matter whether we believe that human rights are natural or a matter of convention. What is 
important is that the implementation of human rights is a matter of the state-citizen relationship. 
The state guarantees the protection and enjoyment of any form of rights, while citizenship is the 
state membership identification card. I expand this argument in Chapter Five. In the next section I 
would like to take up one further aspect of the debate about the scope rather than the status of 
human rights. Although social and economic rights are by and large recognised as genuine human 
rights, some scholars still contest that notion. I delve into this debate next.  
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2.2 The debate about the content and scope of rights 
Apart from the debate about the ontological status of rights discussed above, there is also 
considerable debate about the content and scope of human rights. In this section, I provide a brief 
overview of this debate that has mainly been ignited by publication of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, which is generally accepted as the principal contemporary articulation of human 
rights (see Henkin 1989:11). Traditionally, only civil and political rights, were assumed to 
constitute human rights, but the UDHR adds an additional category (or generation) of human 
rights, namely social, economic and cultural rights. This has led to what has been dubbed by some 
“human rights inflation”. The conservative view on human rights is that only civil and political 
rights are genuine human rights (see Cranston 1976, Griffin 2008), while the progressive view 
holds that social and economic rights are co-equivalent with civil and political rights. I shall argue 
for the latter position, which has been defended by Sen (2004), Nussbaum (1997) among others. 
In fact, I argue later that most human well-being capabilities, particularly those critical for 
developing countries, are of an economic and social nature.  
I begin, however, by presenting the conservative argument. The view here is that the incorporation 
of social and economic rights in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) has 
“inflated” human rights and this has muddied and obscured the philosophically respectable concept 
of human rights by incorporating into it rights of a different logical category (Cranston 1976:133). 
In Cranston’s view, only traditional political and civil rights, such as the right to life, liberty and a 
fair trial, are genuine rights (ibid: 133). Social and economic rights, such as the right to 
unemployment insurance and a right to holidays with pay, belong to a different logical category: 
they are simply social and economic rights and not human rights. Cranston forwards two sets of 
objections to this expanded new theory of human rights – one philosophical (conceptual) and the 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
137 
 
other political. Concerning the philosophical objection, he argues that the theory of human rights 
that incorporates social and economic rights does not make sense. There are several reasons why 
this is so. Firstly, social and economic rights are impossible to translate into positive law by 
analogous political and legal action (ibid: 137). In his view, human rights must bear a clear 
relationship to duties, or simply put, genuine human rights must be practical. In line with this 
reasoning, Cranston argues that social and economic rights do not pass the “practicability” test. If 
they are not practical, it will be absurd to claim them as human rights. He thinks that it is 
impossible, for example, for everyone in the world to be provided with “holidays with pay” 
(Article 24 of the UDHR).  
Cranston further argues that socio-economic rights do not pass the test of “paramount importance”. 
A human right should be of paramount importance – something that of which no-one may be 
deprived without it being a grave affront to justice. A right to fair trial is a right of considerable 
importance, unlike, say, a right to holidays with pay (Cranston 1976:142). Our moral conscience 
tells us that, not only does the former right trump the latter, but a right to ‘holidays with pay’ 
sounds like a superficial right. To argue that socio-economic rights are generally unimportant, 
without sound backing is wrong.  
The third test for genuine rights, according to Cranston, is the test of universality (Cranston 
1976:141). Any authentic right must be consistent with the general definition of human rights as 
the rights of all people, at all times and in all situations. But if you look closely at social and 
economic rights, you will notice that most of them are not truly universal. For example, a right to 
holidays with pay only applies to the class of people who are workers – unlike a right to life, for 
example, which for him, is clearly universal (ibid:141). Since not all people belong to the class of 
workers, this right cannot therefore be a universal right. Employees’ rights are simply moral rights 
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of parties in a special contractual relationship, but they are not universal human rights. But if we 
are to go by this, some civil and political rights do not pass the test either. The right to a fair trial, 
for example, applies only to people suspected of having violated the law. The right to political 
participation, and host others, do not apply to infants and the mentally retarded. 
More recently, a conservative view of human rights has been defended by scholars such as Neier 
(2006). Neier (2006: 1) argues that social rights cannot possibly be authentic rights, owing to the 
fact that it is impossible to enforce them through the judicial process. For him it is impossible to 
enforce social rights because such rights require a broad redistribution of society’s resources or its 
economic burdens, something that is both undesirable and practically impossible. He adds that, 
even if the enforcement of certain civil and political rights attracts some economic costs, such costs 
are incidental compared to the more substantial costs of economic redistribution (ibid: 1). Neier 
consequently advises that in cases of unfair economic distribution and discrimination of all types, 
the appropriate action to take would be to invoke rights to challenge the injustices, and not to 
attempt economic redistribution. 
 What can be said against this conservative argument? In the first place, the claim that socio-
economic rights are not susceptible to judicial protection is erroneous, and can be challenged. Why 
would it be impossible, for instance, to provide judicial protection for free primary education for 
children with disabled parents, or free health care for children with chronic diseases, or free tertiary 
education for orphans? Such social rights are as capable of being protected by the law as property 
rights or rights of non-interference, for instance. In all cases, protecting such rights would require 
positive action from the state and its institutions. Then there is the claim that enforcing social rights 
is expensive. Cranston thinks that socio-political rights are not practical because they require huge 
resource allocations that some countries cannot afford any time soon. But if some countries, 
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however few, can afford to provide their employees with paid holidays, we should not insist on 
the claim that socio-political rights are not practical. It is one thing to argue that something requires 
more effort, and another, to argue that something is not practical. Moreover, if it is possible to 
secure socio-economic rights, then, clearly, such rights are not in principle and necessarily 
unrealizable. We would therefore be better served by asking what needs to be done in order for 
any given society to be able to secure such rights. As Sen (2004:320) argues, the current 
unrealisability of any accepted human right which can be promoted through institutional or 
political change, does not, by itself, convert that claim into a non-right. In addition, the argument 
that socio-economic rights require huge budgetary allocations might as well be levelled against 
civil and political rights. Even without exact figures, we can estimate that, the budget North 
America uses for fighting terrorism, with a view to secure the right to life, is bigger that the budgets 
that go towards social services like unemployment insurance. We therefore cannot dismiss social 
and economic rights on the ground of costs. As Henry Shue (1980: 37) points out, even the 
traditional civil and political rights require the performance of duties which are not simply negative 
ones of non-interference. To secure civil and political rights, a country may be required to establish 
a complex and expensive judiciary and security system. 
I therefore propose that it is a mistake to pit different first generation and second generation rights 
against each other. Instead, we should evaluate rights according to their importance to human well-
being, regardless of the class in which they belong. Going on holiday (or resting) after several 
months immersed in work is not trivial. If resting has some health benefits both physically and 
psychologically, we might well argue that holidays with pay are a basic right (see Shue 1980 on 
basic rights). In addition, experience around the world has shown that more and more employers, 
including those in industrialising countries, can afford to send their employees on paid leave. Thus 
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there is nothing about paid holidays per se – Cranston’s go-to example – that essentially and of 
necessity excludes them from being a genuine right.  
The case for social rights can also be argued further using the right to education (Article 26 of the 
UDHR). My aim here is to bolster the argument that social and economic rights are as important 
as civil and political rights. According to the European Training and Research Centre’s (ETC 
2003) manual on human rights education, the human right to education can be characterized as an 
empowerment right. Such a right provides the individual with more control over the course of his 
or her life. The idea here is that, exercising an empowerment right enables a person to experience 
the benefits of other rights. In this regard, the enjoyment of many civil and political rights, such as 
the freedom of information, the freedom of expression, the right to vote and to be elected and many 
others, depends on at least a minimum level of education (ETC 2003:175). In addition to this, a 
number of economic, social and cultural rights such as the right to choose work, to receive equal 
pay for equal work, to enjoy the benefits of scientific and technological progress and to receive 
higher education on the basis of capacity, can only be exercised in a meaningful way after a 
minimum level of education has been attained. In the same manner, the right to take part in cultural 
life requires education because, for ethnic and linguistic minorities, the right to education is an 
essential means to preserve and strengthen their cultural identity (ibid: 375). Education also helps 
in the protection or promotion of other human rights through fostering a culture of understanding, 
tolerance, respect and friendship among nations, ethnic or religious groups and this can help in 
creating a universal human rights culture.  
Another crucial importance of social rights, as rightly noted by Honneth (2001:53), is that social 
rights are required for full compliance with the implications of equality before the law that 
promises equal treatment by the law for all members of a democratic polity. This demonstrates 
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that the granting of social rights, and the subsequent provision of basic social welfare, fulfil the 
normative function of giving each citizen the opportunity to participate in the democratic process 
of the public formation of a community based on the law. We cannot talk of equality before the 
law when, for example, some members of society cannot afford legal representation. 
I have so far argued that socio-economic rights undoubtedly pass the test of paramount importance. 
But do they pass the other test of universality? Here we need to inquire more carefully into 
Cranston’s understanding of universality. His own argument is developed in the dual context of an 
advanced economy and a comparatively stable political society. These are very different 
circumstances from those that hold in the developing world. Arguably, Cranston’s views reflect 
an environment in which many social and economic rights have already been realised, in contrast 
to many parts of the developing world, where the absence of these rights is much more keenly felt. 
In the latter context, it is easier to view a standard of living adequate for health and well-being as 
a necessary condition for the exercise of civil and political rights such as freedom of speech, 
freedom of movement, freedom of association, etc. With a healthy body, there is a chance of 
speaking my mind in the future when circumstances change. But of what help is speaking my mind 
now while prematurely dying from a curable disease? Some African politicians take the argument 
even further to claim that, a man's belly must be full before he can indulge in the “luxury” of 
worrying about his political freedoms (see Howard 1983:469). This is the so called African ‘full-
belly’ thesis, which is famed for arguing that civil and political rights can wait until basic economic 
needs are secured. I am not defending the full-belly thesis against Cranston’s argument for first 
generation rights. The point, rather, is to demonstrate the difficulty of trying to separate human 
rights into classes or generations. There is no good reason for weighting negative rights more 
heavily than positive rights, without due regard for (a) the importance of the latter for the 
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realisation of the former, and (b) the importance of both negative and positive rights for the 
realisation for human well-being. For example, as Sen argues in Poverty and Famines: An Essay 
on Entitlement and Deprivation (1981), the negative rights of freedom of expression and free 
political participation (characterized by multi-partyism and active opposition), work together to 
motivate the state to provide positive basic subsistence to its people, averting famine in the process. 
The fact that negative and positive rights complement each other does not, however, solve all of 
the conceptual challenges confronting human rights. In particular, there is still no agreed criterion 
for determining whether a listed human right can be justified on the basis of its importance for 
human well-being. Cranston’s exclusive criteria have by and large been unconvincing. This is why 
the capability approach theorists like Nussbaum (2011) have proposed to replace the language of 
rights with that of capabilities – a solution that I have also adopted in this dissertation. I discuss 
this solution in Section Three below. Meanwhile, I wish to briefly investigate one other 
contemporary attempt at solving the problem of criteria for rights that has been proposed by Griffin 
(2008, 2012). Griffin’s theory of rights is relevant for my argument in so far as it bolsters the 
rights-as-capabilities position I wish to defend.  
Griffin’s theory of human rights emanates from his observation that more and more lists of human 
rights are being produced, a clear indication that we are living with an indeterminate notion of 
human rights.32 In an attempt to clarify matters, Griffin therefore seeks to articulate a determinate 
account of human rights founded on moral personhood. The claim is that human rights are 
protections of personhood, and the essence of personhood is normative agency, while normative 
agency is defined as humans’ capacity to choose and to pursue their conception of a worthwhile 
                                                          
32 At the beginning of this Chapter, I alluded to a conceptual friction between the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. 
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life (Griffin 2012:7). Human rights are thus the rights necessary for normative agency, understood 
to be drawn in ways that satisfactorily address the various practical considerations, such as human 
nature and the nature of society (ibid: 8). Practical considerations help us in determining where to 
draw the lines that define what the various rights protect, and these lines need to as clear as 
possible. Given these criteria, it is possible to identify three categories of human rights that are 
necessary for normative agency, namely autonomy rights, liberty rights, and welfare rights. 
Normative (or standard) agency simply means our capacity to autonomously choose our path 
through life.  
Autonomy rights are the rights that are necessary for people’s ability to form, revise, and pursue 
conceptions of a worthwhile life (Griffin 2008: 27-44). Such rights are prior to and are the source 
of the other lower level rights like the right to life, or the right to a certain level of health (Talbott 
2016:1). The right to liberty, on the other hand, is not the right to do whatever one wants, but it is 
a right to the liberty that is necessary for normative agency. Among these rights are the rights to 
freedom of expression, of religion, and of assembly. Liberty rights require that one has real options 
and choices. The third category of human rights comprises welfare rights, provided at the level 
necessary for normative agency (Talbott 2016:1). This involves having sufficient education, 
information, resources, and capabilities in order for one’s choices to be “real” (Griffin 2008: 33). 
For example, we require the right to health, but only so long as its scope is restricted to the 
protection of those aspects of our health that are crucial to our lives as normative agents.  As a 
guide, Griffin sets the level of welfare provision at threshold as something that goes beyond mere 
subsistence but is lower than the general level of well-being in contemporary Western societies 
(Talbott 2016: 1). This level is set as such for practical purposes and also to drive home the point 
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that not everything that is of high value is matter of human rights. What is important is that we at 
least achieve the basic requirements for normative agency. 
By developing a clear framework for determining human rights, Griffin has gone some way in 
overcoming the main conceptual challenge confronting human rights talk, namely the challenge 
of indeterminacy. However, the notion of normative agency is not without its problems. Firstly, 
normative agency applies to rational and sane adults only and is thus exclusive. The mentally 
disabled and infants are excluded from having rights because they do not bear normative agency 
(Griffin 2012: 7). But this is a problem because we normally deem infants and the mentally ill to 
have human dignity and full human rights, and intentionally killing these attracts the same penalty 
as killing sane adult humans. We cannot make capacity for reflection a prerequisite for rights. In 
addition, if we are to follow the theory seriously, it implies that some violations, that at face value 
appear to be genuine human rights violations, may not count as such in so far as they do not 
undermine normative agency. Thus, if razing one of my three houses does not impair my ability 
to form and pursue a conception of a worthwhile life, such an act of destruction does not violate 
my human rights. The theory may thus fly in the face of our common sense understanding of the 
moral content of rights because some acts we normally deem immoral may not all pass as such if 
assessed accordance with Griffin’s concept of human rights. Griffin’s theory therefore does not 
provide us with a final answer on the scope and ontological status of human rights. Nevertheless, 
Griffin’s framework is helpful in so far as it shows that some f rights are capabilities in their own 
right. Achieving certain rights, like welfare results and autonomy rights, results in one achieving 
a certain state of being (or functioning), in this case, normative agency. This is the sort of argument 
I am presenting regarding citizenship rights, although my focus is different from that of Griffin 
stated above.  
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In what follows, I intend to show that conceiving of citizenship rights, as a specific subset of human 
rights, as capabilities does not suffer from the same conceptual problems associated with the 
general concept of human rights. I will first investigate the relationship between human rights and 
capabilities, after which I will show why we ought to understand citizenship rights in particular – 
though not human rights in general – as capabilities. 
3. The relationship between rights and capabilities 
While the preceding sections of this chapter dealt with the origins, status and scope of human 
rights, this section deals with the relationship between human rights and capabilities. Nussbaum 
(2011:36), for instance, is of the view that the CA is can be situated within the broader human 
rights tradition. However, the CA theorists do not all conceive of the link in the same way, and 
they do not all treat human rights as capabilities tout court.33 Donnelly (2013:14), for instance, 
argues that many internationally recognized human rights are fundamentally about human dignity, 
not human capabilities. This position is shared by Sen (2005:163), who also believes that many 
political rights cannot be adequately theorized within the CA. Nevertheless, both Donnelly and 
Sen concede that human rights and capabilities share important characteristics, and it is these 
characteristics that I discuss in the paragraphs below. The important point in this regard is that, 
when defending the position that human rights are related to capabilities, we need to be specific 
about the human rights that we are linking with capabilities, instead of trying to defend the blanket 
claim that all rights are capabilities. I begin by analysing Sen’s conception of the relationship 
between rights and capabilities, after which I turn to Nussbaum’s argument.  
                                                          
33 The link between capabilities and human rights is discussed in Sen (2000, 2004b, 2005, 2009) and Nussbaum (2003, 
2005, 2011). 
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Sen (2005: 152) argues that human rights and human capabilities have a common motivation, 
namely the concern for the dignity and freedom of the individual. More accurately, human rights 
are best understood as rights to certain freedoms, and, in so far as capabilities are freedoms of 
particular kinds, there is clearly a link between rights and capabilities. The motivation for a specific 
right derives from the importance of the corresponding freedoms – the freedoms that are identified 
and privileged in the formulation of the rights in question (Sen 2004:121). He gives the example 
of the human right of not being tortured. In his analysis, the motivation of this right is the 
importance of freedom from torture for all. Given that capabilities are kinds of freedoms, the two 
concepts — human rights and capabilities — thus go well together as there are many human rights 
that can be seen as rights to particular capabilities. However, Sen (2005:152) warns that we should 
not try to subsume either concept entirely within the territory of the other, because these concepts 
also differ in various ways. Specifically, although human rights incorporate significant economic 
and social freedoms, not all freedoms can be subsumed under the idea of human rights. For 
instance, the concept of human rights, for Sen, consists of two aspects of freedom, namely freedom 
of processes and freedom of opportunity (ibid: 152). Only the latter kind of freedom can be linked 
to capabilities, even though the freedom of processes such the right to a free trial, regardless of the 
outcome, is uncontroversially a human right. The CA does not concentrate on processes, because 
that amounts to a concentration on means or instruments for certain opportunities. Instead, the core 
focus of the CA is on ends – i.e. the real freedoms to achieve various functionings. In addition, 
Sen argues that even though the concept of human rights is related to the idea of opportunity, it is 
not specific enough. It is therefore better to see opportunity in terms of capability, as this allows 
us to distinguish appropriately between whether a person is actually able to do things she would 
value doing, and whether she only possesses certain means or instruments or permissions to pursue 
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what she would like to do. As discussed in Chapter Two, some contingent factors may lead to a 
disparity between means and actual ability; hence the need to focus on ends or real freedoms. 
All in all, Sen admits that there is a connection between human rights and capabilities, but he 
prefers to keep these two concepts separate for reasons highlighted above. He acknowledges that 
the concept of human rights has a strong appeal but claims it is also ‘intellectually frail – lacking 
in foundation and perhaps even in coherence and cogency’ (Sen 2005:151). However, I do not 
think that all human rights are vulnerable to the above problems, and that there is a strong 
conceptual convergence between citizenship rights and capabilities. I develop this argument in 
detail in Chapter Five. In this regard, my position is closer to that of Nussbaum, to whom I now 
turn. 
Nussbaum (2011) argues that capabilities cover the terrain covered by both ‘first-generation rights’ 
(political and civil liberties) and second-generation rights (economic and social rights), and they 
play a similar role, providing both a basis for cross-cultural comparison and the philosophical 
underpinning for basic constitutional principles (Nussbaum 2011:36). She proposes that human 
rights and capabilities are related in three ways: firstly, the CA is a specific kind of human rights 
approach; secondly, the language of capabilities supplements of human rights, and thirdly, the 
language of capabilities critiques that of human rights (ibid.:24).  
In the first place, human rights and capabilities are conceptually related, in that some rights – for 
example, the right to political participation, the right to free exercise of religion, the freedom of 
speech, and the freedom to seek employment outside the home – are all best thought of as human 
capacities to function, or, in Nussbaum’s terminology, combined capabilities (Nussbaum 
1997:292). Such rights are combined capabilities in the sense that they possess both an internal 
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component and an external component. Both components are essential, in that an individual who 
is systematically deprived of, say, information in political matters does not really have political 
liberty, even if the state imposes no barrier to political participation. On the other hand, internal 
conditions are not enough by themselves, because, even if one is fully enlightened politically, he 
or she still lacks freedom to political participation, if the political environment has many barriers 
like legal bottlenecks and violence. The above-mentioned rights are capabilities only if they are 
fully secured – i.e., when their enjoyment is effectively possible. Thus, for Nussbaum, human 
rights can be identified with capabilities only if circumstances for securing the rights are present. 
However, she acknowledges that there is another sense of ‘right’ which is at variance with that of 
capability (ibid: 293). We often claim to ‘have a right to something’ even when conditions to 
secure such a right are not present. This happens when we assert that, “by virtue of being human I 
have a right to this and that”, even if that right cannot be secured in the prevailing circumstances. 
A right in this sense is not a capability but a ground for the securing of a capability. Nussbaum 
thus argues that the best way of thinking about what it means to secure the rights of persons is to 
think in terms of capabilities. For example, the rights of political participation, of free exercise of 
religion, of free speech and more are all best thought of as secured for people only when the 
relevant capabilities to function are present. In other words, to secure a right for people in these 
areas is to put them in a position of capability to function in that area (Nussbaum 2005:36). 
Remember that having the capability to function means having real freedom to assume a desired 
state of being, or having real freedom do what one desires to do. Moreover, to the extent that rights 
are used in defining social justice, we should not grant that a society is just unless the capabilities 
have been effectively achieved: 
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We make it clear that a people in country C don’t really have an effective right to political 
participation, for example, a right in the sense that matters for judging that the society is a 
just one, simply because this language exists on paper: they really have been given a right 
only if there are effective measures to make people truly capable of political exercise. … 
In short, thinking in terms of capability gives us a benchmark as we think about what it is 
really to secure a right to someone (Nussbaum 2011:36). 
It is clear from the above that Nussbaum views the CA as one species of the human rights approach 
– a position that I also support. Understood in a particular way and given an enabling environment, 
some human rights are essentially capabilities. What we need at this stage is to explain and justify 
what the notion of capabilities does or what it adds to the already existing notion of human rights. 
On this point Nussbaum (2011:36) argues that the language of the CA improves and preserves 
what is best in the human rights tradition and avoids some deficiencies and controversies 
associated with some versions of that approach (see the debates above). In her view, the language 
of capabilities does not obliterate or replace that of rights, because the latter has such wide currency 
and resonance in global politics that it would be unwise to try to do away with it. The human rights 
tradition has already so heroically struggled for basic justice that it would be foolhardy to turn 
away from that tradition. Nonetheless, the tradition has points of vagueness which the CA can 
usefully supplement. The CA can plug the gaps that have rendered the human rights concept 
vulnerable to the criticisms of conceptual incoherence and/or ontological indeterminacy. Below, I 
discuss some of the advantages of adopting the employing the language of capabilities over that 
of human rights. I draw extensively from Nussbaum (2011), who has worked this out in significant 
detail.  
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 Having shown that her version of the CA is a variant of the human rights approach, Nussbaum 
goes on to justify why the CA should be preferred over the mainstream human rights approach. 
She argues that the concept of capabilities supplements that of human rights by clarifying its basic 
notions and giving it a much-needed precision (Nussbaum 2011:24; Sen 2009:355-387). As I have 
shown in the sections above, human rights have been understood in many different ways, and 
difficult theoretical questions are frequently obscured by the use of rights language, resulting in 
serious conceptual contestations. For example, people differ about what the basis of a rights claim 
is, with rationality, sentience, and mere life having had some defenders (Nussbaum 2011:24) In 
addition, rights theorists differ about whether rights are pre-political or artefacts of laws and 
institutions (see discussion above). Moreover, there is disagreement about whether rights belong 
only to individual persons, or also to groups – something that is of particular salience in the various 
attempts to theorize an African communitarian ethics and politics (ibid: 24). Finally, theorists also 
differ about the nature of the relationship between rights and duties: “if A has a right to S, then 
does this mean that there is always someone who has a duty to provide S, and how are we to decide 
who that someone is?” (Nussbaum 2011: 24). Nussbaum argues that her version of the CA has the 
advantage of taking clear positions on these disputed issues, as the CA makes clear what the 
motivating concerns for human entitlements are and what their goal is (ibid: 25). The ten central 
capabilities she defends (see Chapter Two, and also Nussbaum 2000, 2003 and 2005), are anchored 
in human life, “being born from human parents, and having a minimal level of agency or capacity 
for activity” (Nussbaum 2011:25). This, in her view, is a straightforward basis for securing 
capabilities in contrast to the traditional human rights approach that bases rights on rationality 
(which may exclude people with some disabilities), or any other specific human property. The goal 
of the CA is also clear – minimum social justice, or a life worthy of human dignity. For Nussbaum, 
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justice at a minimum requires that we secure for each individual the capabilities (freedoms) to 
function at a threshold level in every way that is required for a decent human life. My aim here is 
not to pit CA theorists against each other, but to show why we ought to prefer the CA over the 
human rights approach in well-being conceptualisations. I have extensively used Nussbaum on 
this argument because, in my view, she clearly and directly addresses the similarities and 
differences between the capability and the human rights approaches.  
Adopting the CA also resolves the problem of the scope of human rights, which concerns the 
traditional division of rights into two groups: political and civil rights, which are often called first-
generation rights, and economic and social rights, which are called second-generation rights. For 
Nussbaum (2011:33), while the human rights tradition suggests that political and civil rights have 
no economic and social preconditions, the CA recognises that they do, particularly if we consider 
the fact that people’s ability to participate in political debate, to vote, to run for office, and so forth, 
can be inhibited by extreme poverty, lack of education, and ill health. The CA thus avoids a 
separation between first generation and second generation rights, insisting that all entitlements 
have material and institutional necessary conditions (ibid: 33). In addition, as argued in sections 
above, some second generation rights are a pre-requisite for the enjoyment of some first generation 
rights. I have already argued to the effect that education (a social right), is a precondition of the 
adequate exercise of several first generation rights, among them, political rights. The CA thus 
argues against grouping and dividing rights into first generation and second generation, but advises 
that we should look at each entitlement separately, asking what its importance to well-being is and 
what its material and institutional preconditions are (see Nussbaum 2011:34).  
Concerning the legitimate duty bearer of these entitlements, Nussbaum vacillates on this issue, 
although I think her concept of capability helps us to give a clear-cut response on this. At one point 
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she claims that, “[i]f people have entitlements, then there is a duty to secure them, even if it is 
difficult to say to whom the duty belongs” (Nussbaum 2011:26). Elsewhere, in Frontiers of Justice 
(2005), she argues that the whole world is under a collective obligation to secure the capabilities 
to all world citizens, even if there is no worldwide political organization. Now this is problematic. 
Although it can be argued that the world has enough resources to meet the basic needs of all people, 
in the absence of a clearly binding distributive framework, it is hard to see how these resources 
can be distributed in the absence of a clearly defined duty bearer with both the power and the 
legitimacy to effect and regulate such a distribution. Admittedly, the international community 
plays a critical role in providing humanitarian and other forms of assistance to countries in need, 
but this assistance can only go some, but not usually all, the way. It is for these reasons that I argue 
that the state remains the main institution for securing people’s rights or capabilities, and 
Nussbaum’s concept of capability supports this position (see Chapter Two, Section 1.2). Yes, 
Nussbaum argues – and I agree – that capabilities are freedoms created by a combination of internal 
personal abilities (or capabilities) and the external political, social, and economic environment. In 
some sense, the external environment is the whole world, but only in the most abstract sense. The 
means through which the external environment has an effective impact on the well-being of 
persons is through the actions of the state – both positive and negative. Although she does not 
articulate a clear-cut position on the duty-bearer for human entitlements, Nussbaum herself admits 
that human rights or the central capabilities she proposes cannot be secured for people in the 
absence of political society. Human rights are, for her, pre-political, inherent in people’s very 
humanity, but they require political society for their protection. She writes: 
These central entitlements are pre-political, belonging to people independently of and prior 
to membership in a state; and they generate constraints that political institutions must meet, 
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if they are to be even minimally just. In other words, they belong to humans just on account 
of their human dignity, and would be there even if there were no political organization at 
all, although no doubt they would not be secured to people (Nussbaum 2011:25). 
Conclusion  
The main aim of this chapter has been to justify my allegiance to the capability approach instead 
of the human rights approach that is more commonly associated with conceptions of citizenship 
(see Nash 2009: 1068). I have argued that the human rights approach is less attractive owing to 
some difficult conceptual issues confronting it, some of which the CA has gone some way in 
resolving. Apart from this, the human rights approach remains useful for certain aspects of my 
argument. As I have shown, Nussbaum classifies the capability approach as one species of the 
human rights approach. For this reason, we cannot entirely dispense with human rights issues when 
discussing the CA. 
In addition to the above, my defence of social rights in Section Two bolsters my argument for 
social citizenship in particular and liberal citizenship in general. Another important conclusion I 
drew in this chapter is that human rights require political society for them to be secured. This 
position does not depend on the final resolution of the question of whether human rights are pre-
political or not. Whether human rights are pre-political or not, they require a political society for 
their implementation.  
Having analysed the complex relationship between human rights, citizenship and capabilities, all 
that remains is for me to seal my argument that citizenship is a capability. By this, I do not refer 
to citizenship simply as a means to some capabilities (although this makes some sense), but I argue 
that it is itself a capability. There are two senses in which citizenship is conceptualized, as a status 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
154 
 
and as a set of civil, political and social rights (social rights in this case incorporate economic 
rights). Citizenship as a status is the fundamental or architectonic capability, what I am referring 
to as ‘the capability to have other capabilities’. The status of citizenship is the empowerment 
capability that enables us to enjoy the capabilities that go with this status. I consequently argue 
that the rights of citizens are essentially well-being capabilities. My task in the next and final 
chapter is to defend this claim.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CITIZENSHIP AS AN ARCHITECTONIC CAPABILITY 
 
Introduction 
The preceding chapters have set the scene for the argument in this final chapter. Having shown 
that the CA offers a better platform for assessing human well-being than the exclusive use of the 
contested universal human rights approach (see Chapter Four), in the present chapter, I propose a 
specific way of giving content to the CA with a view to making it theoretically accessible and 
practically useful for human well-being. In this regard, I propose that we understand citizenship as 
an architectonic capability. As I indicated at the beginning of the dissertation, a capability is 
architectonic in so far as it organises and pervades some, many or all other capabilities. My use of 
the term “architectonic” is inspired by Aristotle (1962), Arendt (1950), Nussbaum (2011), and Le 
Grange (2012). 34  For example, Nussbaum (2011:39) argues that two of her capabilities, the 
capabilities of practical reason and affiliation, are architectonic in the sense that they organise and 
pervade the others, or, in simpler terms, they influence and structure all other capabilities. But 
what is the nature of this influence? For Nussbaum, there cannot be a good policy commensurate 
with human dignity that excludes these capabilities. Being able to exercise practical reason is vital 
for choice – the ability to plan one’s own life. Affiliation is also fundamental, owing to the fact 
that the person is respected as a social being and public policies are structured by various human 
relationships (ibid: 39-40). My use of the term “architectonic” resembles that of Nussbaum, but 
there are differences. While for Nussbaum the exercise of, say, practical reason influences other 
capabilities, citizenship as an architectonic capability in my view, is the licence or gate-pass to the 
                                                          
34 I summarized how each of these theorists use the term “architectonic” in the Introduction to the dissertation. 
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enjoyment of other capabilities that go with the status. For Nussbaum, it is possible for other 
capabilities, like being able to be well nourished, to be fully secured even in the absence of the 
capability of practical reasoning, although this will be inadequate for human dignity. This is 
because, if individuals are taken care of by others, without making their own decisions and choices, 
this amounts to treating them like infants (ibid: 39). In the case of citizenship, I argue that, in all 
but the rarest of cases, one lacks the well-being capabilities without being a citizen first. In 
architecture, it is the structure of the building that influences, shapes and organises the activities 
within it. The structure of the building is not the only thing that does so, of course. However, it is 
accurate that architectural design makes certain kinds of human activities possible and others 
impossible and, in this way, either advances or impedes human well-being. I apply the same 
reasoning in the context of liberal citizenship, which I argue to be a structural determinant of well-
being.  The “architectonic” metaphor helps me explain the importance of citizenship for well-
being, which in turn operationalizes the CA in a specific direction. This is a novel approach, since 
in most conceptualizations of well-being by CA theorists, citizenship only features indirectly, as 
in cases when a listed capability is deemed a citizenship right. 
The purpose of this final chapter, then, is to return to the subject of human well-being and 
demonstrate in full the nature of the relationship it has with citizenship. I indicated in Chapter One 
that well-being is a complex and multidimensional concept that is understood in different ways by 
different schools of thought and disciplines, among them utilitarians, economists, and 
psychologists. In Chapter Two I took the position that the CA conceptualizes well-being better 
than income-based and utilitarian approaches, but I also noted that the content of well-being 
capabilities is still a contested matter. In this chapter I therefore demonstrate and justify how 
citizenship provides that content. To be clear: I am arguing that one useful way of understanding 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
157 
 
well-being is to understand it as being constituted by a set of civil, political and social freedoms. 
The condition for accessing these freedoms is citizenship – in this case, a specific, rights-based 
liberal conception of citizenship. In Section One, I present the connection between well-being and 
citizenship in general terms. This sets the tone for Section Two, where I demonstrate that specific 
capabilities and capability sets are essentially citizenship rights – freedoms which full members of 
political societies are able to enjoy and which are denied to stateless people (including refugees).  
Having made the case for considering a specific, normative conception of citizenship as an 
architectonic capability, in Section Three I apply this to the case of gender. I use gender inequality 
to make explicit how the lack of effective citizenship rights is detrimental to human well-being. 
At the end of this chapter, I hope to have shown that citizenship is an entitlement to the political, 
civil and social capabilities that go with the status of full membership and that these capabilities 
are essential for well-being. Put in another way; it should be clear at the end that the status of being 
a citizen is the capability to have capabilities. 
1. Citizenship as the capability to have capabilities   
I now wish to demonstrate the specific respects in which citizenship is essential or architectonic to 
well-being. Recall that by well-being I mean a positive quality of life reflected through having 
effective opportunities to live valued lives. Alternatively, well-being denotes good life or human 
flourishing in general (see Chapter One). My starting point is Arendt’s analysis of the specific 
condition of being stateless, or being a non-citizen. I particularly appeal to Arendt here in so far 
as her argument is the primary motivation for my claim that citizenship is an architectonic 
capability. Although in The Origins of Totalitarianism (1951) Arendt was not directly talking 
about capabilities but rather human rights, her views are illuminating, particularly on the subject 
of citizenship. In brief, Arendt’s argument is that human rights made sense only in the context of 
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citizenship – that is, in being a member of state – as it is only the state that guarantees the enjoyment 
of such rights (Arendt 1951: 291). Consequently, Arendt saw a problem with the notion of 
universal human rights; this notion reckoned with an “abstract” human being who simply does not 
exist (see Arendt 1951:291). For Arendt, the conception of human rights, based upon the assumed 
existence of the human being in general – or the universal concept of the human being – runs into 
problems as soon as those who believed in the human being or humanity as such comes face to 
face with people who had indeed lost all individual qualities and specific relationships, except that 
they were still human. When refugees, the stateless, are deprived of the rights of citizens, which 
establish their specific claims upon their fellows in terms of political and legal relationships, the 
“rights of man” seemingly ceased to apply to them as well. Without a political society to secure 
them, human rights become meaningless.  
The relevant point here is that, no matter how ‘human rights’ are defined, they prove to be 
unenforceable whenever people appear who were no longer citizens of any sovereign state (ibid: 
372). Arendt thus associates “a right to have rights” with a right to belong as a full member to 
some kind of organised political community. To belong in this way is not the same as being present 
in a particular territory; nor is it to be a ward of the state or a recipient of private charity. Rather, 
it is to enjoy a particular civic status. To be a bearer of citizenship is thus a necessary – though 
perhaps not sufficient – condition for securing and enjoying most other rights. The strength of 
Arendt’s argument lies in the fact that it is based on the actual experiences of Jewish refugees in 
the 1930s and 1940s; yet we can also make reference to similar contemporary cases. The plight of 
hundreds of thousands of refugees and illegal migrants who are getting into Europe after fleeing 
from war and poverty in their countries is a case in point. Refugees and migrants from Syria, Iraq, 
Afghanistan, the Horn of Africa and elsewhere, arriving in Europe since 2010, have met with 
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resistance from European nations reluctant to receive them; tens of thousands continue to reside 
in sub-standard camps and makeshift accommodations, with little assistance and little hope for 
their future. As non-citizens or stateless persons, these people’s well-being is seriously 
compromised. Their well-being is compromised because, as people who are neither legally nor in 
practice recognised as bona fide members of the state, they lack political and civil freedoms and 
the state is not obligated to offer them social protection. Consequently, such people, in most 
instances, lack effective opportunities to be educated or to be healthy.   
For Arendt, two things are necessary for human rights to be effective: firstly, political society, and 
secondly, a right to membership in that political community; and only these make one’s actions 
and opinions count (Arendt 1951:376). By this she meant that one can only legitimately make 
claims to the political community of which one is a recognized member; alternatively, any rights 
claims are only effective in so far as is the one making such has standing within a polity.. To be 
deprived of a polity and consequently without citizenship, one is in effect deprived of the “right to 
have rights” (ibid: 376). Although Arendt argues along the same lines as Bentham and Burke, her 
argument is more compelling, on the grounds that she rides over some of the obstacles of the 
ontological debate by arguing that, regardless of the conception of human rights we adopt, 
citizenship of a state is required for such rights to mean anything at all (ibid: 377). Being a citizen 
in a polity matters more to Arendt than having ‘inalienable’ rights, which, in her view, lack a 
determinate referent; “it turns out that man can lose all so-called Rights of Man without losing his 
essential quality as man, his human dignity. Only the loss of a polity itself expels him from 
humanity” (ibid: 377). This means, what undermines human dignity is not, in the first place, the 
loss of rights but the loss of the condition to have such rights protected.  
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Analogous to Arendt’s “right to have rights”, I argue that citizenship is best understood as an 
architectonic capability, or a “capability to have capabilities”. That is: citizenship directly or 
indirectly provides access to a range of important well-being goods like public order, physical 
safety, and access to a job market; the complex array of civil, political, social, and economic rights; 
and even intangibles such as a feeling of belonging (Brubaker 2010:229). Admittedly, non-citizen 
members of a state are not completely shut off from the enjoyment of some well-being goods. 
Illegal immigrants, refugees, and some oppressed groups can still enjoy such goods as public peace 
and or access to insecure employment. But this is obviously inadequate for such individuals to live 
the lives they may deem valuable, and they lack the full capability set of those who are citizens. 
Notwithstanding some exceptions, lack of citizenship places enormous constraints on well-being. 
There is a reason why crime rates and cases of drug abuse are high among non-citizens. The same 
group is vulnerable to exploitations of all forms, including labour and sexual exploitations. 
As this point, two clarifications are in order. In the first place, it is important to reiterate that, while 
the architectonic capability I am working out here is that of a liberal rather than a communitarian 
or republican notion of citizenship, it is liberal citizenship with a substantial social component. 
Arguably, most elements that contribute to, or constitute the multidimensional well-being, are of 
a social nature. Without disregarding the role of civil and political freedoms, Sen (1999:15) lists 
sources of unfreedom as being the lack of basic opportunities for healthcare, or functional 
education, or gainful employment, or economic and social security. In addition, gender inequality 
is detrimental to well-being in so far as it seriously restricts the substantive freedoms that women 
are able to enjoy (see Sen 1999, Nussbaum 2003, 2005, 2011, Robeyns 2003). All of the above are 
clearly the special concern of social citizenship. I am here aligning myself with Rawls’s (1971, 
1999) view that no society can be “well ordered” and therefore just when the respective state does 
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not concern itself with issues of poverty and other social issues that have an impact on the citizens’ 
pursuit of their plans in life.  
The second clarification concerns the case of persons that are legally referred to as citizens but 
who seem not to meet the conceptual requirements of citizenship of full and equal membership. I 
have in mind societies in which women and or people of colour are unable to convert their formal, 
legal rights as citizens into effective freedoms. I am reluctant to call such persons citizens at all, 
precisely because, as I have shown in Chapter Three, the bundle of freedoms should be equal for 
all those deemed citizens. This is why I find the idea of “second class citizenship” misleading. If 
citizenship is founded on equality, logically speaking we cannot have varying degrees of 
citizenship without violating equality. 
Generally, the purpose of this section has been to show the connection between citizenship and 
well-being. In the next section I want to strengthen my argument that citizenship is the foundational 
capability by showing that some already-listed capabilities by notable CA theorists like Sen (1980, 
1999, 2004), and Robeyns (2003), require citizenship for their enjoyment. 
1.1 Citizenship entitlements as capabilities: examples 
As indicated in Chapter Two (Sections 2-3), there have been various attempts by theorists to 
complete the CA by way of recommending a list of the most important capabilities (see Nussbaum 
2000, 2003, 2006, 2011, Robeyns 2003, Alkire 2002, Anderson 1999, Sen 200435). Admittedly, 
almost all the proposed capabilities are important for human well-being, but I wish to use two of 
these lists to show the extent to which citizenship matters in accessing most of these capabilities. 
                                                          
35 Even though Sen does not recommend an official list of capabilities, he nevertheless give examples of fundamental 
capabilities from time to time (see Sen 2004 :78, 1999: xii) 
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In what follows, I will rely on the lists of capabilities developed by Sen and Robeyns. All 
capabilities listed in the table below are conceptually dependent upon citizenship entitlements, in 
that they are all, in one way or another, enabled, nurtured or developed by the state. I have avoided 
taking examples from Nussbaum’s capabilities because at least some of her capabilities seem to 
be innate abilities whose development we certainly cannot link to the state. Although Sen, unlike 
Robeyns, does not systematically recommend a list of capabilities, he does discuss various 
candidates for capabilities that would seem to demand attention in any theory of justice, and more 
generally in social assessment. I have surveyed several publications by Sen and Robeyns and 
prepared two representative – though not exhaustive – lists based on their examples.36  
Sen’s list of capabilities (selected) Robeyns’s list of capabilities (selected) 
 
1. The ability to move around 
2. The ability to meet one’s nutritional 
requirements. 
3. The wherewithal to be clothed and sheltered. 
4. The power to participate in the social life of the 
community. 
5. The real feeling of self-respect. 
6. The freedom to obtain remedies for treatable 
illnesses. 
7. The power to avoid poverty as well as tyranny, 
poor economic opportunities as well as 
systematic social deprivation, neglect of public 
facilities as well as intolerance or overactivity 
of repressive states.  
 
 
1. Life and physical health: being able to be 
physically healthy and enjoy a life of normal 
length.  
2. Mental well-being: being able to be mentally 
healthy.  
3. Bodily integrity and safety: being able to be 
protected from violence of any sort. 
4. Social relations: being able to be part of social 
networks and to give and receive social 
support.  
5. Political empowerment: being able to 
participate in and have a fair share of influence 
on political decision-making. 
                                                          
36 Note that “Sen’s list” on the table is my own, but generated using Sen’s own examples. See Sen (1979) and Robeyns 
(2003).  
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 6. Education and knowledge: being able to be 
educated and to use and produce knowledge. 
7. Paid work and other projects: being able to 
work in the labor market or to undertake 
projects, including artistic ones. 
8. Shelter and environment: being able to be 
sheltered and to live in a safe and pleasant 
environment.  
9. Mobility: being able to move between 
geographical locations. 
10. Leisure activities: being able to engage in 
leisure activities.  
11. Respect: being able to be respected and treated 
with dignity.  
12. Religion: being able to choose to live or not to 
live according to a religion”. (Robeyns 
2003:71-2) 
 
A closer look at both lists of capabilities shows that the bulk of them are secured by the relevant 
component of the three that constitute liberal citizenship. Such capabilities as freedoms to be well 
nourished, to avoid famine, to live a disease-free life, to be educated, to be clothed and sheltered, 
are candidates of the social component of citizenship. Remember, social citizenship rights entail 
access to a modicum of social security from the state that capacitates one to live the life of a 
civilized being (Marshall 1950:10-11). It should be clear, therefore, that most of the capabilities at 
stake for Sen and Robeyns are indeed secured by citizenship, in so far as they do not depend on 
individual motivation and ingenuity, or on private associations, but require both the formal, legal 
protection of a state plus well-functioning social and political institutions in order to secure them. 
The state develops these capabilities through various initiatives, among them eliminating poverty, 
ensuring availability of economic and employment opportunities for all, and maintaining thriving 
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public facilities. In addition to social security, state policies for strengthening democratic values 
are also critical in fostering both political agency and subsequently psychological well-being. For 
instance, the feeling of being recognised as a bona fide member of society, capable of participating 
in shaping its laws and policies, is critical for psychological well-being. Lack of recognition, on 
the other hand, has a negative bearing on well-being. As Taylor (1992: 25) states, the absence of 
recognition leads to real damage because it is a form of oppression or imprisonment. This is so 
because if people are not recognised, they feel demeaned, and this consequently makes them adopt 
a depreciatory image of themselves. They come to see themselves as inferior, to the extent that, 
even if obstacles to their advancement are removed, they may not even realize it. My argument is 
therefore that citizenship is a necessary condition for the advancement of human well-being in so 
far as it is the passport to full state protection and recognition. My point is not only to show that 
citizenship is a capability or a superior status, and stop there, but by implication, I am arguing for 
inclusion or accommodation and recognition. By implication, I am also arguing against 
statelessness and other forms of exclusions based on, say, sex, tribe race, and religion. Citizenship 
provides the moral basis for the state’s obligation to advance well-being. Outside of the state-
citizenship relationship, we can only proceed through unreliable and inadequate humanitarian 
actions. 
I wish to briefly clarify what this conception of citizenship means for children. This clarification 
is important, because, as Roche (1999: 475) points out, much of the current discussion and 
discourses on citizenship display a “negative agenda” which serve to problematize and marginalize 
children. Children, just like adults, are social actors who take on significant responsibilities in a 
range of contexts, but they (children) are often rendered silent and invisible by the attitudes and 
actions of adult society (ibid: 475). Just like adults, children are confronted with social problems 
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such as poverty and racism, but the language of citizenship seems to exclude them owing to their 
immaturity. I concede that the concept of citizenship that I adopted in this dissertation does exclude 
children to some extent, owing to the fact that children are unlikely to make full use of civil, 
political and social rights. Children cannot drive cars or fill political positions. However, children 
are “citizens through parents” until they reach a certain age of maturity when they would be 
capable of making rational choices. To argue that children are citizens through parents is to argue 
that the position of parents in society, to some degree, determines the position of their children. In 
other words, the entitlements a particular child has are a result of the position (or citizenship status) 
of the parents of that child. Children of citizens of a country that offers free health care for children 
under five, free primary education, among other provisions, benefit by virtue of being children of 
these citizens. In addition, policies can be instituted that cater for the capabilities of orphans of 
deceased citizens. Thus the liberal, rights-based conception of citizenship can be said to cater for 
the well-being of children to a significant extent. A different but related issue concerns the status 
of expatriate workers, business persons, sportspersons, diplomats and the like. Such reside in 
foreign states for specific positive causes and may only need limited rights of concern to their 
respective missions. In addition such people already have a maximally expanded capability set 
because they are and have been citizens of another state, and thus developed their capabilities 
under the auspices of the latter – and still enjoy its legal protection – which places them in a 
positive position even in a state where they are only a member and not a citizen. 
Given the above, it should be clear at this point in which respects and to what extent citizenship is 
an architectonic capability. Liberal citizenship (understood both as equal status and a set of rights) 
is a capability to have well-being capabilities. This is so because in being the foundational 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
166 
 
capability, citizenship structures and paves way for the enjoyment of all capabilities that are 
connected to this status.  
I have so far argued that citizenship should be understood as a capability – and then a capability 
of a particular kind, namely a foundational or architectonic capability; that is, a capability that 
secures and expands an individual’s overall capability set. 37 Before I show how this conception of 
citizenship works in practice, I need to demonstrate how citizenship structurally matches the 
description of a capability and why it should not be confused with mere means to capabilities such 
as wealth, opportunities, etc. 
2. The structure of citizenship as a capability 
In this section, I show that citizenship is a capability in the sense that it fits the description of a 
capability as given by Nussbaum (2011), who is one of the founding members of the CA. To 
refresh our memory, Nussbaum defines capabilities (or combined capabilities) as freedoms created 
by a combination of internal personal abilities (or capabilities) and the political, social, and 
economic environment. This means that a person’s political, social and economic situation (or 
status) is one necessary part in the creation of capabilities (see Nussbaum 2011:20). The other part 
comprises what Nussbaum calls internal capabilities, which are abilities, skills, or traits resulting 
from one’s interaction with the social, economic, familial, and political environment (ibid: 21).  
In a fashion similar to Nussbaum, Smith and Seward (2009:215) see citizenship as a capability 
made of two components. To begin with, they define citizenship as the underlying condition of 
possibility for achieving certain functionings. It is a causal power (a “power to”) that provides the 
potential to realize particular functionings (ibid: 215). This description of citizenship fits the 
                                                          
37 From now on, I will be using the term “citizenship” to refer to a liberal citizenship, unless otherwise stated.  
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conception of an architectonic capability that I defined above. Regarding the components of 
citizenship, Smith and Seward (2009:214, 219) indicate that the citizenship capability includes 
both individual capacity and social factors, and this resonates with Nussbaum’s idea of combined 
capabilities.  
Smith and Seward posit that capabilities are of a social nature because particular social structures 
are the causal powers or are the reasons and resources for the realization of particular capabilities 
(ibid: 225). In other words, these capabilities are context-caused. They are the outcome of the 
interaction of an individual’s innate capacities, the individual’s position relative to others in 
society, and the social structures that provide reasons and resources for particular behaviours (ibid: 
214). Following this, Smith and Seward argue that citizenship, which they define as a social 
position of political equality within a democratic structure with an associated set of practices, is, 
like most capabilities, quintessentially a social capability (ibid: 225). To buttress their argument, 
they carefully delineate the mechanisms, both individual and structural, that are necessary for the 
realization of the capability of citizenship. The table below shows these mechanisms (see Smith 
and Seward 2009: 227).  
 
Mechanism Abstract description Necessary mechanisms for the 
capability of citizenship 
Individual 
mechanisms 
The inherent capacities of humans. 
These capacities include the capacity for 
intentional reflexive behaviour 
A citizen requires the physical and 
cognitive capacity to engage in the 
political process, including the 
knowledge and skills necessary for 
participation, as well as the belief 
that their participation has influence 
or is politically efficacious. The 
individual identifies with the identity 
of the “citizen.” 
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Structural 
mechanisms 
The material and normative reasons and 
resources that motivate and provide 
incentives for (constrain/ enable) choices 
and actions. These emerge from the 
position of the individual/collective in 
the relevant set of social relations 
between people and the relations 
between people and nature for the 
capability 
Citizenship involves membership in 
a political community, and therefore 
identity is necessary for the 
capability of citizenship. This 
identity (most commonly a national 
identity) provides reasons to uphold 
the rights and responsibilities 
inherent to citizenship. Democratic 
institutions provide the resources for 
citizens to engage in citizen 
practices. Citizens must also have 
trust in democratic institutions in 
order to fully participate in the 
democratic process and believe that 
their participation is influential. 
Democratic values in society provide 
individuals with normative reasons 
for participation 
 
2.1 Internal components for the capability of citizenship  
The table above shows that a capability has two components: an internal component plus an 
external component. I start by analysing internal components, which Smith and Seward call 
individual mechanisms, and which correspond to Nussbaum’s “internal capabilities”. I choose to 
term these internal components or skills, to avoid the vagueness that I identify with Nussbaum’s 
concept of combined capabilities.38 However, I share the view that some internal capacities are 
conducive to the capability of citizenship. Nussbaum (2011:21) defines these as “the 
characteristics of a person (personality traits, intellectual and emotional capacities, states of bodily 
fitness and health, internalized learning, skills of perception and movement)”. These capacities are 
defined by Nussbaum in the fourth, fifth and sixth of her proposed list of central “capabilities”. 
                                                          
38 I maintain the position that internal skills on their own do not constitute capabilities, but are, however, necessary 
components of capabilities. I therefore dispute the idea of internal or combined capabilities. See Chapter Two on this. 
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These include: senses, imagination, thought, which include among other things, “being able to use 
one’s mind in ways protected by guarantees of freedom of expression with respect to both political 
and artistic speech and freedom of religious exercise; emotions, which include “being able to have 
attachments to things and persons outside ourselves; and practical reason, being able to form a 
conception of the good and to engage in critical reflection about the planning of one’s own life 
(this entails protection for liberty of conscience)” (Nussbaum 2003:41).  
In Chapter Two, I argued that some of Nussbaum’s proposed central capabilities are better 
understood simply as innate abilities rather than capabilities. Although they are developed through 
the individual’s interaction with the socio-political environment, they remain essential components 
of capabilities but not fully-fledged capabilities. However, the important point Nussbaum makes 
is that capabilities are developed through individuals’ exposure to the socio-political environment. 
For example, education is necessary for developing professional skills and probably some traits 
such as self-confidence. A sound health system helps in the development of physical health, which 
in turn is important for the development of emotional health (Nussbaum 2011: 21). All of this goes 
to demonstrate that the state-citizen relationship is essential for the development of capabilities. 
The state or socio-political environment provides the environment and support for the development 
of the capabilities. Yet one has to be a full member of the state for one to have his or her capabilities 
fully developed. That is where citizenship comes in. Citizenship is the passport or fundamental 
capability for tapping into the full providence of the state.  
 In sum: if capabilities are understood as freedoms created by a combination of internal personal 
abilities and the political, social, and economic environment, it follows that citizenship, in so far 
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as it involves a specific legal, political and social status, is co-constitutive of such capabilities.39 It 
is a bundle of fundamental capacities or causal powers that are developed by social structures, and 
are responsible for the achievement of various functionings. We can therefore conclude that 
citizenship is a necessary condition for achieving certain valuable beings and doings. That is to 
say, citizenship is the capability to have capabilities. I now want to zoom in on the role of the state 
in developing and securing these capabilities. 
2.2 External components: the role of the state in the development of capabilities 
I discuss human rights in detail in Chapter Four, but for the purposes of explaining the role of the 
state in the development of capabilities, it is important to mention that it is more meaningful to 
relate capabilities to clearly circumscribed citizenship rights rather than just to universal human 
rights, since citizenship rights are largely immune to the conceptual challenges associated with 
universal human rights. Citizenship rights are rights of members of a political society. As such, 
these rights can only be secured by the state, implying that they have a clear duty-bearer, while 
universal human rights lack a straightforward guarantor of these rights (see Isin and Turner 2007, 
Barbalet 1988; Chapter Four, Section One). Gunsteren (1994:37) posits that, it is the role of the 
state to maintain the conditions for citizenship, and help individuals aspiring to citizenship to 
surmount the obstacles to admission – both by helping them to obtain the qualities required for 
admission, and also by removing obstacles. State laws and policies, and how they secure people’s 
civil, political and social rights, matter in this endeavour. For example, a sound education system 
helps in developing individuals that are able to participate effectively in politics, either as voters 
or as candidates. Similarly, some policies help women to acquire and own property, and to obtain 
                                                          
39 I emphasise that what I am advocating here is a normative conception of citizenship. It is only in so far as the legal 
status of citizenship complies with certain conditions – among them, that it includes an extensive set of positive rights 
– that it facilitates the development of human functioning capabilities.  
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equal opportunities in the labour market with their male counterparts. Basic social welfare enables 
all members of society at least to access basic education and healthcare, and this enables them to 
live civilized lives commensurate with the level of development of their society. Poverty, 
malnutrition, and lack of education are examples of obstacles to human well-being that the state 
ought to guard against. The role of the state in the developing of capabilities is therefore clear.  
Both Nussbaum and Sen buttress the position that there is a strong conceptual connection between 
capabilities and state action. For them, one pivotal end of the state is to secure to people their most 
central entitlements, meaning that any government that fails to secure basic entitlements would 
have failed in its most important function. It is the role of governments to enhance, protect and 
secure capabilities using law and public policy to achieve this end (Nussbaum 2011: 26, Sen 
1999:10). Government action in the securing of capabilities should involve affirmative material 
and institutional support, not simply a failure to impede, or negative rights (see Nussbaum 2011: 
31). I have already argued in support of social citizenship in Chapter Three. The state is the engine 
behind the developing both negative and positive rights. Drawing her justification from Aristotle’s 
Politics, Nussbaum argues that the best state is that arrangement according to which anyone 
whatsoever might do best and live a flourishing life: “It is the job of the excellent lawgiver to 
consider, concerning a city and a class of human beings and every other association, how they will 
partake in the flourishing living (eudaimonia) that is possible for them” (Nussbaum 1992:2-3). 
This conception urges us to assess political arrangements by looking to the functionings of 
individuals, taken one by one — seeing whether they are enabled by that arrangement to function 
best. This means that when we arrange or assess our institutions, for example our laws, policies 
and social services, we need to arrange or assess them in relation to the desired functional 
outcomes. For example, the functionings we expect from a good healthcare system include such 
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outcomes as being healthy, and living lives of normal length among others. When we assess our 
healthcare system, we assess whether it is arranged in ways that secure these functionings. We 
conduct a similar assessment on our education system. We assess whether people are being 
educated, whether they are as a result being politically enlightened and so on. Laws determine the 
kinds of doings people can do and the beings they can be, in politics, in the economy and in their 
social lives. The point is that the structure creates a context in which a person might choose to live 
well, to flourish.  
 At this point, we are beginning to see the outline of the claim that citizenship is not merely a 
capability among others, but that it is an architectonic capability. For example, it clear that the 
state provides the context for individuals to flourish. There is a reason why we choose to be 
members of states, and why we desire to be citizens of some states but not others. Of what use is 
it for us to strive to be citizens, when this is not going to lift us from the state of being hungry, 
oppressed, or excluded? The connection between citizenship and human well-being is therefore 
already emerging. Citizenship is a passport to state enabled human flourishing. It might be objected 
that by keeping borders (through defining well-being capabilities as citizenship rights relating to a 
bounded political community) this argument swims against the tide. Some citizenship theorists 
propose that we should expand the moral horizons of citizenship, arguing that the dignity and well-
being of each human person warrants equal respect and concern from all. I endorse this view in so 
far as it specifies a general moral obligation which all human beings have towards one another. 
However, as I have tried to show, when it comes to certain specific areas of human well-being, 
these are better dealt with at the level of the state. 
In the next section, I embark on the final objective of the dissertation, which is a demonstration of 
the practical usefulness of the thesis that citizenship is an architectonic capability. Using gender 
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inequality as a case in point, I will show the implications of living without being recognized as 
being a full member of society. I use gender inequality here as an example, but the same thesis can 
be used as a guide in the analysis of problems related to the well-being of specific racial or ethnic 
groups, minorities of all description, immigrants, refugees and the disabled, among other 
vulnerable groups. Members of these groups may be incapacitated in various ways that emanate 
from the nature of their membership in society. In some cases, such groups are denied full 
membership. The example below is therefore just a template or a guiding framework for 
considering the various ways in which the development of capabilities and hence the expansion of 
human well-being are conditioned by – and hence either enabled or undermined – by a person’s 
civic status.  
3. Application: gender inequality as deprivation of citizenship capability  
The view that citizenship is a “capability to have capabilities” is clearly demonstrated when we 
consider the various obstacles women face in several parts of the world. My aim here is to 
demonstrate in practical terms that once one is denied the fundamental or foundational capability 
of citizenship, the enjoyment of all other well-being capabilities is greatly compromised. It is 
critical to note that denial of citizenship leads to inequality. Citizenship is about equal membership. 
Even before we start to be specific, before we start to talk about gender equality and the like, we 
first need to understand what equal citizenship means. For Conover et al (2004: 1036) equal 
citizenship is an important ideal of liberal democracy, which, as I have shown, is the conception 
of citizenship that informs the CA. When individuals or groups are routinely ignored, excluded, 
patronized, and not regarded as full members of the political community, their equal citizenship is 
effectively violated, irrespective of their formal legal status. The idea of equal citizenship is 
founded on the ethical principle that all human beings are of equal worth, and that all citizens, 
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including minorities, should be regarded as full and equal participating members of the political 
community (ibid: 1037). The link between equal citizenship and capabilities is clear. Equal 
citizenship capacitates individuals to freely pursue their different values and ways of life without 
the fear of being harmed both physically and psychologically. The idea of second-class 
membership emanates from the existence in society of people who lack equal citizenship. Even 
though such may be legally called citizens, this is inadequate if they at the same time are denied 
equal respect and feel unwilling to participate in the wider society’s civic and political life – a sign 
that they are denied important capabilities to function. As Dworkin (1978: 272) argues, the 
principle of equal citizenship requires that all citizens be equally respected as members of the 
political community and equally welcome to participate. In most African countries, persons whose 
ancestry is traced from other countries are directly or indirectly denied full participation rights. In 
a somewhat bizarre case, the Zambian High Court declared in 1999 that Kenneth Kaunda, the first 
president of independent Zambia (1964-1991), was not a citizen of that country. He was 
subsequently prohibited from standing as a presidential candidate for another term. In Zimbabwe, 
long-time immigrants from Malawi were barred from voting in 2005, even though they had 
participated in previous elections. Outside Africa, the socio-economic hardship and discrimination 
faced by many African-Americans and Hispanics in the United States make it difficult for us to 
call them equal citizens (see Conover et al 2004:1037). These groups may have formal rights, but 
these are only necessary and not sufficient for equal citizenship. The point therefore is that it is 
equal citizenship that fully capacitates an individual to achieve valued well-being functionings. I 
now want to demonstrate this further by analysing gender inequality. 
 I have singled out gender inequality precisely because it is one of the most critical impediments 
to inclusive human well-being. As Sen (2001:466) notes, within almost every community, the 
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burden of hardship often falls disproportionately on women. Recall Marshall’s claim that 
citizenship “is a status bestowed on those who are full members of a community. All those who 
possess the status are equal with respect to the rights and duties with which the status is endowed 
(Marshall 1950:28)”. For the purposes of my argument I wish to rephrase the second part of 
Marshall’s statement to read, “All those who possess the status are equal with respect to the 
capabilities with which the status is endowed”.  For the avoidance of confusion, this means that 
the capability set of all deemed citizens must be the same. These capabilities are typically effective 
civil, political and social freedoms. Differences among citizens should come from different 
individual choices and effort and not from having a constrained or less equal capability set. The 
latter scenario amounts to discrimination. To fail to vote because one has chosen not to go to the 
polling station is different from failing to vote because one is barred from doing by virtue of being, 
say, a woman.  While individuals may differ in terms of their in-born talents or abilities, the same 
cannot be said of conventional freedoms.  
Understanding citizenship in this way has far-reaching consequences for our analysis of gender 
inequality. It is possible to argue that, while being a citizen of a state is, per definition, to have the 
same membership status as every other citizen of that state, throughout most of human history and 
in all regions of the globe, women of all classes, races, ethnicities, and religions have been, and 
often continue to be, denied full membership status, and hence full citizenship (Friedman 2005:4). 
So exclusively male has this status been for nearly all of human history, that substantial numbers 
of women do not yet have a status equal to that of their male counterparts in any given state, and 
even today, women and men are likely to differ in the political rights and privileges of citizenship 
that affect them, and differ in ways that are linked systematically to gender categories. This 
exclusion of women means they are excluded from full enjoyment of the different elements of 
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citizenship, to the detriment of their autonomy, health, education, employment, in short, well-being 
(Lister 2008:4). According to the UNDP (2015), even though a lot of progress has been made over 
the past 20 years (1995-2015) in reducing disparities between men and women and although some 
convergence has occurred in capabilities between them, there is still some ground to cover as 
women remain unable to fully function, and are still unable to exercise the same choices and realise 
their potential. These disparities generate unequal achievements, and, as a result, the full potential 
of many women’s lives cannot be realised. In this regard, ending gender inequality requires the 
expansion of political, social and economic citizenship rights to fully include women. As long as 
women have lesser capabilities relative to men, they are in effect deprived of equal freedom to do 
what they desire to do or to be whom they want to be in life. My argument therefore is that gender 
inequality can be analysed in terms of unequal citizenship which, in turn, leads to disparate 
capabilities among men and women. I have specified these capabilities as a specific set of civil, 
political and social rights.  
A plethora of indices aimed at assessing trends in gender equality have been developed in recent 
years. Among these are, the Gender Gap Index (GGI) developed by the World Economic Forum, 
the Gender Equality Index (GEI) of White (1997), the Gender Inequality index (GI) of Forsythe et 
al. (1998), the Relative Status of Women (RSW) by Dijkstra and Hanmer (2000), the Standardised 
Index of Gender Equality (SIGE) of Dijkstra (2002), the African Gender Status Index (GSI) of the 
UN Economic Commission for Africa (2004), the Gender Equity Index of Watch (2005), and the 
Multidimensional Gender Equality Index (MGEI) of Pernmanyer (2008) (see Pernmanyer 
2010:18). For present purposes, let us compare my proposed understanding of citizenship rights 
as capabilities with the Gender Gap Index (GGI), which, like the CA, is an concerned with 
outcomes rather than means. The Global Gender Gap Index examines the gap between men and 
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women in terms of four fundamental categories (sub-indexes): Economic Participation and 
Opportunity, Educational Attainment, Health and Survival and Political Empowerment. The aim 
is to provide a snapshot of where men and women stand with regard to these fundamental outcome 
variables (Hausmann et. al. 2014:5). The Economic Participation and Opportunity sub-index 
contains three concepts, namely the participation gap, the remuneration gap and the advancement 
gap. The participation gap is reflected in the difference between women and men in labour force 
participation rates. The remuneration gap is reflected in a hard data indicator (ratio of estimated 
female-to-male earned income) and a qualitative variable gathered through the World Economic 
Forum’s Executive Opinion Survey (wage equality or wage inequality for similar work). Finally, 
the gap between the advancement of women and men is captured through two further hard data 
statistics, the ratio of women to men among legislators, senior officials and managers, and the ratio 
of women to men among technical and professional workers (ibid.). 
The Educational Attainment sub-index measures the gap between women’s and men’s current 
access to education, and is captured through the ratios of women to men in primary, secondary and 
tertiary-level education. A longer-term view of the country’s ability to educate women and men in 
equal numbers is captured through the ratio of the female literacy rate to the male literacy rate 
(ibid.). 
The Health and Survival sub-index highlights the differences between women’s and men’s health 
through the use of two variables: firstly, the sex ratio at birth, which the developers believe to 
capture the phenomenon of “missing women” prevalent in many countries with a strong son 
preference; and secondly, the gap between women’s and men’s healthy life expectancy, which is 
an estimation of the number of years that women and men can expect to live in good health, taking 
into account the years lost to violence, disease, malnutrition or other relevant factors (ibid.).  
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Lastly there is the Political Empowerment sub-index, which measures the gap between men and 
women at the highest level of political decision-making through the ratio of women to men in 
minister-level positions and the ratio of women to men in parliamentary positions. The index also 
includes the ratio of women to men in terms of years in executive office (prime minister or 
president) for the last 50 years (ibid.). Each component is computed as the standardized average 
of the ratios between women and men achievement levels for certain sub-components (Pernmenyer 
2010:191). Using standardized averages, each sub-component has the same relative importance in 
the construction of the corresponding component. The new GGI is the arithmetic mean of the 
values of each component. This is arrived at by a rigorous calculation process where an unweighted 
average of each sub-index score is taken to create the overall Global Gender Gap Index score. 
The GGI is attractive in that it measures outcomes rather than inputs, and it is very useful for 
comparative analysis, but as the information above shows, the index involves a lot of calculations. 
Calculating the final score of each sub-index is cumbersome enough, but one also needs to 
calculate the overall Global Gender Gap Index score, and this a daunting task. In addition, just like 
any index, the GGI hides vital information behind a figure. Most policy makers, for example, will 
not make much sense of the information that the GGI of their country is 0.337 and therefore low. 
A figure cannot tell us where we are lacking and what we need to do. We are forced to go back to 
study how this final score was calculated, and which information was used, and in the process we 
lose vital time. So, while the GGI is an extremely useful tool in gender inequality assessments, it 
may need to be improved to make it more user-friendly. It can be made simpler and more readily 
accessible by resolving and maintaining scores at the sub-index level, and using these for 
international comparisons. For example, we can end at the sub-index level without seeking to 
further consolidate the totals from the sub-indexes into a single figure (the GGI). We get more 
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information if we analyse the sub-indexes separately. The consolidated figure, on the other hand, 
does not tell us much. For example if the GGI figure is 0.75, we will not be able to tell how things 
are distributed at the sub-index level. In addition to minimising complex calculations and 
increasing information, maintaining sub-indexes directly points to what we are measuring, whether 
it is Economic Participation and Opportunity, Educational Attainment, Health or Survival Political 
Empowerment.40 In this case, we know exactly what we are measuring or comparing. Analysing 
gender inequality using the citizenship-as-capability approach not only specifies the area in which 
the inequality occurs, but in addition, gives us an insight into the underlying causes of the 
inequality. This is demonstrated in the discussion below.  
Understanding gender-related deprivations as deprivations of citizenship reveals that in most 
instances, women more than men in much of the world lack full civil, political and social rights – 
in short, they are forced to function as second-class members of society. In the sections below, I 
employ a restricted list of capabilities in order to evaluate gender inequality.41 I propose to evaluate 
gender inequality in terms of the deprivation of citizenship, which in turn prevents them from 
enjoying a specific set of capabilities equalling their male counterparts. In each case, I provide a 
detailed explanation as to how obstacles to the capability violate well-being. In particular, I focus 
on the following capabilities: 
i) Equality and dignity: being able to live and compete for opportunities free from any form of 
arbitrary discrimination, regardless of sex, gender, race, ethnic group, tribe, and religion. 
                                                          
40 I am not arguing, however, that we ought to ignore or replace all such statistical data. Some aspects of capability 
might very well be analysed by means real statistical data. However, I question the usefulness of representing complex 
information with just a single digit or set of digits. In other words, I am concerned with the “hidden information” that 
cannot be captured by a set of figures alone. 
41 Although women in most regions of the world have fewer capabilities compared to men, much of my focus is on 
Sub-Saharan Africa, simply because this is the region I know best, and because I have a personal stake in the outcome. 
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ii) Political participation and influence: Being able to freely and effectively participate (as a 
voter or candidate) in politics in an informed way regardless of sex, gender, race, ethnic 
group, tribe, and religion. Free and effective participation here means participation that is 
free from any form of manipulation, including violence, intimidation, and rigging. Political 
influence means having real opportunity to bring about change. 
iii) Property: Being able to own, inherit or transfer both movable and fixed property regardless 
of sex, gender, race, ethnic group, tribe, and religion  
iv) Education and employment: being able to be educated and being able to be appropriately 
employed regardless of sex, gender, race, ethnic group, tribe, and religion. 
3.1 Equality and dignity 
The normative conception of citizenship developed in Chapter Three has equality as an essential 
feature. Citizen status is reserved only to full members of society and a full member is one equal 
to other members. As Anderson (1999:288) argues, it is a mistake to think that equality is required 
to compensate people for undeserved bad luck. The proper aim of equality is rather to end 
oppression, which by definition is socially imposed. The absence of oppression reflects a 
community in which people stand in a relation of equality to others. Where equality exists, people 
are able to make claims on each other in virtue of this equality, instead of depending on the good 
will of their social, economic or political superiors to their inferiors (ibid: 289). Despite 
constituting the majority of the world’s population, women and girls continue to be denied 
citizenship, which leads them to have unequal access to health, education, employment and 
political participation. The battle for gender equality should therefore be a battle for full 
membership or equal citizenship. For instance, in Agarwal and Panda’s (2007) study of domestic 
violence in Kerala, an important finding was that a determining factor of a woman’s susceptibility 
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to acts of domestic violence was her economic standing relative to her husband (Smith and Seward 
(2009:219). Interestingly, in this case, a woman’s capability is not determined by an absolute level 
of economic status, but by her relative positioning. The point is that it is her unequal position vis 
á vis her fellow citizens, from the husband to other males beyond the home, that renders her 
vulnerable to abuse and hence undermines her well-being. At issue here is what Schemmel (2012) 
calls the “relational equality” between men and women. This stands in contrast to the distributive 
equality of means-based theories, which are concerned with equality in the distribution of 
particular goods, without taking into account the possibility that we can have equality in the 
distribution of a particular good, while social relations remain unequal (Schemmel 2012:2). 
Relational equality is a richer concept of equality in the sense that it is concerned with “the way 
that social institutions create or maintain inequalities between individuals in society – how 
institutions treat individuals, as opposed to which patterns of distribution they bring about” (ibid: 
3). In the case of gender inequality, the issue is therefore not simply an unequal share of goods, 
but rather the way in which women are treated by their fellow citizens – that is, their relative 
positioning in terms of the respect they are able to command from others (including other women).   
 Although cases differ from society to society, both in extent and degree, generally girls and 
women are vulnerable to physical violence and sexual abuse. For instance, according to the United 
Nations Population Fund (2016), in Zimbabwe, about 1 in 3 women aged 15 to 49 have 
experienced physical violence, and about 1 in 4 women have experienced sexual violence since 
the age of 15. Such statistics are an indication that, in cases such as Zimbabwe, women do not 
command respect as equal citizens and this lack of respect undermines both their safety and bodily 
integrity as well as their confidence to freely participate in the civic life of society. The lack of the 
latter capability in turn deprives them of the capability to effect meaningful legislative and policy 
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changes in their own lives, and to ensure that these are enforced. In this way, inequality breeds 
inequality, whereas, as I argue, specific capabilities expand other capabilities. 
As I demonstrate in the sections below, lack of equal citizenship brings serious obstacles to women 
for effective participation in political life, and prevents them from having the same property rights 
as men, the same rights to negotiate contracts, and the same rights of association, movement, and 
religious freedom (see Nussbaum 2000: 1). The unequal social and political circumstances women 
find themselves in mean they possess unequal human capabilities. All too often women, as 
Nussbaum rightly points out, are not treated as equal citizens, as ends in their own right, persons 
with a dignity that deserves respect from laws and institutions (ibid.). 
 Meer and Sever (2004:9) have pointed out that human development theorists are increasingly 
appealing to citizenship rights and responsibilities as a means to addressing well-being goals such 
as poverty eradication, discrimination and democratisation. Women’s rights activists, feminist 
academics and women’s social movements are using ideas of inclusive citizenship in order to 
advocate greater gender equality.  
Arguing for a genuinely inclusive citizenship and thus for gender equality must not, however, turn 
a blind eye to human differences, particularly those that are basic and that have significant impact 
on human well-being capabilities. As Sen (1992:117) reminds us, human beings are dissimilar in 
many ways, including in gender, and to ignore this fact makes our analysis of human well-being 
inadequate. In this regard, the capability approach runs counter to the view that citizenship rights 
can or ought to be neutral with respect to gender and other differences. The latter view can be 
expressed as the claim that “our freedom and equality as citizens refer only to our common 
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characteristics – our universal needs, regardless of our identities, for “primary goods” such as 
income, health care, education and the right to hold public office” (Gutmann in Taylor 1992:4).  
From a CA perspective, Gutmann’s view suffers the same problem as Rawls’s “equality of primary 
goods” approach to human well-being. Our differences mean also that we also differ in our ability 
to convert these primary goods into valuable functionings. What is needed is a state of affairs in 
which both men and women are equal in terms of freedoms and choices to live their desired lives. 
Affording equal freedoms and choices to both men and women is different from giving them the 
same amount of goods, because the same amount of goods or merely formal equal rights, as these 
may not lead to equal freedoms and choices given their differences. Equalizing freedoms and 
choices takes cognisance of the undeniable facts that women are more vulnerable to sexual 
violence than men, may not withstand acts of political violence as men do, may have to be absent 
from work for a while to give birth, and have historically been discriminated against in health, 
education, political representation, labour market, etc., all with negative repercussions for the 
development of their capabilities. My argument here is anchored in Taylor’s (1992) idea of the 
“politics of difference” (See also Young 1990, 2003, Tebble 2002). According to Taylor (1992:38), 
everyone should be recognized for his or her unique identity, and therefore what we are asked to 
recognize is “the unique identity of this individual or group, their distinctness from everyone else”. 
Demanding recognition of uniqueness in gender is in fact a demand for gender equality. A 
persistent problem in addressing gender inequality has been to conceptualize equality in a vague 
way, at the same time ignoring or glossing over our distinctness and assimilating everything to a 
dominant identity. This charge has typically been directed at the white heterosexual male (see 
Corboz 2006: 1). But human beings differ from each other is many important ways, and because 
of these distinctions, conceptualizing and evaluating gender inequality requires an ends approach 
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like the one offered by the CA, rather than a means approach that focuses on equality in the 
possession of a particular bundle of goods. Equality in citizenship demands equality of capabilities 
or equality in real freedoms, not equality of means.  
3.2 Education and employment 
Being educated and being employed are among the fundamental social citizenship capabilities. 
Women’s participation in the labour market is key to financial independence and represents an 
important locus of social participation, which many women value, as well as a source of self-
esteem (Lister 1997:139). The value of education for women cannot be underestimated. Education 
is a basic capability that opens up other capabilities; employment, self-confidence, and political 
participation being some of them. Education enables women to be well-informed in matters of 
health, something that is important for the well-being of both the mother and the child. It is now 
also clear in almost all societies that women are key players in poverty reduction by enhancing 
food security as a result of their participation in both the informal and formal sectors. Education 
increases their capacity in this regard through improving their negotiation, engagement, and 
technological skills. Becker (1992:16), however, makes the stark observation that, although most 
societies insist that women are full citizens, entitled to protection of the laws and to full and equal 
participation in the labour market and democratic government, in reality, many women lead lives 
circumscribed by cultural biases and fear of harassment and violence from strangers and non-
strangers, and without adequate government protection. Should they enter the enter the labour 
market, they are intimidated by both spouse and family, who may fear that, by being independent 
financially, the woman is likely to refuse her ‘duties’ as a housewife and may even use the 
independence to get into extra-marital affairs. At the workplace, women often face further 
challenges that include sex discrimination in hiring and promotion, and sexual harassment – all, 
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often, without effective legal protection. In addition, evidence around the world points to the fact 
that women’s choices and opportunities in education and employment are limited because there 
are systematic, complex and often hidden encumbrances to women’s full and equal participation 
in education and employment. Firstly, although values are changing, in some cultures, the value 
or priority placed on the boy-child in comparison with the girl child means women are much less 
likely than men to be educated, and still less likely to undergo vocational training (see Odewel 
2018: 14542). Secondly, the type of education one receives, the type of tertiary training one pursues 
and the job one occupies have a bearing on future capabilities.  
It can be argued that through the influence of cultural norms and values, as well as some religious 
beliefs, society indirectly or in subtle ways directs women towards certain professions while 
discouraging them from other academic fields and professions. This explains why girls are less 
likely to choose scientific and technological fields of study, and even when they do, they are less 
likely to take up a career in these fields. An OECD survey of member countries in 2009 showed 
that at university, women and men largely choose different fields of study. On average, only 26% 
of graduates in engineering, manufacturing and construction were women, compared to more than 
75% of graduates in health and welfare degrees. The pattern is similar in most societies. Because 
women are stereotyped as more caring, more tender, more understanding and capable of relating 
to children, it is not an accident that most women are employed in nursing, social work, and 
teaching (see Macarov 1995:163). The fact that we have fewer women in engineering must 
therefore be understood on the basis of the fact that women do not usually take up engineering 
                                                          
42 Forthcoming 
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degrees at university, and most of them do not take up science subjects at high school.43 This is 
hardly women’s fault; rather, as stated above, society has its salient ways of bottle-necking certain 
women’s capabilities. In some societies this may be the result of deep seated prejudices acquired 
over a long period. For example, it is still common in some parts of Africa for someone – male or 
female – who is visiting a doctor to expect to see a man in the consultation room, while someone 
visiting a nurse or nurse aide expects to see a woman. Implicit as well as overt social norms act as 
incentives for men and women to choose particular professions and eschew others. It is a fact, 
however, that some professions open up more and better opportunities for those who take taken 
them up, while other professions are a dead end. 
For instance, in many societies, women are discouraged by society from serving in combat or 
serving generally in the military (Becker 1992:16). It is argued that women, owing to their 
‘physical weakness’, may be unable to do what male soldiers can do to the same extent, and may 
endanger their unit in battle, for example, if they cannot operate as fast as men with heavy burdens. 
In addition, pregnancy is usually cited as problem for a soldier in battle. This has led to the 
argument that male and female job differences are related to innate natural differences (see, for 
instance, Stassinopoulos 1974). As a consequence of such views, only a small percentage of those 
in the military are women, though women constitute a bigger percentage of the population in most 
societies. These limits on women’s military participation, according to Becker (1992:16), translate 
in countless ways into limits on women’s ability to participate in government and be full citizens 
of a democracy. The limited opportunities for women in the military means top military leaders 
                                                          
43 It is possible, of course, that some career choices are the result of innate gender preferences. However, while in 
practice these choices still are so clearly influenced by social expectations, implicit bias, stereotyping, discrimination 
and the like, we have no grounds for assuming innate differences to be the primary cause of the under-representation 
of women in high-status professions. 
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are all men and, even more critically, more men than women can run for political office as veterans. 
Indeed it is still customary in much of the world that service in the military, especially with a high 
rank, is one platform or springboard for entering politics. In Africa, veterans of the liberation 
struggle are first choice for getting key government positions. In Zimbabwe for example, Robert 
Mugabe, the former head of state is a veteran of the liberation struggle. All those who deputised 
for Mugabe during his 37 year reign, about seven of them, have military backgrounds. These 
include Joshua Nkomo, Simon Muzenda, John Nkomo, Joseph Msika, Joyce Mujuru, Emerson 
Mnangagwa and Pelekezela Mphoko. In addition, about half of the current cabinet in Zimbabwe, 
two-third of whom are male, is composed of war veterans and former army generals. The current 
President of Nigeria Muhammadu Buhari, is a retired army general, and at some point (1983-
1985), served as a military ruler through a coup. The same can be said of Olusegun Obasanjo, the 
former president of Nigeria. Obasanjo, was president of Nigeria from 1999 to 2007, is also a retired 
army general, and at one time (1976-1979) served as military ruler. All over the world, key political 
positions are still being exchanged among World War II veterans or nationalist leaders of the 
liberation struggle, or those who successfully executed some foreign military operations. To this 
end, if opportunities for women are limited in the military, they as a consequence have limited 
opportunities to run for political office. This results “in government that is dominated at many key 
points by men (and the few women) who have been in the military rather than being open to all 
citizens: we have in large part and (mostly male) ‘militocracy’ rather than a true democracy” 
(Becker 1992:16). The issue, of course, isn’t only allowing women into the military and enabling 
them to rise to the highest rank; it is also whether it is justified for military service, or any 
profession dominated by a particular gender, to be a more powerful springboard for public office.  
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The above observations point to the fact that development efforts should not merely be expended 
on seeing women in school and employment without due attention being paid to the nature of the 
education or employment. Expanding women’s choices requires in particular that we focus on their 
capabilities of participating in sectors previously dominated by men – sectors like engineering, 
defence, intelligence, aviation, and so forth. The size of the population of women with such 
capabilities matters. Celebrating that one woman is flying an aeroplane or that two women are 
heads of state is in actual fact celebrating exclusion, because the very limited number points to a 
negative state of affairs rather than a positive one. Instead, we should adopt the freedoms approach 
to evaluate gender inequality in education and employment. The freedoms we should focus on are 
the ones we expect to be possessed by all citizens, namely civil, political and social freedoms. 
3.3 Political participation  
 
Political participation is a key determinant of citizenship as it has a bearing on policy choices and 
outcomes, in addition to direct well-being outcomes, by increasing an individual’s happiness and 
satisfaction with life in general (see the argument in Chapter Two, Section 1.4). Although citizens 
ought to be equal, in politics, men in most instances enjoy a privileged position vis-a-vis women 
in most societies. It is easier for men to be elected as party candidates and, to negotiate for 
resources to fund campaigns. In addition, men can campaign day and night and can be away from 
home for long periods without repercussions. Men can better withstand the acts of violence that 
sometimes come with elections. This is not a new phenomenon, as there is a lot of evidence to the 
effect that women have been excluded from political citizenship since time immemorial. For 
instance, the classical Greek philosopher Aristotle’s concept of citizenship excluded women. His 
assertion that women were not citizens was based on the sole reason that they did not participate 
in the administration of justice in the city. Upon analysis, that did not by any means mean that 
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women were inferior to men; they were not citizens because they lacked the opportunity to become 
citizens. Men then simply claimed the space of politics for themselves, rendering women non-
citizens in the process. My point is that obstructing women’s participation in politics is equivalent 
to disregarding their equal citizenship.  
There is plenty of evidence that when women get the opportunities that are typically the preserve 
of men, they are no less successful in making use of these facilities that men have claimed to be 
their own over the centuries (Sen 1999:199), and that, by extension, the gender disparity in political 
participation has greatly narrowed (see Nancy et al 2005: 2). Women in much of the world are 
now active participants in politics, but for the most part, only indirectly. Political participation is 
direct when the participant’s activity directly affects the making or implementation of public 
policy; in short, when the participant possesses effective political authority to carry out decisions 
on public policy, to adopt and implement authoritative decisions that have the force of law and are 
binding on all members of the society. Authority only counts as such if it is effective rather than 
purely formal. Women in much of the world are still victims of “stooge authority”, whereby the 
woman simply occupies an important post while key decisions are made by the man in the 
background. This is why euphoria at the appointment of female vice presidents in Africa may be 
viewed as misplaced. In most cases, vice presidents do not make independent decisions, but always 
take directives from a superior. In rare instances, a woman may however be “the power behind the 
throne”, as was said of Simone Gbabgo, the former first lady of Ivory Coast (See a report by 
France24, 9 May 201644).  
                                                          
44 http://www.france24.com/en/20160531-ivory-coast-iron-lady-simone-gbagbo-confronts-controversial-past-again 
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The latter is an example of indirect rather than direct political participation. Participation is indirect 
when the participant’s activity is confined to the selection of people who make policies (Nancy et 
al 2005: 4). The individuals and groups exercising political influence do not hold political power 
in themselves, and therefore do not possess the capability to make the official governmental 
decisions they seek to shape and control; but they have the capability to shape and control the 
decision-making behaviour of those with political authority. Most women, particularly in the 
global south, participate in politics mostly as voters, and therefore their participation is indirect 
and is therefore second-order. With regard to political participation, a significant population of 
women world-wide is still denied this critical benchmark of citizenship. The number of women 
who occupy key political positions in countries like Germany and Britain is an inadequate means 
for us to have a clear picture with regard to the state of gender equality in politics. In Africa, the 
appointment of female vice president (something that is not consistent) is an attempt at affirmative 
action, as they are usually only received under special circumstances, such as in politically 
calculated quota systems. For example, between 2009 and 2013 in Zimbabwe, the vice presidents 
of the main political parties, namely ZANU (PF) and the MDC, were both women. From 2009-
2012, Joyce Banda was the Vice President of Malawi. It is for these reasons that, when measured 
against the yardstick of political participation, most women have fewer opportunities compared to 
men, and this once again violates the equality condition with regard to citizenship.  
What I call equal political citizenship is a state of affairs where a society’s political playing field 
is levelled in such a way that both men and women have equal participation capabilities. In 
accordance with the concept of relational equality, both women and men ought to be equally 
protected against unjust treatment during the selection of candidates, during campaigns and during 
any other political events. Achieving such a state of affairs requires positive changes both in 
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societal laws and policies, and in people’s attitudes towards women. A “physically” conducive 
political playing field (for example an environment free of violence), is inadequate to provide real 
political opportunities for women if people hold wrong perceptions on women’s participation in 
politics – perceptions such as “politics is a man’s game”. Good laws and policies are not enough 
if some people think that a woman makes a weak political leader. Where we have equal political 
citizenship, both men and women should have real opportunities in every sense to participate both 
as voters and as candidates. Equal political participation obviously enhances psychological well-
being. The feeling that I am equal to others and that I have an equal say is psychologically healthy, 
while any form of unequal treatment diminishes one’s self-esteem and hence one’s well-being. 
Moreover, political freedoms are connected to issues of material and bodily security, prominently 
including security against violence, and both of these are seen as closely connected to economic 
empowerment (Nussbaum 2005: 175). Equal political participation also leads to a healthy balance 
of societal policies that are considerate of the requirements of both sexes (the same would hold, of 
course, over the full spectrum of gender identity). 
In view of the above, I propose that the best way to evaluate gender equality in political citizenship 
is to focus on the effective opportunities women have to directly participate in politics in the sense 
of making and implementing public policy. Numbers matter in this evaluation. The number of 
women with effective freedoms to be rise to top political decision-making positions should be 
considered. Statistical data will be useful for this purpose. Or, as discussed above, the number of 
women with equal opportunities with men to head defence, intelligence and finance portfolios 
should be taken into account. Our evaluation of equality in political citizenship must be pitched at 
this level, because celebrating that women have achieved important but lower positions of 
authority is still celebrating a situation where inequality and exclusion exist. Equal political 
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citizenship means that men and women have equal opportunities particularly at the highest political 
levels. At the same time, a female figurehead presiding over a male-dominated party and state 
apparatus is also not indicative of equal citizenship. We have to measure women’s participation 
across the entire spectrum of political authority.  
Although equality in political citizenship essentially means equality of capabilities for 
participation, any efforts towards equality in political citizenship ought, however, to take into 
account the differences between men and women. The challenge of every society is to find a way 
of ensuring that women have equal political capabilities to those of men without at the same time 
compromising their nature and unique needs. For example, child-bearing should not be an obstacle 
to full or direct political participation, and in the same vein, political participation should not be 
an obstacle to child-bearing. By comparison, stairs should not be an obstacle preventing a disabled 
person from reaching the fifth floor. Our task is to ensure everyone gets to the fifth floor safely, 
comfortably and in a dignified manner regardless of physical condition. If we disregard diversity, 
equality becomes difficult to achieve, because only people who can climb stairs on their own will 
reach the fifth floor.  
The above example is not meant to suggest that women are disabled. The point is that diversity 
should not be used as an excuse to engender inequality but should rather be used as a motivation 
to equalize capabilities. The argument is aimed against a particular, unjustified way of 
distinguishing the public and private, which assumes that the man, who is competitive and 
aggressive, is the one who should leave the home to perform civic functions, while the woman 
who has the caring and emotional qualities suited for the private, should stay at home to perform 
her domestic and familial functions (see Heater 1999:93, Nussbaum 2005:176). It is such 
arguments, real or perceived, that compel us to evaluate gender equality, focusing on the ends 
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rather than the means of gender equality. What matters is whether men and women have equal 
capabilities for political participation. Having shown that possessing equal capabilities in political 
participation is important for human well-being’ I should re-emphasise that equal political 
participation is a direct product of equal citizenship. Citizenship is the architectonic capability that 
we need to secure before other capabilities. 
3.4 Private property ownership  
 
Being able to own, control and inherit resources is a basic capability, and one of the fundamental 
measures of well-being. This is so because owning and controlling resources is an indication of 
full-fledged agency. Being able to own property is one way of showing that one is not someone’s 
property oneself. Being able to acquire, maintain and dispose of property of one’s own without 
fear of any reprisals from the husband, family, or the community expands women’s agency. Unless 
one possesses civil rights in full, one cannot freely form and pursue desired goals in life. Having 
real freedoms to own, inherit and transfer property is fundamental to the well-being of women and 
their children. My argument here is for the capability to own private property. Exclusive communal 
ownership is inconsistent with both liberal citizenship and the CA, which is by and large liberal.45 
It is also impossible to talk of individual agency when all property in every respect is communally 
controlled. In addition to this, Mbote (2005: 11) argues that in African countries, communal 
systems of property ownership are often anchored in patriarchy. (This might not be a necessary 
feature of all forms of communal ownership. However, in societies that are patriarchal, securing 
                                                          
45 The argument for property ownership that is line with the liberal ideal of citizenship should not be taken as an 
argument for a free-market, capitalist economic system. I am agnostic about the specific economic arrangements that 
will allow citizens to realize the capabilities that are essential for human well-being. It is likely that there are a number 
of such arrangements. The point is that the economic arrangements are the means for the realization of capability, and 
it would be a mistake to commit to any specific means before having a clear conception of the kind of capabilities we 
seek to realize.  
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women’s individual property rights provides a strong bulwark against their domination by men in 
other spheres.) The law can then come in to reinforce or make permanent social injustices, and, in 
the realm of women’s rights, legal rules may then be used to entrench gender inequality. It is for 
these reasons that I confine my argument to discussing individual private property ownership. The 
right to own property is a critical mark of citizenship, since it defines the civil component of the 
concept of citizenship. In practice being able to own and control property shows that one is an 
equal non-dominated member.  
Conversely, the inability to control resources essentially excludes one from full membership of a 
state in which one’s fellow citizens do have this capability. A significant proportion of women in 
Sub-Saharan Africa and in many states in which Sharia Law is applied lacks the capability to own 
and inherit property, and this negatively impacts their well-being freedom. Although formal law 
in most African states does not directly discriminate property ownership on gender lines, 
patriarchal tendencies in the region are still a factor in incapacitating women, particularly young 
divorcees and young widows. In most African cultures, marriage is not simply a contract between 
two consenting adults, but rather, the woman is married into the husband’s family (see Kyalo 2012: 
115). The implications of this are that all property, including property directly acquired by the 
efforts of the woman, is registered in the name of the husband, and such property even though 
being used by the married couple, is deemed to be the property of the whole extended family of 
the husband. Young female divorcees or widows are the most disadvantaged. Upon divorce or 
death of the husband, the young woman, who would now be viewed as having been divested from 
the family of husband, has to leave all property behind. Since young widows or young divorcees 
are likely to remarry, it is against most African cultures for a different man to benefit from the 
wealth or property of another man. Intimidation and threats from the former husband or the 
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husband’s family, and deep seated cultural beliefs, deter some women from approaching the courts 
for assistance. Older widows and divorcees get protection from their mature children and from the 
fact that they are unlikely to get married again, although property may remain registered in the 
name of the former or deceased husband (see Richardson 2004:1). In essence, women in Africa 
are generally prohibited by customary law from owning or inheriting land or other property, 
although this varies, in terms of degree, from one culture to another (Richardson 2004:1). Property 
ownership traditionally is passed through male heirs and a woman’s right to access and use of 
property has customarily been defined solely by her relation to men (ibid: 1).  
Without property, women lack many well-being capabilities. Lack of full access to tenure or 
ownership renders many women vulnerable to poverty, and prevents access to credit through lack 
of collateral, thus rendering them socially and economically disadvantaged. 46  Evaluating the 
property ownership capability thus requires us to determine the level of real freedoms women have 
to own and inherit property – freedoms to register property in their names and freedoms to co-own 
or jointly own land and property. Equality in property ownership is a significant step in equalizing 
the possession of civil capabilities between men and women, and this in turn is a huge step towards 
human development or well-being.  
It should be clear from the above that a great many capabilities, including having a sense of self- 
esteem, being educated, being healthy, being employed, participating in political decision-making, 
and owning property of one’s own, depend on one’s having the status of, and being treated in 
practice as, a full and equal citizen vis à vis one’s fellow citizens. Citizenship is, in other words, a 
first-order capability necessary for the development of various second-order capabilities, which in 
                                                          
46 For an example of how access to credit can enhance women’s well-being capablity, consider the story of Grameen 
bank in Bangladesh (See Bernasek & Stanfield 1997; Bernasek 2003; Aslanbeigui, Pressman & Summerfield 2003.)  
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turn make up the scaffolding that organises the various functionings and capabilities of a given 
person’s life.  
Conclusion 
Having separately defined the concepts of capability (Chapter Two) and citizenship (Chapter 
Three), and building on the analysis of the capability approach and human rights in Chapter Four, 
the purpose of this final chapter has been to demonstrate the specific respects in which citizenship 
is an architectonic well-being capability. I have shown in specific terms in which respects the 
quality of our lives is dependent on our equal status as citizens. Firstly, I have shown that 
citizenship at the ideal level is not merely a legal status, but a capability to have other capabilities. 
In other words, citizenship is the bedrock of most well-being capabilities. Apart from being a 
condition of equality, citizenship paves way to the enjoyment of other second-order capabilities, 
some of which have been discussed in this Chapter. Secondly, I have demonstrated that previously 
listed capabilities by influential CA theorists Sen and Robeyns are essentially citizenship rights, 
even though these theorists did not specifically refer to citizenship. This demonstrates that my 
initial thesis that citizenship is a capability is to some degree the elucidation or, then, the 
formalisation of an existing idea. This elucidation and formalisation is a contribution to the existing 
CA scholarship because the CA is arguably still developing and therefore efforts aimed at 
clarifying, improving, and enriching the approach, are still important at this stage. 
All in all, this dissertation is an appeal for all societies to strive to extend full – rather purely formal 
or legal – citizenship to all its members for the sake of their well-being. Another important 
conclusion to emerge from this discussion is the particular respects in which states are responsible 
for the well-being of their members. State laws and policies, together with their effective 
implementation, determine whether a particular society has equal citizenship and therefore equal 
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well-being capabilities, or is fraught with inequalities and discrimination. We have reason to value 
full citizenship because we want protection from various dangers of living isolated lives, and to 
flourish in particular ways. Constrained freedoms in this case signal failure of citizenship – when 
membership has failed to improve well-being.   
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CONCLUSION 
 
In defending the thesis that citizenship is a well-being capability my overall aim has been to bridge, 
in a particular way, the theory-praxis gap that plagues the capability approach. In pursuance of this 
aim, this dissertation has sought to achieve two main objectives. The first objective endeavoured 
to justify why the CA should be viewed as a more accurate as well as morally justifiable framework 
for conceptualising and assessing human well-being. In this regard, Chapter One dealt with the 
shortcomings of some common conceptualisations and measurements of well-being, including 
one-dimensional and some multidimensional theories. These shortcomings became the 
springboard from which I argued in support of the CA. However, I also demonstrated that, much 
as the CA was a promising approach, it has a number of shortcomings that have affected its smooth 
translation into practical use. The main shortcomings are the lack of a clear and agreed-upon 
concept of capabilities, and the absence of a clear roadmap of how to apply the CA in practice. My 
second main objective has been an endeavour to make good on these shortcomings. I defined and 
analysed the CA in Chapter Two and from Chapter Three onwards I gradually developed a solution 
for this theory-praxis chasm, namely that citizenship, both as a status and as a bundle of state 
secured rights, should be understood as an architectonic capability, which means it is a 
foundational capability that designs and structures a host of other well-being capabilities. I have 
justified why this should be viewed as a possible solution to the problem of operationalizing the 
CA. 
Turning now to the conclusions I drew from each of my five chapters: in Chapter One I 
demonstrated that well-being was a multidimensional rather than a one-dimensional concept. I 
highlighted the limitations of defining and evaluating well-being solely on the basis of reductionist 
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criteria such as hedonistic happiness, desire-satisfaction or income. I argued that hedonistic 
happiness for instance, much as it is an important ingredient of human well-being, is a 
psychological state that was susceptible to adaptation and conditioning, meaning one could 
unwittingly become ‘happy’ when one had adapted or become used to particular deplorable 
conditions or situations. I also warned that hedonistic happiness was different from Aristotelian 
happiness, as the latter meant flourishing or living well; it was a complete and sufficient good, 
implying that it was an end that was desired for its own sake. Aristotelian happiness, as has been 
shown in that chapter, is one inspiration behind the development of the CA. As for the use of 
income as a measure of well-being, I also concluded that it was too narrow as a measure of well-
being, as it had been shown in practice that economic growth in most instances did not “trickle 
down”, was indifferent to distribution and in some instances, was actually accompanied by 
declining incomes for some, and such scenarios were the antithesis of human well-being. I 
therefore demonstrated that it was undesirable to conceptualize well-being in terms of any form of 
utility as issues of distribution, rights and justice would be ignored in favour of maximizing 
aggregate utility. Finally, in Section Two of Chapter One I surveyed some multidimensional 
conceptualizations of well-being, among them the Physical Quality of Life Index (PQLI), the Basic 
Needs approach and Rawls’s primary goods approach. I showed that these were an improvement 
over one-dimensional concepts, but the main challenge for the first two was disagreement on the 
constituent dimensions of well-being. There was disagreement on whether the elements that made 
up the PQLI or basic needs were the ones relevant or sufficient for well-being. With regard to 
Rawls’s primary goods approach, I argued in support of Sen that focusing on these primary goods 
neglected some considerations that could be of great importance to the substantive assessment of 
equality and also of efficiency. For Sen, there is a strong need of moving from focusing on primary 
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goods to actual assessment of freedoms and capabilities, considering the fact that people varied in 
their ability to convert the same amount of primary goods into good living (see Sen 2009: 66). 
These considerations led me to an analysis of the CA as an alternative approach for conceptualizing 
and assessing well-being.  
 I had two main objectives for Chapter Two, my first was to define and analyse the CA for the 
purpose of defending it as a better framework for conceptualizing and evaluating human well-
being. Following this analysis, I made the claim that, compared to some theories discussed in 
Chapter One, the CA was a richer and more appropriate framework for evaluating human well-
being because it underscored the position that well-being was multidimensional and as such, it 
provided a richer vantage position for assessing well-being. In addition to the fact that it is not 
reductionist, the CA focuses on actual lives or real opportunities available to people, and this 
makes it an attractive framework for evaluating people’s quality of life. My second main objective 
in Chapter Two was to analyse how the CA worked. In Section Four, I joined a host of CA scholars, 
among them Alkire and Srinivasan, in arguing that, in its current form, the CA could not be 
translated smoothly from theory into practice. The main reason for that I took to be the ambiguity 
regarding the nature of capabilities. There was a need to provide concrete guidance as to what 
human well-being (or development) capabilities were. Nussbaum, Alkire and Robeyns among 
others, had responded to this by way of recommending lists of what they deemed central 
capabilities; but the proposed capabilities had not received universal acceptance. My effort from 
Chapter Three to Chapter Five was developing step by step, a clearer conception of these 
capabilities.  
In Chapter Three I began to develop the argument that citizenship was a capability with a view to 
closing the theory-praxis gap of the CA mentioned above. In this regard, my sole aim in this 
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chapter was to develop a coherent, normative conception of citizenship. My first objective was to 
develop an argument in support of liberal citizenship, both because the CA is generally founded 
on liberal theory, while the social component of liberal citizenship is relevant for understanding 
the social component of capabilities (developed in Chapter Five). Secondly, I argued that 
citizenship should be understood in terms of rights, and if understood that way, it would only be 
possible to talk about citizenship in relation to a state that was limited in its extent. I also made a 
distinction between citizenship rights, which I deemed to be a special form of rights, and universal 
human rights, and in arguing that way, I laid foundation for my argument that such (citizenship) 
rights were intimately connected to human well-being capabilities.  
My task in Chapter Four was to justify why I chose to use the capability approach rather than the 
human rights approach for conceptualising well-being. My justification for adopting the capability 
approach was based on demonstrating that the concept of universal human rights upon which the 
human rights approach sat was fraught with controversial conceptual issues – among them, 
whether human rights are natural or proto-legal, and also some issues about which rights should 
count as genuine human rights. I therefore argued that, although the human rights approach to 
well-being had been successful in its own right, it faced significant practical and conceptual 
challenges that the CA went a long way towards resolving. Admittedly, CA and the human rights 
approach share a common motivation in the matter of human freedoms and human dignity, but the 
former approach avoids certain conceptual problems that affect the latter. In this regard, I 
demonstrated how the capability approach helped in addressing some of the important ethical 
debates about human rights. Other important conclusions made in this chapter in support of my 
thesis included the conclusion that human rights required political society for them to be secured, 
regardless of whether human rights were deemed pre-political or not.. In addition, I demonstrated 
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that Sen and Nussbaum gave social and economic rights the same ranking as civil and political 
rights, and that they were correct in doing so. 
Chapter Five, the last of the five chapters, had one main objective: to synthesize all elements of 
the dissertation, and demonstrate, with the aid of examples and a case study, the thesis that 
citizenship, both as a status and a bundle of rights was an architectonic human well-being 
capability. By this I meant that citizenship as a status was the fundamental capability, what I 
referred to as “the capability to other capabilities”. The demonstration took place in two related 
steps. Firstly, I demonstrated that previously listed capabilities by influential CA theorists such as 
Sen and Robeyns were essentially citizenship rights even though these theorists did not specifically 
refer to their capabilities as such. With this demonstration, I made it clear that taking citizenship 
as capability was not an entirely new idea but rather, to some degree the elucidation or (loosely) 
the formalisation of an already existing idea. Secondly, I used gender inequality as a practical 
example of the usefulness of my thesis. I demonstrated in practical terms that attaining citizenship 
was akin to attaining some important well-being capabilities, and this meant that accommodating 
previously excluded groups was at the same time part of the process of expanding the catchment 
area of human well-being. Another important conclusion to emerge from Chapter Five was that 
individual states were by and large responsible for the well-being of their members. State laws and 
policies in place determined whether a particular society was egalitarian or was fraught with 
inequalities and discrimination. In short, it was the state that was the duty bearer in ensuring the 
maintenance of a society in which members had as far as feasible equal capabilities or 
opportunities.  
In conclusion, the overall motivation for this research was to demonstrate the importance of 
citizenship to human well-being or human flourishing. It is worthwhile to remember that 
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citizenship is not something that can be denied to individuals without harming many aspects of 
their well-being. As I have argued in this dissertation, there are several ways in which people can 
be denied citizenship. There are those that are completely shut out from legal citizenship – those 
who are labelled “illegals”, who have to evade law enforcement on a daily basis. Experience has 
shown that, in most societies, those that are labelled illegal find it very difficult to regularize or 
formalize their membership. Without protection of the state these people suffer a myriad of 
problems and are usually suspected of committing all sorts of crimes. However, I have also 
demonstrated that the distinction between immigrants without legal status and native-born citizens 
is not at all as clear-cut. In many political societies there are those who have legal “citizenship” 
but who are lacking in equality and full recognition. Within some borders, women, people of 
colour, and religious and ethnic minorities, etc., find themselves in this category. Such people are 
psychologically tortured and their political, civil and social capabilities immensely compromised. 
This dissertation is therefore an appeal for full state protection for all, which necessarily means 
equal citizenship for all. Citizenship is indispensable because it is an architectonic capability, or a 
necessary condition for human well-being.   
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